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Abstract
This thesis develops equilibrium models, and studies the effects of market frictions on risk-
sharing, derivatives pricing, and trading patterns.
In the chapter titled “Imbalance-Based Option Pricing”, I develop an equilibrium model of
fragmented options markets in which option prices and bid-ask spreads are determined by
the nonlinear risk imbalance between dealers and customers. In my model, dealers optimally
exploit their market power and charge higher spreads for deep out-of-the-money (OTM)
options, leading to an endogenous skew in both prices and spreads. In stark contrast to
theories of price pressure in option markets, I show how wealth effects can make customers’
net demand for options be negatively correlated with option prices. Under natural conditions,
the skewness risk premium is positively correlated with the variance risk premium, consistent
with the data.
In the chapter titled “The Demand for Commodity Options”, we develop a simple equilibrium
model in which commercial hedgers, i.e., producers and consumers, use commodity options
and futures to hedge price and quantity risk. We derive an explicit relationship between
expected futures returns and the hedgers’ demand for out-of-the-money options, and show
that the demand for both calls and puts are positively related to expected returns, and the
relationship is asymmetric, tilted towards puts. We test and conﬁrm the model predictions
empirically using the commitment of traders report from CFTC.
In the chapter titled “Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange”, we model
a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading platform
with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor’s order
is informative about the asset’s payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor use
this information in the interdealer market. Increasing the number of contacted dealers lowers
markups through competition but increases the dealers’ costs of providing the asset through
information leakage. We then compare a centralized market in which investors can trade
among themselves in a central limit order book to a market in which investors have to use the
electronic platform to trade the asset. With imperfect competition among dealers, investor
welfare is higher in the centralized market if private values are strongly dispersed or if the
mass of investors is large.
Key words: Market Structure; Market Power; Risk Imbalance; Hedging Pressure; Option
Liquidity; Risk Premia; Information Leakage
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Résumé
Cette thèse développe des modèles d’équilibre et étudie les effets des frictions de marché sur
les structures de prix et d’échange des produits dérivés.
Dans le chapitre intitulé «Valorisation d’options basée sur les déséquilibres», je développe
un modèle d’équilibre des marchés d’options fragmentées dans lequel les prix des options et
les écarts entre les cours acheteur et vendeur sont déterminés par le déséquilibre de risque
non linéaire entre les négociants et les clients. Dans mon modèle, les négociants exploitent
de manière optimale leur pouvoir de marché et facturent des spreads plus élevés pour des
options hors la monnaie (HLM), ce qui entraîne une distorsion endogène des prix et des
spreads. À l’opposé des théories de la pression sur les prix sur les marchés d’options, je montre
comment les effets de richesse peuvent faire en sorte que la demande nette d’options des
consommateurs soit corrélée négativement avec les prix des options. Dans des conditions
naturelles, la prime de risque d’asymétrie est positivement corrélée avec la prime de risque de
variance, en adéquation avec les données.
Dans le chapitre intitulé «La demande d’options sur matières premières», nous développons
un modèle d’équilibre simple dans lequel les sociétés de couverture commerciales, c’est-à-dire
les producteurs et les consommateurs, utilisent des options sur matières premières et des
contrats à terme aﬁn de s’assurer contre les risques de prix et de quantité. Nous établissons
une relation explicite entre les rendements futurs attendus et la demande des sociétés de
couverture pour les options hors la monnaie. Nous montrons que la demande pour les options
d’achat et les options de vente est positivement liée aux rendements attendus, et la relation
est asymétrique, orientée vers les options de vente. Nous testons et conﬁrmons les prédictions
du modèle de manière empirique en utilisant une importante base de données d’opérations
et de cours d’options sur des matières premières.
Dans le chapitre intitulé «La négociation électronique dans les marchés de gré à gré vs. les
marchés centralisés», nous modélisons une structure de marché à deux niveaux dans laquelle
un investisseur peut négocier un actif sur une plateforme de négociation avec un ensemble de
courtiers qui ont accès à un marché intercourtiers. L’ordre de l’investisseur est instructif sur
le gain de l’actif et les courtiers contactés par l’investisseur utilisent cette information sur le
marché intercourtiers. Augmenter le nombre de courtiers contactés réduit les majorations de
prix en raison de la concurrence accrue, mais augmente les coûts des courtiers pour fournir
l’actif en raison de fuites d’informations. Nous comparons ensuite un marché centralisé
dans lequel les investisseurs peuvent négocier entre eux au moyen d’un carnet d’ordres de
bourse à cours limités à un marché dans lequel les investisseurs doivent utiliser la plate-
vii
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forme électronique pour négocier l’actif. En présence d’une concurrence imparfaite entre
les courtiers, le bien-être des investisseurs est plus important sur le marché centralisé si les
valeurs privées sont fortement dispersées ou si la masse des investisseurs est importante.
Mots clés : Structure de Marché; Pouvoir de Marché; Déséquilibre des Risques; Pression de
Couverture ; Option de Liquidité ; Primes de Risque; Fuite d’Informations
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Introduction
Options play a fundamental role in the functioning of modern ﬁnancial markets. Jumps, trad-
ing costs, and stochastic volatility are among many factors that make options non-redundant
and attractive vehicles for spanning risks. Despite many options are traded on exchange, the
market structure is highly fragmented and has a pronounced two-tiered structure, whereby
dealers trade with customers in the dealer-to-customer (D2C) segment and then rebalance
their inventories with each other in the dealer-to-dealer (D2D) segment.
In light of these facts, in the ﬁrst chapter I develop an equilibrium model of fragmented options
markets in which option prices and bid-ask spreads are determined by the nonlinear risk
imbalance between dealers and customers. Consequently, option prices in my model consists
of three parts: compensation for the fundamental risk, compensation for dealers’ inventory
risk which arises endogenously due to distorted risk sharing, and markups customers pay
to dealers. The latter two are speciﬁc to my model and can play a role in resolving the main
empirical puzzles in option pricing and trading patterns.
In the second chapter, we try to understand the origin of non-linear endowment risks in
commodity markets. To this end, we develop a simple, two period general equilibrium model
populated by three types of agents: commodity producers, commodity consumers, and
speculators. We assume that, in addition to price risk, producers face quantity risk: In this
case, options become necessary to hedge the endowment risk, and producers may in fact
ﬁnd it optimal to take a long position in the futures contract, and expected futures returns are
positive if and only if price risk is larger than quantity risk.
Many derivatives contracts are traded in a two-tiered market structure, despite the fact that
dealers can have market power, and that state prices and risk-sharing in the economy are
distorted. In the third chapter, we build an equilibrium model to show that investors prefer
to trade in such a two-tiered market structure when they are concerned about information
leakage.
1

1 Imbalance-Based Option Pricing
Yuan Zhang1
1 – EPFL and Swiss Finance Institute
I develop an equilibrium model of fragmented options markets in which option prices and bid-
ask spreads are determined by the nonlinear risk imbalance between dealers and customers.
In my model, dealers optimally exploit their market power and charge higher spreads for deep
out-of-the-money (OTM) options, leading to an endogenous skew in both prices and spreads.
In stark contrast to theories of price pressure in option markets, I show how wealth effects can
make customers’ net demand for options be negatively correlated with option prices. Under
natural conditions, the skewness risk premium is positively correlated with the variance risk
premium, consistent with the data.
1.1 Introduction
Options play a fundamental role in the functioning of modern ﬁnancial markets. Jumps,
trading costs, and stochastic volatility are among many factors 1 that make options non-
redundant and attractive vehicles for spanning risks. In addition to the fundamental risk
factors, agents’ exposure on each possible future state may as well be nonlinear, resulting in
another source of option demand. 2 This extra demand has no effect on equilibrium option
prices in the absence of trading frictions.
However, despite many options are traded on exchange, the market structure is highly frag-
mented and has a pronounced two-tiered structure, whereby dealers trade with customers in
1Jumps refer to discontinuous price movements; trading costs refer to transaction fees and ﬁnancing/short-
selling constraints; stochastic volatility refers to the randomness in the range of price movements.
2For instance, the advancement of new technology may on average improve the performance of the stock
market but can have adverse effects on those industries being replaced (think of the idiosyncratic income shock in
Constantinides and Dufﬁe [1996]).
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the dealer-to-customer (D2C) segment and then rebalance their inventories with each other
in the dealer-to-dealer (D2D) segment. 3
In light of these facts, I develop an equilibrium model of fragmented options markets in which
option prices and bid-ask spreads are determined by the nonlinear risk imbalance between
dealers and customers. I show that dealers optimally exploit their market power and charge
higher spreads for deep out-of-the-money (OTM) options, leading to an endogenous skew
in both prices and spreads. Consequently, option prices in my model consists of three parts:
compensation for the fundamental risk, compensation for dealers’ inventory risk which arises
endogenously due to distorted risk sharing, and markups customers pay to dealers. The latter
two are speciﬁc to my model and can play a role in resolving the main empirical puzzles in
option pricing and trading patterns.
My model works as follows. There are two trading rounds: A round of D2C trade is followed
by a round of D2D trade. The D2D trade happens in a centralized exchange, while the D2C
trade is an outcome of bilateral bargaining. In the D2C round, each of the dealers is randomly
assigned a customer and the two share nonlinear endowment risk by bargaining on option
prices across all strikes. The bargaining outcome depends on the rational expectations of
both dealers and customers regarding the future equilibrium prices in the D2D trade. Because
markets in the D2D round are complete, its prices are determined by the total inventories
that the dealers accumulate from trading with customers. This trading process determines a
ﬁxed point system for equilibrium prices in both trading rounds. I show explicitly how the
distribution of the nonlinear risk enters into the pricing kernels for all exchanges.
The Black-Scholes formula is acknowledged to be consistent with equilibrium in a frictionless
market if all agents have the same constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and the
aggregate endowment is log-normal. I show that this result still holds when dealers’ bargaining
power is zero: In fact, in this case, equilibrium in my model always coincides with that in the
frictionless model. However, this result breaks down as soon as dealers have some market
power. Thus, customers are not able to trade at the D2D option prices and, hence, efﬁcient
risk sharing between dealers and customers is not feasible. This market power effect then
leads to a pecuniary externality: Dealers do not internalize the impact that their market power
has on the total inventories of the dealers’ population; the latter determines the total risk to be
shared in the D2D trade and hence its pricing kernel.
3I use the word “dealers" to denote option-trading specialists, designated market makers, members of a multi-
dealer platform, or any entity that has direct access to option markets; “customers" refers to anyone who uses
options but cannot access the markets directly and has to trade with dealers. For customers who trade options on
exchange, (i) large orders (e.g., block trade), complex orders (e.g., trade involving multiple strikes), and orders with
non-standard strike/maturity are often negotiated privately with dealers before execution on the exchange; (ii)
in the US, 15 options exchanges at the moment make sourcing and providing liquidity extremely difﬁcult, and
(iii) retail orders are usually aggregated and internalized by brokers. Moreover, many options are also traded over-
the-counter, for example, Back for International Settlements (BIS) reports that the notional amount outstanding
for equity-linked options is $ 3,987 billion and for commodity options is $ 378 billion for the ﬁrst-half of 2017
(Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics).
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My model can generate the skew in both the percentage bid-ask spreads (measured in $ terms),
and the implied volatility (IV) curve. Speciﬁcally, the spreads for out-of-the-money options
are larger than those for at-the-money options, and the implied volatilities for OTM puts are
higher than those for OTM calls (e.g., equity index options). To understand this, I consider
a customer endowed with short positions in options, trades in an almost competitive D2C
exchange. With little market power, his dealer, in response to the buying demand, optimally
quotes a D2C pricing kernel that is the sum of a mean-preserving spread and the D2D pricing
kernel. This D2C trade results in the out-of-the-money option prices to increase more than
the prices of at-the-money options, as the former loads more on the tails of the pricing kernel.
For customers endowed with long positions in options, the opposite happens (i.e., out-of-
the-money option prices decrease more than the prices of at-the-money options). Hence,
dealers’ optimal quoting strategies on the D2C exchanges generate the price wedge between
option buyers and option sellers, resulting in higher spreads for out-of-the-money options
than at-the-money options. Further, the IV smile derived from the average option prices
across D2C exchanges (‘mid’ prices) is skewed to the left and the variance risk premium 4 is
positive if customers’ net buy of options is positive and skewed to the left (i.e., buying more
OTM puts than calls).
A well-known puzzle in the literature on demand-based option pricing 5 is that in recent
years customers’ net buy of options has become negatively correlated with the variance risk
premium (Chen et al., forthcoming;Constantinides and Lian, 2015), which is in stark contrast
to the earlier observations in Gârleanu et al. [2009]. In this paper, I use the Open/Close dataset
from the largest three US options exchanges 6 to construct customers’ net option demand
for liquid exchange-traded fund (ETF) options and show that this demand is often negatively
correlated with the corresponding variance risk premium, conﬁrming the puzzle. In addition,
I document another puzzling observation: The relation between the downside risk 7 and the
variance risk implied from options data is often positive, despite a negative relation implied
from historical underlying returns.
My model can address both puzzles. For the ﬁrst puzzle, because of the wealth effect, when
dealers’ net worth drops, their effective risk aversion rises, increasing their incentive to smooth
consumption. As a result, dealers ﬁnd it optimal to give price concessions to customers, in-
ducing the latter to take more risk off dealers’ balance sheets. This active hedging activity by
dealers explains the ﬁrst puzzle. For the second puzzle, in my model, in addition to the funda-
mental risk factors, the option prices 8 are affected by the distribution of the nonlinear risk
4The variance risk premium is deﬁned as the difference between the risk-neutral variance and the physical
variance.
5Bollen andWhaley [2004] ﬁnd that changes in implied volatility are correlatedwith option order-ﬂow imbalance.
Gârleanu et al. [2009] provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence to demonstrate the importance of
customers’ option demand in determining option prices (the level and the skew). Fournier and Jacobs [2016] show
that dealers’ inventory and wealth matter.
6Speciﬁcally, the Chicago Board of Option Exchange (CBOE), the NASDAQ Philadelphia Option Exchange
(PHLX), and the International Stock Exchange (ISE).
7Downside risk is measured as the risk-neutral skewness.
8The volume-weighted average equilibrium D2C option prices, to be more precise.
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between dealers and customers. Intuitively, as dealers are risk-averse, a disaster risk generates
upward price pressure on OTM puts relative to OTM calls. At the same time, customers with
short positions on OTM calls create buying pressure, resulting in downward price pressure on
OTM puts relative to OTM calls. This extra source of option premium due to dealers’ market
power can explain the second puzzle, as long as the occurrence of endowment shocks on the
upside are more frequent than that of the fundamental shock.
On the other hand, the demand pressure theory in Gârleanu et al. [2009] predicts customers’
demand pressure causes option prices to move up, not down. Nevertheless, their model
can potentially explain the second puzzle, as exogenous option demands from customers
may allow changes in option prices due to demand pressure (if the source of the market
incompleteness is chosen carefully), which is different from price changes due to a shift in
physical density. Meanwhile, to explain the ﬁrst puzzle, Chen et al. (forthcoming) argue that
dealers become more risk-averse 9 when the perceived intensity of the disaster risk is high, and
hence, they cannot accommodate the option demand from customers, in turn causing option
prices to increase and option demand to decrease. However, their model cannot explain the
second puzzle as customers’ option demand is tightly linked to the fundamental risk: Indeed,
in their model, in light of a disaster risk, customers buy protection from dealers, pushing up
OTM put prices more relative to OTM call prices while simultaneously increasing the variance
risk premium.
To test the prediction of my model on the second puzzle, I use liquid ETF options. Speciﬁcally,
I show that the cross-sectional difference in the correlation between the risk-neutral variance
and the risk-neutral skewness is explained by the proxy for the shape of the customers’ net
option demand. Moreover, in the time series, the panel regressionwith controls for the physical
skewness shows that the risk-neutral skewness increases with the risk-neutral variance when
the customers’ demand is skewed towards the OTM call options.
1.1.1 Related Literature
My paper is related to several strands of literature.
First, the literature on equilibrium option pricing (cited above) explicitly models changes in
option prices due to supply and/or demand shocks. I contribute to the literature by modeling
a realistic two-tier market structure and showing that my model can explain several puzzles on
option pricing and trading patterns. To this end, I use the approach of Malamud and Schrimpf
[2017] and extend their model to allow for an intermediate bargaining power of the dealers.10
Second, my assumption that customers can only trade options with dealers is closely related
to the proliferating literature on intermediary-based asset pricing. Bernanke and Gertler
9To also capture the notion of constrained dealers, Constantinides and Lian [2015] specify a Value-at-Risk
constraint for risk-neutral dealers.
10In contrast to my paper, Malamud and Schrimpf [2017] have a dynamic model, but they assume that dealers
have monopoly power and use their model to study monetary policy pass-through.
6
1.1. Introduction
[1989] and Moore and Kiyotaki [1997] highlight the importance of intermediation frictions
in determining equilibrium prices. Subsequently, the ﬁnancial frictions are micro-founded
as limits-to-arbitrage [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Gromb and Vayanos, 2002], collateral con-
straints [Geanakoplos, 2010], Value-at-Risk constraints [Adrian and Shin, 2010, Adrian and
Boyarchenko, 2012, Danielsson et al., 2012, Etula, 2013, Constantinides and Lian, 2015], equity
ﬁnancing constraints [Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014, He and Krishnamurthy, 2013, He
et al., 2017], and margin constraints [Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009], among others. I
recognize the importance of the limited risk-bearing capacity of dealers and model risk-averse
dealers with market power. My assumption on nonlinear endowments is in the spirit of
Constantinides and Dufﬁe [1996] and Franke et al. [1998]; that is, the nonlinear risks render
options non-redundant 11. My assumption on fragmented markets 12 is borrowed from the
literature on over-the-counter markets [e.g., Dufﬁe et al., 2005, 2015, Atkeson et al., 2015, Mala-
mud and Schrimpf, 2017]; that is, markets are fragmented and local prices are determined
by bilateral bargaining. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the ﬁrst to incorporate
these assumptions into an equilibrium option pricing model and show that they are indeed
necessary to explain the main empirical puzzles in option pricing and trading patterns.13
Third, the literature on market microstructure identiﬁes the following determinants of bid-ask
spreads: dealers’ inventory [Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, Ho and Stoll, 1983], asymmetric
information [Copeland and Galai, 1983, Kyle, 1985, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Easley and
O’Hara, 1987], and operation costs, among others. I further complement the literature by
showing options spreads across strikes are non-trivially determined by customers’ option
demand and dealers’ market power. The predictions are consistent with the empirical evi-
dence, including George and Longstaff [1993], Cho and Engle [1999], and De Fontnouvelle
et al. [2003].
Fourth, option prices imply a skewed and fat-tailed risk-neutral distribution for the underlying
returns [Buraschi and Jackwerth, 2001, Bakshi et al., 2003]. According to Bates [2003], the
literature on no-arbitrage option pricing models [e.g., Merton, 1976, Heston, 1993, Bates,
1996] does not fully capture the empirical properties of option prices. Another strand of
literature speciﬁes unspanned risk factors in representative agent models to generate fat-tailed
risk-neutral distribution [e.g., Bollerslev et al., 2009, Drechsler and Yaron, 2011, Drechsler,
2013, Bekaert and Engstrom, 2017]. I take a different approach by showing how an implied
volatility skew emerges naturally when customers with nonlinear endowments trade with
non-competitive dealers.
Fifth, the literature on information content of options prices and trades contains documented
11Options are also non-redundant if agents have heterogeneous utilities [Bates, 2008, Baker and Routledge, 2016]
or heterogeneous beliefs [Liu et al., 2005, Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006].
12Papers that have also assumed market fragmentation but with different trading protocols include Basak and
Cuoco [1998], Edmond and Weill [2012], and Goldstein et al. [2014]. For endogenous market fragmentation, see
Alvarez et al. [2002] and Babus and Parlatore [2017].
13While Malamud and Schrimpf [2017] also have fragmented markets and state-contingent claims traded in
their model, they do not study option pricing and do not have non-linear endowments’ imbalance.
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empirical evidence. On the information content of option prices, Bollerslev et al. [2009] show
that variance risk premium (VRP) derived from S&P 500 index options predicts equity market
returns, Trolle and Schwartz [2010] show that crude oil and natural gas returns are correlated
with the contemporaneous VRP computed from their respective option prices, Trolle and
Schwartz [2014] show that VRP and skewness risk premium are correlated with changes in the
yield curve. On the information content of option trades, Chen et al. (forthcoming) show that
customers’ net buy of put options is negatively correlated with next-period S&P 500 returns
as well as returns on other asset classes, Bollen and Whaley [2004], Cremers et al. [2015], Hu
[2014], Muravyev [2016], and Malamud et al. [2017] show that the option order-imbalance
measure is correlated with option premium and/or underlying returns, Pan and Poteshman
[2006a] show that the put-call ratio is correlated with next-period single equity returns, Roll
et al. [2010a, 2014] and Ge et al. [2015] show that the ratio between option volume and stock
volume (O/S) is correlated with future equity volatility and returns. I further contribute to the
literature by building a model and providing an explicit formula that extracts physical density
of the underlying asset from the customers’ net option demand and the option bid-ask quotes.
1.2 A Model of Fragmented Options Markets
I consider an economy with two rounds of trading and three time periods t = 0−,0+,1. At time
t = 1, the state of the world, X ∼ P (X ), is realized, and consumption takes place.
1.2.1 Market Structure
Markets are fragmented. Time 0− is the D2C exchanges trading round: At this time, each
dealer is randomly matched with a customer14 and they trade contingent claims following a
bargaining protocol described below. Time 0+ is the D2D trading round: In this round, dealers
trade with each other in a competitive, centralized inter-dealer market. In both rounds, agents
trade derivatives, contingent on the realization of X . In addition, I assume that customers
have access to the centralized market for trading the security with payoff X at time t = 1. I use
s to denote the price of this security, and I normalize its supply to 1. In addition, all agents can
trade a risk-free bond maturing at t = 1. The bond has an exogenous interest rate r and is in
zero net supply.
Formally, my assumptions imply that there is a continuum of fragmented markets: a con-
tinuum of bilateral D2C exchanges 15, indexed by a pair (i , j ) and a single D2D exchange.
Throughout this paper, the following assumption is always present:
14Such market structures are frequently used in modeling decentralized trade [e.g., Dufﬁe et al., 2005, 2015,
Atkeson et al., 2015, Malamud and Schrimpf, 2017]. My model can be extended to allow for simultaneous trading
with multiple customers (e.g., an over-the-counter (OTC) trading hub) or for trading with multiple dealers (order
splitting). The bilateral trade assumption can be viewed as a reduced form of modeling aggregate customer orders.
15In practice, the continuum of D2C exchanges are exempliﬁed by the large amount of order-ﬂows from the
customers if the options are exchange-traded, or by the over-the-counter trading desks of dealers if the options are
OTC-traded.
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Assumption 1. In each exchange, markets are complete: Agents have access to a set of securities
(e.g., options with a continuum of strikes) that spans the entire range of X , and there is no
arbitrage in either trading rounds.
From the fundamental theorem of asset pricing [see, e.g., Dybvig and Ross, 2003], no arbitrage
in either exchange implies the existence of exchange-speciﬁc, positive state prices; that is,
prices of Arrow Debreu contingent claims, M D2C(i,j) or M
D2D paying one unit of consumption good
in state X and nothing in any other states. Since, by assumption, markets are complete, these
state prices are unique. The exchange-speciﬁc price of an asset paying W (X ) at t = 1 is then
given by the following:
E [M D2C(i,j) (X )W (X )] or E [M
D2D(X )W (X )] .
Given the risk-free rate r , equilibrium state prices must also satisfy the no-arbitrage condition:
E [M D2C(i,j) (X )] = E [M D2D(X )] = e−r .
Similarly, since all agents can trade the underlying, the following no-arbitrage condition
should hold in all exchanges:
E [M D2C(i,j) (X )X ] = E [M D2D(X )X ] = s .
1.2.2 Agents’ Preferences and Endowments
The economy is populated by a continuum of dealers (indexed by j ∈ [0,1]) and a continuum
of customers (indexed by i ∈ [0,1]).
For simplicity 16, I assume that all agents in the economy share the same utility functionU
deﬁned on an interval (X,+∞) with some X≥−∞, satisfying the standard Inada conditions
U ′(X)=+∞, U ′(+∞)= 0. Each agent a = i , j is initially endowed with a portfolio of options,
represented by a nonlinear function Fa(X ), a = i , j ∈ [0,1]. I assume that the agents’ option
endowments net out, so that X represents the payoff of the “market portfolio". Formally, I
make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.
X =
∫1
0
F Dj (X )d j +
∫1
0
F Ci (X )di .
16This is to remove the effects of heterogeneous risk-aversion on the pricing kernel.
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1.2.3 Agents’ Outside Options
Absent the D2C trading, customers can only trade X and the risk-free bond, and their indirect
utility is given by
ν¯i ≡ max
βi
E [U (F Ci (X )+βi (X − ser ))] . (1.1)
In contrast to customers, a dealer j has access to complete markets and hence he can attain
an arbitrary consumption proﬁle C j (X ) satisfying the budget constraint
E [M D2D(X )C j (X )] = E [M D2D(X )F Dj (X )].
Denoting Gj (X )=C j (X )−F Dj (X ), we can rewrite dealer j ’s indirect utility as
ν¯ j ≡ max
Gj
{E [U (F Dj (X )+Gj (X ))] : E [M D2D(X )Gj (X )]= 0} . (1.2)
These indirect utilities will play an important role in the subsequent analysis because they
deﬁne agents’ outside options in the D2C trading round. Hereafter, when no confusion arises,
I will omit X for brevity and use a capital letter to denote any state-dependent function; for
example, M D2D(X ) becomes M D2D.
1.2.4 Trading Protocols
In the D2C trading round, agents i and j bargain over prices of all state-contingent claims
written on X . As an outcome of this bargaining, dealer j quotes a kernel M D2C(i,j) that encodes
the prices of all possible state-contingent claims. The quote is binding: The dealer commits
to buy/sell contingent claims at the quoted prices in arbitrary quantities. Given such a
kernel, customer i submits his or her demand schedule G(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) ) to dealer j . Without loss of
generality, I assume that G(i,j) satisﬁes E [M D2C(i,j) G(i,j)]= 0.17
Observing the kernel M D2C(i,j) , customer i submits the optimal demand schedule G
∗
(i,j)(M
D2C
(i,j) ) as
the solution of
ν(i,j)[M
D2C
(i,j) ] ≡ max
G(i,j)
{E [U (F Ci +G(i,j))] : E [M D2C(i,j) G(i,j)]= 0} . (1.3)
This in turn determines dealer j ’s indirect utility after optimally hedging the total exposure
(i.e.,the D2C inventories and the endowments) in the D2D exchange:
ν(j,i)[M
D2C
(i,j) ] ≡ max
G(j,i)
{E [U (F Dj −G∗(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) )+G(j,i))] : E [M D2DG(j,i)]= 0} , (1.4)
17Indeed, if an agent chooses a claim C and transfers E [MD2C(i,j) C ] to the dealer, this is equivalent to buying
G =C −E [MD2C(i,j) C ] from the dealer, with E [MD2C(i,j) G]= 0.
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by choosing his optimal demand schedule G∗(j,i)(M D2C(i,j) ).
Given dealer j ’s bargaining power θ, the pair bargain and choose the pricing kernel that solves
a version of the Nash bargaining problem, that is, maximizing the weighted surplus from
trade, 18
max
MD2C(i,j)
(1−θ) log(ν(i,j)[M D2C(i,j) ]− ν¯i )+θ log(ν(j,i)[M D2C(i,j) ]− ν¯ j ) , (1.5)
subject to the no-arbitrage constraints
0= E [M D2C(i,j) X ]−E [M D2DX ] , (1.6)
0= E [M D2C(i,j) ]−E [M D2D] . (1.7)
Note that when dealers’ bargaining power θ 	= 0, the participation constraints ν(i,j) ≥ ν¯i and
ν(j,i) ≥ ν¯ j never binds: Indeed, by the no-arbitrage condition, at any prices offered by the dealer,
the customer can still decide to just trade the risky asset and the risk-free bond and, hence,
reach his autarky utility. Formally,
Lemma 1. In a fragmented equilibrium, customers’ participation constraints never bind, while
dealers’ participation constraints bind only for those D2C exchanges that are competitive.
1.2.5 Equilibrium
I denote by E (P,r, {Fa}a=i , j ,U ,θ) the primitives of the economy. A fragmented equilibrium of
the economy E is a pricing kernel M D2D and a continuum of D2C pricing kernels M D2C(i,j) , as well
as a set of trading strategies {G∗(i,j),G∗(j,i),β∗i ,G¯(j,i)} such that given M
D2C
(i,j) and M
D2D,
• G∗(i,j) maximizes customer i ’s utility in (1.3),
• G∗(j,i) maximizes dealer j ’s utility in (1.4) conditional on the customer’s demand schedule
G∗(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) ) as a function of the quoted pricing kernel M D2C(i,j) ,
• β∗i maximizes customer i ’s autarky utility in (1.1),
• G¯(j,i) maximizes dealer j ’s autarky utility in (1.2),
• M D2C(i,j) maximizes the Nash bargaining protocol (1.5) given constraints (1.6), (1.7),
• the D2D market clears, 0=∫[0,1]2 G∗(j,i)did j .
18The trading protocol is standard in the literature on OTC markets [see e.g., Dufﬁe et al., 2005, Malamud and
Schrimpf, 2017]. Other trading protocol will deliver qualitatively similar results, for example, demand schedule
game as in Kyle [1989]. In Appendix A.1, I use the uncertainty of getting a competitive execution in a two-stage
trading game to micro-found the trading protocol.
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1.3 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes the fragmented equilibrium. I ﬁrst establish a benchmark equilib-
rium that features a centralized exchange for all agents to trade contingent claims. Then I
compare the fragmented equilibrium to the centralized competitive equilibrium.
1.3.1 Economy without Frictions: Centralized Exchange
Suppose there are no D2C exchanges and all dealers and customers can trade in a centralized
exchange; then there exists a unique pricing kernel M that prices all contingent claims. Under
this kernel, any agent, a = i , j , chooses a demand schedule Ga that solves
max
Ga
{E [U (Ga +Fa)] : 0= E [MGa]} .
The Lagrangian for this problem is
E [U (Ga +Fa)]−λaE [MGa] ,
where λa is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to Ga yields
U ′(G∗a +Fa) = λaM .
For ease of representation, I denote the inverse of functionU ′(·) as J (·) and solve for G∗a .
Lemma 2. In a centralized exchange, the optimal demand schedule G∗a for each agent a = i , j ,
satisﬁes
G∗a (M) = J (λaM)−Fa ,
and the Lagrange multiplier is given by the budget constraint E [MJ (λaM)]= E [MFa] .
It is then obvious that agent a’s optimal consumption plan J(λaM) depends only on the
pricing kernel M and his own Lagrange multiplier. As options are in zero-net supply, all agents’
demand schedules sum up to zero for any realized state of the world,
0 =
∫1
0
G∗i (M)di +
∫1
0
G∗j (M)d j .
Then according to assumption 2, I obtain the market clearing condition
X =
∫1
0
J (λi M)di +
∫1
0
J (λ j M)d j ,
after substituting in agents’ optimal demand schedules.
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Throughout the paper, I use the Black-Scholes formula as a benchmark to evaluate the effects
of nonlinear risk imbalance and dealers’ market power on option prices. To this end, I always
use the following assumption in the comparative statics analysis as well as in simulations.
Assumption 3. I assume all agents have the same CRRA utility function,
U (X ) = X
1−γ
1−γ .
The state of the world X is log-normally distributed with density P (X )∼ lognormal(μ,σ2).
I use Q to denote the risk neutral measure with the density er MP ; and EQ to denote the
corresponding expectation. I use mP1 = E [logX ], mQ1 = EQ[logX ] and
mPi ≡ E [(logX −mP1 )i ], mQi ≡ EQ[(logX −m
Q
1 )
i ], i > 1
to denote the moments of logX under the two measures. The following lemma is well known
[see e.g., Rubinstein, 1976] and shows that, under log normality and CRRA preferences, option
prices are given by the Black-Scholes formula.
Lemma 3. Under assumption 3, a competitive equilibrium features a unique pricing kernel
M = e−r X
−1/γ
E [X−1/γ]
,
and all options are priced by the Black-Scholes formula. In particular, the implied volatility
curve is ﬂat across strikes, there is no variance risk premium as mQ2 =mP2 =σ2, and there is no
skewness risk premium as mQ3 =mP3 = 0.
1.3.2 Economy with Frictions
At the D2C trading round, the Lagrangian for customer i ’s optimization problem (1.3) is
E [U (G(i,j)+F Ci )]−λ(i,j)E [M D2C(i,j) G(i,j)],
where λ(i,j) is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. This is the same problem as in
Lemma 2, except the pricing kernel is now exchange-speciﬁc. Therefore, customer i ’s optimal
demand schedule is G∗(i,j) = J (λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )−F Ci , a function of the pricing kernel M D2C(i,j) . In addition,
the Lagrange multiplier is determined by the budget constraint
0 = E [M D2C(i,j) G∗(i,j)] . (1.8)
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After trading, customer i ’s optimal consumption plan is J(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )=G∗(i,j) +F Ci , which then
determines the indirect utility,
ν(i,j)[M
D2C
(i,j) ] = E [U (J (λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) ))]. (1.9)
At the D2D trading round, the Lagrangian for dealer j ’s optimization problem (1.4) is
E [U (G(j,i)+F Dj −G∗(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) ))]−λ(j,i)E [M D2DG(j,i)],
where again λ(j,i) is the Lagrange multiplier. This is similar to Lemma 2, except that dealer
j faces the D2D pricing kernel and his or her total exposure consists of two parts, the en-
dowments and the inventories from D2C trading round. The optimal demand schedule is
G∗(j,i) = J (λ(j,i)M D2D)−F Dj +G∗(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) ), where λ(j,i) is determined by
0 = E [M D2DG∗(j,i)] . (1.10)
Given the optimal consumption plan J (λ(j,i)M D2D), I can write dealer j ’s indirect utility as
ν(j,i)[M
D2C
(i,j) ] = E [U (J (λ(j,i)M D2D))] . (1.11)
Proposition 1. The fragmented equilibrium is unique and coincides with the centralized com-
petitive equilibrium if all D2C exchanges are competitive; that is, the bargaining power θ = 0.
In a competitive D2C exchange, the dealer cannot charge any markup on the D2C pricing
kernel and hence earns zero proﬁt. Therefore, when all D2C exchanges are competitive, dealers
essentially become agency brokers, and the allocation of risk is efﬁcient. As long as the outside
options are well deﬁned, such equilibrium exists. From now on, the competitive equilibrium
refers to either the centralized equilibrium or the fragmented equilibrium with θ = 0.
Having established the benchmark, I now solve the generic D2C Nash bargaining problem
(1.5). Its Lagrangian is
(1−θ) log(ν(i,j)[M D2C(i,j) ]− ν¯i )+θ log(ν(j,i)[M D2C(i,j) ]− ν¯ j )
−μ(i,j),s(E [M D2C(i,j) X ]− s)−μ(i,j),r
(
E [M D2C(i,j) ]−e−r
)
.
The second line consists of the no-arbitrage constraint for the risky asset (1.6) and that for
the risk-free bond (1.7), where μ(i,j),s and μ(i,j),r are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. I
differentiate the Lagrangian function with respect to the D2C pricing kernel to get
0 = (ν(i,j)− ν¯i )−1(1−θ)
δν(i,j)[M D2C(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
+ (ν(j,i)− ν¯ j )−1θ
δν(j,i)[M D2C(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
−μ(i,j),sPX −μ(i,j),rP .
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Then for θ ∈ (0,1], I deﬁne
π(i,j) ≡
λ(i,j)
λ(j,i)
1−θ
θ
ν(j,i)− ν¯ j
ν(i,j)− ν¯i
.
The ﬁrst-order condition can be rewritten as 19
0 = π(i,j)
δν(i,j)[M D2C(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
+ δν(j,i)[M
D2C
(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
−μ(i,j),sPX −μ(i,j),rP . (1.12)
π(i,j) is an endogenous variable measuring the competitiveness of the D2C exchange (1−π(i,j)
measures the dealer’s market power). Indeed, when θ goes to zero, π(i,j) converges to one and
the D2C exchange becomes fully competitive. On the other hand, when θ = 1, π(i,j) becomes
zero, and the D2C exchange becomes monopolistic. Formally,
Lemma 4. The endogenous variable π(i,j) lies in the unit interval [0,1] and corresponds one-to-
one to the exchange-speciﬁc bargaining parameter θ(i,j).
In the above Lemma, I have relaxed the D2C Nash bargaining problem by introducing an
exchange-speciﬁc bargaining power θ(i,j). Due to the one-to-one mapping between θ(i,j) and π(i,j),
I can treat π(i,j) as exogenous and infer the bargaining parameter θ(i,j), as well as other indirect
utilities (1.1), (1.2), (1.9), and (1.11) after computing the equilibrium.
Given the relaxed and simpliﬁed D2C problem, I next compute the functional derivatives for
the pricing kernel M D2C(i,j) in Appendix A.3 and plug them into the relaxed ﬁrst-order condition
(1.12) to get
0 = (κ(i,j)−π(i,j))(J (λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )−F Ci )+λ(i,j) J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(κ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) −M D2D)−μ(i,j),sX −μ(i,j),r ,
where κ(i,j) measures the price difference between the D2C and the D2D exchange; it is denoted
as
κ(i,j) ≡
E
[
J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )M D2C(i,j) M D2D
]
E
[
J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(M D2C(i,j) )2
] . (1.13)
Indeed, when the pricing kernel in the D2C exchange equals that in the D2D exchange, κ(i,j) = 1.
Next, to have an explicit expression of the D2C pricing kernel in terms of the D2D pricing
kernel and other endogenous parameters, I assume all the agents have log utility. Then,
substituting D2C pricing kernels into the D2D market clearing condition,
0 =

[0,1]2
G∗(j,i) did j ; (1.14)
I arrive at the following theorem.
19In appendix A.1, I show that this ﬁrst-order condition endogenously arises in a two-stage D2C trading game.
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Theorem 1. Suppose all agents have U (X )= log(X + c) 20. Suppose also that an equilibrium
exists. Then, for each pair (i , j ), the state-by-state D2C pricing kernel is given by
M D2C(i,j) [M
D2D] = 2M D2D
(
π(i,j) +
√
π2(i,j) −4M D2Dλ(i,j)Z(i,j)
)−1
,
where I have deﬁned Z(i,j) ≡−(F Ci +c)(κ(i,j) −π(i,j))−Xμ(i,j),s −μ(i,j),r.
The state-by-state D2D pricing kernel is characterized by a positive real root of a polynomial
equation with order 2NI×J , where NI×J is the number of different dealer-customer pairs (D2C
exchanges).
Taking π(i,j) as given, all other parameters are determined by equations (1.8) (1.13), (1.6), (1.7),
and (1.10), respectively, for each D2C exchange.
Once the relaxed system is solved , I can then determine the indirect utilities and bargaining
powers for all D2C exchanges. Due partly to the nonlinearity of the system that characterizes
the fragmented equilibrium, it is not trivial to provide a general condition such that the
equilibrium exists. However, as long as the endowment function F Ci is such that customer i ’
outside option (1.1) has an interior solution in the competitive equilibrium, then a unique
fragmented equilibrium exists for a certain range of market competitiveness π(i,j) and its local
uniqueness is given by the implicit function theorem.21
1.4 Examples
In this section, I provide numerical examples 22 and use them to show how my model can
generate empirically observed patterns in option prices and trading volume.
1.4.1 Primitives
Table 1.1 reports parameter speciﬁcations used throughout this section. The comparative
statics are derived locally by asymptotic expansion. Speciﬁcally, I consider two cases: (i) when
the D2C exchanges are ‘almost’ competitive and (ii) when the D2C exchanges are monopolistic,
and the size of the nonlinear risks is ‘small’. The local properties for both cases are qualitatively
quite similar. Furthermore, the numerical example shows that the results of local comparative
statics hold well globally.
20The parameter c is the subsistence of the agent and assures that the agents’ outside options are well-deﬁned
and have an interior solution.
21My extensive numerical results suggest that equilibrium is in fact always unique. One can show that the
equilibrium is indeed unique, if dealers are monopolist and either the risky asset or the risk free asset is centrally
traded.
22For details of computation, see appendix A.3.
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Table 1.1 – Primitives of the numerical example.
Variables Values
Agents’ utility U (X )= log(X +c)
Risky asset payoff Lognormal(μ,σ2)
Interest rate 1%
Supply of the risky asset 1
Supply of the risk free asset 0
Supply of nonlinear risk 0
Population of customer S measure 0.5
Population of customer B measure 0.5
Population of dealer measure 1
Endowment of customer S F CS (0)= 0.6X +0.8FJ
Endowment of customer B F CB (0)= 0.8X −2.0FJ
Endowment of dealer j F Dj (0)= 0.3X +0.6FJ
Market Power θi (0)= 1 for i = S,B
Risks The payoff of the risky asset follows a log-normal distribution with mean μ= 0.05 and
volatility σ= 0.4. Recall the results in Lemma 3: The Black-Scholes formula holds, and the
variance and the skewness risk premia are zero in a centralized competitive environment. 23 I
use this competitive equilibrium as the benchmark.
For ease of illustration, the nonlinear risk is speciﬁed as, 24
FJ =
(
er s−X )2 , X ≤ er s.
Agents differ only in their respective loadings on this function. Clearly, this function is ev-
erywhere convex in the domain of the asset payoff X ∈ (0,∞). According to Carr and Madan
(2002) 25, a continuous twice differentiable function can be replicated by a portfolio of a risky
asset, a risk-free bond and a continuum of options. Formally,
Lemma 5. For a continuous twice differentiable function F (X ) deﬁned on X ∈ [X,∞), the
following representation holds, 26
F (X )= F (ξ)+F ′(ξ)(X −ξ)
+
∫ξ
X
F ′′(K )(K −X )+dK +
∫∞
ξ
F ′′(K )(X −K )+dK .
23This result does not hold perfectly in my numerical example, as the utility function has a subsistence parameter
c ≥ 0. Nevertheless, the implied volatility curve in the competitive benchmark is ‘almost’ ﬂat and close to σ.
24For X < X∗, I set FJ = (er s+X∗ −2X )(er s−X∗) with 0< X∗ < er s. This assures that the customers’ outside
options have interior solutions.
25Chapter 29 of “Volatility: New estimation techniques for pricing derivatives”. Edited by R. Jarrow. The same
result is also in Bakshi and Madan [2000].
26As a convention, I use F ′(·) to represent the ﬁrst-order derivative, F ′′(·) for the second-order derivative, and
(K −X )+ for the maximum between K −X and 0.
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where ξ is an arbitrary constant in the domain of X , F ′(ξ) is the number of shares held in
the risky asset, F ′′(K ) is the number of options with strike K , and F (ξ)−ξF ′(ξ) is the amount
invested in the risk-free bond.
The choice of the cut-off ξ is arbitrary. In this section I set ξ equal to the future price of the risky
asset, er s. Effectively, contingent claims in all exchanges are implemented by a continuum of
out-of-the-money put and call options.
According to the lemma, FJ represents a long portfolio in options. Hence, option sellers will
hold positive FJ and vice versa. Moreover, FJ is non-symmetric around the future price, er s,
that is, more convex for the low state of X than for the high state. Hence, hedging demand
for out-of-the-money (OTM) put options is higher than the demand for OTM call options.
Formally, the skewness of FJ is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. From the dealers’ perspective, any convex nonlinear risk FJ is said to be skewed to
the left if
E
[
M [FJ ]
((
log
X
s
−mQ1
)3
−3mQ2 log
X
s
)]
< 0.
with the linear operatorM [·] deﬁned in 4, and mQi such that i = 1,2 the risk-neutral moments
for log returns.
This deﬁnition is closely linked to the third centered risk-neutral moments of log returns (see
Proposition 3 below). In fact, it measures the ﬁrst-order effect of the nonlinear risk FJ on the
risk-neutral skewness. Intuitively, we may think that the risk-neutral skewness increases with
customers’ buying pressure on OTM call options (i.e., F ′′J (X )> 0 for X ≥ er s). This is mostly the
case if the physical distribution P is log-normal. However, when logX follows a left-skewed
distribution, customers’ buying pressure on OTM call options for certain range of strikes may
push down the risk-neutral skewness.
When P is log-normal, this deﬁnition covers broadly four trading activities. Speciﬁcally, when
FJ is convex and skewed to the left, the dealers have the incentive to sell OTM put options;
when FJ is convex and skewed to the right, the dealers have the incentive to sell OTM call
options. It is also possible that FJ is concave and skewed to the left 27; then the dealers have the
incentive to buy OTM put options. Similarly, for FJ concave and skewed to the right, dealers
have the incentive to buy OTM call options.
Agents There are two classes of customers, labeled B (buyers) and S (sellers), each class
accounting for half of the customer population. I specify the endowments to ensure that
customer S is the option seller and customer B is the option buyer. Speciﬁcally, customer S
holds 0.8 units of FJ and 0.6 units of the risky asset, while customer B holds −2.0 units of FJ
27Here, the ‘left’ refers to the region that the second-order derivative of FJ is non-zero.
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Figure 1.1 – Implied volatility for D2C exchanges.
Moneyness is deﬁned as the log Ker s . This example uses parameters in Table 1.1 and does not include
any shocks.
and 0.8 units of the risky asset. The difference in the holdings of the risky asset assures that
both customers have a comparable size of wealth in the benchmark equilibrium. Formally, I
denote customer’s endowment without shocks as F Ci (0) with i =B ,S.
Dealers are homogeneous. According to assumption 2 (i.e., the aggregate nonlinear risks are
zero), dealers’ total nonlinear endowments are given by X −∑i=S,B F Ci . Each dealer therefore
starts with endowment F Dj (0)= 0.3X +0.6FJ . This endowment in effect makes dealers option
sellers. In addition, FJ measures the nonlinear risk imbalance between dealers and customers.
To show the effects of nonlinear risks and market power, all dealers are initially monopolists in
their respective D2C exchanges. Given the parametrization, I then solve the model numerically.
Figure 1.1 shows the implied volatility 28 computed using four different pricing kernels, namely,
the two D2C pricing kernels, the ‘mid’ pricing kernel and the centralized benchmark pricing
kernel. The ‘mid’ pricing kernel is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 2. The ‘mid’ pricing kernel is the wealth-weighted average pricing kernel among all
D2C exchanges, M¯ D2C =[0,1]2 λ−1(i,j) MD2C(i,j) did j/[0,1]2 λ−1(i,j) did j .
In my model, customers’ demand for options is proportional to their wealth, λ−1(i,j) . Empirically,
we can think of the ‘mid’ pricing kernel as the volume-weighted average transaction (or
quoted) price.
Clearly, the implied volatility (hereafter, IV) for customer B is the highest among all the four IVs.
Meanwhile, the IV for customer S is the lowest. Hence, I refer to the price paid by customer B
28To generate a more pronounced implied volatility skew, I would need to assume that the endowment risks
satisfy one of the following conditions: (i) customers on average buying out-of-the-money put options, and selling
out-of-the-money call options; (ii) the endowment risks are reasonably large, and tilt towards down-side risks (in
the numerical example, the endowment risk is ﬂat in the sense that customers buy the same amount of options
across strikes for put options); (iii) the dealer to customer pricing kernel has a corner solution; (iv) either the risky
asset or the risk free asset is centrally traded, but not both.
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as the ask, while the price paid by customer S as the bid. Note that the IV for the ‘mid’ is above
the benchmark IV. Not surprisingly, as the net option demand from customers is positive (i.e.,
more buy orders than sell orders), dealers raise the ‘mid’ price to charge a high markup for
customer B.
Another interesting aspect to note is that the IV for the bid price is below the benchmark IV,
suggesting a negative variance risk premium. This contradicts the ﬁndings in Carr and Wu
[2009], who report that the variance risk premium for SPX options measured from bid prices
is also positive. One possible explanation is that the physical distribution is not log-normal
in reality, or agents have different risk aversion. Both channels are shut down here in the
example.
To measure the overall effects of nonlinear risk imbalance on option prices, I consider two op-
tion premia, namely, the variance risk premium and the skewness risk premium. In particular,
the variance (skewness) risk premium is deﬁned as the difference between the risk-neutral
variance (skewness) and the physical variance (skewness) of the risky asset return (i.e., of
log(X /s)):
RPi ≡ mQi −mPi , i = 2,3.
I compute both premia using the ‘mid’ pricing kernel. Intuitively, the ‘mid’ pricing kernel
measures the total compensation (markup plus the risk premium) customers pay to dealers
for bearing the endogenous nonlinear risk.
Proposition 2 (Variance Risk Premium). Suppose the nonlinear risk imbalance FJ is convex
(concave) in the domain of the random payoff X , then the variance risk premium computed
from the ‘mid’ pricing kernel, M¯ D2C, is larger (smaller) than the premium computed from the
benchmark pricing kernel M (0).
Intuitively, by Lemma 5, the variance risk premium can be replicated by long positions in a
portfolio of puts and calls. In the example, the ‘mid’ IV is uniformly above the benchmark
IV, suggesting a positive markup charged by dealers in response to customers’ net buying
pressure. Hence, the variance risk premium becomes positive.
Regarding the skewness risk premium, ﬁrst note that the IV for the ‘mid’ price is skewed to
the left, suggesting a negative risk-neutral skewness. Meanwhile, the physical skewness is
0 for log-normal distribution. Hence, the skewness risk premium is negative. This is the
result of customers’ excessive demand on OTM put options rather than call options. If the
physical distribution is log-normally distributed, the skewness of the nonlinear risk imbalance
FJ determines the direction of the skewness risk premium. However, more generally, unlike
the variance risk premium, the skewness risk premium depends on both the shape of FJ and
the physical distribution.
Proposition 3 (Skewness Risk Premium). Suppose that P is log-normally distributed, then the
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skewness risk premium
• is positive if the nonlinear risk imbalance FJ is convex and right-skewed;
• is negative if the nonlinear risk imbalance FJ is convex and left-skewed.
Intuitively, if FJ is a long skewness exposure (i.e., short OTM call options), then to hedge
their short skew risk the customers need to buy a portfolio of options that resembles FJ . This
demand allows dealers to charge a premium on the skew, leading to a negative skewness risk
premium.
1.4.2 Macro Shocks
I consider three ‘macro’ shocks, the imbalance shock (IMB), the market power shock (MP), and
the wealth shock (W). They are called macro shocks precisely because of their effects on a sub
population of agents rather than atom-less individual. For each of the shocks, I consider three
levels, labeled Small, Medium and Large.
Imbalance Shock This shock captures the distribution of nonlinear risks between customers
and dealers. It is a shock on the size of the nonlinear risk among dealers. For simplicity, the
shock affects dealers’ endowments uniformly,
F Dj (
IMB) = F Dj (0)+IMBFJ , IMB ∈ {0,−0.2,−0.4} .
Here, the imbalance shock reduces the dealers’ long position in the nonlinear risk FJ , making
them sell fewer options. Speciﬁcally, for a small shock, dealers and customer S hold the same
amount of long positions in FJ (sellers); for a medium shock, dealers do not hold any FJ
(neutral), and for a large shock, dealers hold negative positions in FJ (buyers). Consistent
with Assumption 2, customers are assumed to hold an off-setting position in FJ . The off-
setting shock affects customers uniformly (see Table 1.1), so that their respective endowments
become
F Ci (
IMB) = F Ci (0)−IMBFJ , i =B ,S.
Notably, both customers receive additional long option positions after the shock. Therefore,
customer B wants to buy fewer options, while customer S wants to sell more options.
Market Power Shock The market power shock is uniformly distributed among the D2C
exchanges,
θi (
MP) = θi (0)+MP , MP ∈ {0,−0.5,−1} .
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When the shock is 0, dealers have full market power and can charge the highest markups in
D2C exchanges. When the shock is−1, all D2C exchanges become competitive, and the option
prices and trading patterns coincide with the competitive benchmark.
Wealth Shock The wealth shock also affects all dealers uniformly,
F Dj (
W) = F Dj (0)+WX , W ∈ {0.0,−0.2,−0.4} .
Recall the total supply of the risky asset is normalized to one; a unit increase in the dealers’
wealth thus implies a unit reduction in the customers’ wealth. The wealth shock also affects
customers’ endowment uniformly,
F Ci (
W)= F Ci (0)−WX , i =B ,S.
As the risky asset is centrally traded, the number of shares held does not affect directly the
option trading. However, indirectly, due to wealth effect, for dealers, a negative wealth shock
effectively reduces their risk aversion and, hence, their risk bearing capacity.
1.4.3 Option Premia
Now we look at the correlation between customers’ option demand and option risk premia.
Figure 1.2, column one, shows that with a reduction in the size of the nonlinear risk imbalance
FJ , customers on average buy fewer options from dealers. Consequently, the ‘mid’ option
prices become cheaper (see Figure 1.3, column one). Meanwhile, the shock also reduces the
inventory in the D2D exchange, hence alleviating the distortion on the D2D prices.
Proposition 4 (Imbalance Shock). Customers’ net buy of options is positively (negatively)
correlated with the variance risk premium measured from the ‘mid’ (D2D) pricing kernel if
dealers experience an imbalance shock.
This result relates directly to the ﬁndings in Gârleanu et al. [2009]. The authors show both
theoretically and empirically that customers’ net buy of options is positively correlated with
the variance risk premium, primarily due to the premium paid to dealers for bearing the
non-hedgeable risks (e.g., jumps). Here, the economic reasoning is different: Dealers are able
to hedge perfectly; however, due to the market fragmentation, each dealer charges a markup
to customers, resulting in endogenous inventories to be shared in the D2D exchange. When
the risk imbalance is reduced, customers buy fewer options from dealers and, consequently,
the prices they pay become cheaper. On the other hand, due to the reduction in the aggregate
inventory in the D2D exchange, the D2D prices become less distorted and hence increase
towards the centralized benchmark. Empirically, we can think of the imbalance shock as
demand shocks.
Next, Figure 1.2, column two, shows that, after the reduction of dealers’ market power, cus-
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Figure 1.2 – Effects of ‘macro’ shocks on option demand.
tomers buy more options. At the same time, the variance risk premium becomes smaller (see
Figure 1.3, column one). This result is in stark contrast to the imbalance shock.
Proposition 5 (Market Power Shock). Customers’ net buy of options is negatively (positively)
correlated with the variance risk premium measured from the ‘mid’ (D2D) pricing kernel if
dealers experience a market power shock.
The intuition is as follows. When D2C exchanges become more competitive, customers are
able to trade at more favorable prices, resulting in better risk sharing. This in turn helps to
reduce the size of the inventories in the D2D exchange. Hence, the price distortions on both
the D2D exchange and the D2C exchanges are reduced.
Figure 1.2, column three, shows that customers buy more options from dealers after the
decrease in dealers’ wealth. Meanwhile, the option prices on average become cheaper for
customers to trade (see Figure 1.3, column one). This is consistent with the intuition that
dealers become more risk-averse after the negative wealth shock. Hence, they provide price
concessions to customers to off-load inventories.
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Figure 1.3 – Effects of ‘macro’ shocks on option risk premium.
Proposition 6 (Wealth Shock). Customers’ net buy of options is negatively (negatively) corre-
lated with the variance risk premium measured from the ‘mid’ (D2D) pricing kernel if dealers a
experience wealth shock.
Interestingly enough, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the impact of a wealth shock or
market power shock is very different from that of an imbalance shock (see Proposition 4).
Indeed, while an imbalance shock mostly leads to a positive correlation between customers’
price pressure and option prices, this is not the case for the wealth shock. Speciﬁcally, the
wealth shock always induces a negative correlation between customers’ total net buy of options
and the variance (skewness) risk premium at the ‘mid’ price, consistent with the ﬁndings in
Chen et al. (forthcoming). The underlying mechanism is based on the dealers’ effective risk
aversion: When dealers’ net worth drops, their risk aversion rises, increasing their incentive to
smooth consumption. In this case, dealers ﬁnd it optimal to give large price concessions to
customers, forcing the latter to take more risk off dealers’ balance sheets.
Furthermore, there is also a fundamental difference between the wealth shock and the market
power shock: Although customers can trade more at more favorable prices under both shocks,
the prices on the D2D exchange change differently. A market power shock allows for better
risk-sharing; hence, the inventory reduction is an efﬁcient outcome on the D2D exchange.
On the other hand, the wealth shock reduces dealers’ risk bearing capacity, forcing them to
provide price concessions to customers and also increasing the price they require to bear risks
in the D2D exchange.
Notably, Figure 1.3 also shows that, for all the macro shocks, the variance risk premium is
always negatively correlated with the skewness risk premium. The next proposition shows
that in fact the two risk premia are closely linked through the nonlinear risk imbalance FJ .
Proposition 7. When any of the three macro shocks hits and P is log-normally distributed, the
correlation between the variance risk premium and the skewness risk premium
• is negative if dealers’ aggregate nonlinear risk FJ is left-skewed;
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• is positive if dealers’ aggregate nonlinear risk FJ is right-skewed.
Note that FJ can be either concave or convex.
Four possible trading activities are covered in Proposition 7, customers buy (sell) OTM put
(call) options, and buy (sell) OTM call (put) options. However, regardless of whether dealers
hold long or short options, the sign of the correlation between the two option risk premia is
always determined by whether the trading activities are concentrated on the OTM calls or
puts.
Since the physical distribution is ﬁxed, the negative correlation between the skewness and
the variance risk premia immediately implies that the correlation between the risk-neutral
skewness and the risk-neutral variance is also negative. This prediction is consistent with
the empirical evidence in Constantinides and Lian [2015]. In particular, the authors ﬁnd
that in SPX options markets, customers usually long OTM puts and sell OTM calls, causing a
decrease in the risk-neutral skewness (i.e., implied volatility skews to the left). Meanwhile, the
number of puts being bought exceeds the number of calls being sold, resulting in an increase
in risk-neutral variance. Both price effects arise in my model due to dealers’ market power
and nonlinear risk imbalance.
1.4.4 Cost of Trading
To begin with, I deﬁne the effective spreads as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. The cost of trading is deﬁned as the effective percentage bid-ask spreads,∣∣E [(MD2C(i,j) − M¯D2C)O(K )]∣∣
E
[
M¯D2CO(K )
] .
Note that O(K ) denotes call/put option payoff with strike price K .
Figure 1.4 and 1.5 show that the effective spreads are higher for OTM options than for at-
the-money (ATM) and in-the-money (ITM) options for both calls and puts. This pattern is
consistent with the ﬁndings in George and Longstaff [1993] and Cho and Engle [1999]. In
my model, as the spreads for each strike are normalized by their respective ‘mid’ prices, the
spreads for OTM options become large. In addition, when the nonlinear risk is ‘small’, dealers’
optimal quoting strategy tends to have a larger impact on the tails of the pricing kernel. This
effect results in higher spreads for OTM options than ATM options.
Figure 1.2, column two, shows that both customers’ option demand decreases with dealers’
market power. Consequently, the aggregate trading volume in the D2C segment decreases.
Meanwhile, Figure 1.4 and 1.5, column two, show that the effective spreads for both customers
increase. Intuitively, the market power allows dealers to charge a higher markup on the D2C
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Figure 1.4 – Effects of ‘macro’ shocks on effective percentage bid-ask spreads for call options.
exchanges, and customers respond by trading fewer options. This market power effect limits
the risk sharing between dealers and customers.
Figure 1.2, column three, shows that when increasing dealers’ wealth, customer S sells more
options while customer B buys fewer options. Interestingly, the aggregate trading volume
in the D2C segment decreases. Meanwhile, Figure 1.4 and 1.5, column three, show that the
effective spreads increase with dealers’ wealth for both customers. However, the spreads for
option sellers increase more than the spreads for option buyers. This is not surprising because
dealers are also option sellers, hence pushing ‘mid’ prices further away from bid prices.
I now summarize the results formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. The aggregate trading volume in the D2C segment decreases with dealers’ market
power or wealth, while the effective spreads
• increase with the dealers’ market power;
• increase with the dealers’ wealth for customers trading in the same direction of the dealers,
and can increase or decrease for customers trading in the opposite direction of the dealers.
However, the average of the effective spreads across all D2C exchanges increases with dealers’
market power or wealth.
The results of Proposition 8 are consistent with the existing empirical evidence. For example,
De Fontnouvelle et al. [2003] ﬁnd that options bid-ask spreads decreased after the introduction
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Figure 1.5 – Effects of ‘macro’ shocks on effective percentage bid-ask spreads for put options.
of multi-listed options, likely due to improved competition. Similarly, in a recent study,
Christoffersen et al. show that in recent years (2004 to 2012), the market-wide option bid-
ask spreads decreased while the trading volume increased, consistent with the reduction of
dealers’ market power.
1.5 Empirics
In this section, for 34 liquid ETF options, I show empirically that the customers’ net buy of
options is sometimes negatively correlated with the variance risk premium. This result con-
ﬁrms the result for SPX options documented in Chen et al. (forthcoming) and Constantinides
and Lian [2015] but is in contrast to the evidence in the literature on demand based option
pricing [Gârleanu et al., 2009, Bollen and Whaley, 2004, Fournier and Jacobs, 2016]. My model
provides a rational explanation for such result based on the dealers’ wealth effect.
Second, I show empirically that for the same sample of options the correlation between the
risk-neutral variance and the risk-neutral skewness is often positive despite the negative
correlation between the realized variance and realized skewness. This result is puzzling, as in
an equilibrium model in which only the fundamental risk is priced, such a result will not arise.
For example, models with disaster risks predict that the risk-neutral variance increases with
the intensity of the disaster risk, while the risk-neutral skewness decreases. This prediction
emerges because the marginal investor requires extra compensation for bearing the disaster
risk. This intensity shock also raises the physical variance and decreases the physical skewness.
Hence, the correlation of the two physical moments and the correlation of the two risk-neutral
moments should go hand in hand.
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Third, I use the result in Proposition 7 to build a measure for the shape of customers’ net option
demand and show that this measure can explain the cross-section variation in correlations
between the risk-neutral variance and skewness. In addition, this measure can also explain a
small amount of the time series variation in my ETF panel.
1.5.1 Data Description
I use four database in my empirical study: Open/Close (CBOE, ISE and NASDAQ PHLX), OPRA,
OptionMetrics, commodity options TAQ. The OPRA and the commodity options TAQ data are
provided by Nanex.
The Open/Close data allow me to construct order-ﬂow imbalance measures and have been
used in several empirical studies, including Pan and Poteshman [2006a], Gârleanu et al.
[2009], Chen et al. (forthcoming) and Fournier and Jacobs [2016]. For each option contract
(ticker, put or call, strike, maturity), the data report separately the trading volume for several
trader types 29: Market-Maker, Firm (proprietary ﬁrms and broker/dealers), Customer (small,
medium, large), Professional Customer (small, medium, large). Furthermore, the trading
volume is separated into four types: Open Buy, Close Buy, Open Sell and Close Sell. In
particular, Open Buy means the trader has bought the contract to open a new long option
position, while Close Buy means the trader has bought the contract to close an existing short
position.
The OPRA data run from January 2010 through December 2015. This allows me to observe
trades and quotes for index, equity and ETF options traded in all the US options exchanges. I
use the trades and the corresponding quotes data from this database to construct the bid-ask
spreads measure as well as the order-ﬂow imbalance measure using the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm.
The OptionMetrics data provide option Greeks and prices for index and ETF options.
To test my model, I select a sample 30 of actively traded index and ETF options, as well as
commodity options. These are options based on macro risks and, hence, are subject less to
the concern regarding asymmetric information.31
29NASDAQ PHLX directly reports the buy and sell volume for market-makers. For ISE and CBOE, the market-
maker’s position can be deduced from the difference between volume of the other traders and the volume of the
exchange.
30For a full list of option tickers, see Appendix A.4. The selection criterion is based on the ranking of daily average
trading volume for ETF options on ISE.
31I expect that these market power effects are stronger for over-the-counter order-ﬂows [see, for example, Harald
et al., 2017]. Using my model to understand pricing and trading of OTC derivatives is an interesting direction for
future research.
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1.5.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
Moneyness Bins In practice, multiple options across strikes and maturities are listed for
one underlying asset. To compare prices and trading activities over time, I group options into
bins according to their moneyness and maturities. Assuming zero interest rates, I use the
Black-Scholes delta to proxy option moneyness of a European call,
Δ(C ,K ,T ) = Φ
[
log(K /S)+0.5σ2T
σ

T
]
,
in which Φ(·) is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function, σ is the realized
volatility of the underlying asset over the most recent 60 trading days, K is the strike price, T is
the time-to-maturity, and S is the underlying price. For a European put, I take the 1+Δ(P,K ,T )
as its moneyness. Hence, OTM put options have the same moneyness as OTM call options.
I then group options into ﬁve moneyness bins (Table 1.2) as in Bollen and Whaley [2004].
Formally, I denote the moneyness bin asB =OTM,DOTM,ATM,ITM,DITM.
Table 1.2 – Moneyness Bins Deﬁnitions
Bins Range
Deep in-the-money (DITM) [0.875,1.000]
In-the-money (ITM) [0.625,0.875]
At-the-money (ATM) [0.375,0.625]
Out-of-the-money (OTM) [0.125,0.375]
Deep out-of-the-money (DOTM) [0.000,0.125]
Variance Risk Premium The variance risk premium is deﬁned as the ratio between the
risk-neutral variance and the physical variance. I proxy the physical variance by the realized
variance computed from a 30-day rolling-window. For the risk-neutral variance, I use the
model-free formula in Bakshi et al. [2003]. 32
VRPt = VarianceQt −VariancePt ,t+30 .
Skewness Risk Premium Similarly, the skewness risk premium is the ratio between the risk-
neutral skewness and the physical skewness. The physical skewness is estimated based on the
formulas in Neuberger [2012]. The risk-neutral skewness is again from the formula in Bakshi
et al. [2003]. Then, the skewness risk premium is
SRPt = SkewQt −SkewPt ,t+30 .
32For the details of the formula, refer to the appendix.
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Order-Flow Imbalance Use the Open/Close data (CBOE, ISE and NASDAQ), I compute the
customers’ aggregate net buy of options as 33
IMBt (B, i ) =
∑
K∈B
OBt (i ,K ,T )+CBt (i ,K ,T )−OSt (i ,K ,T )−CSt (i ,K ,T ) , i =C ,P ,
in which OB (OS) stands for open buy (sell) orders, and CB (CS) stands for close buy (sell)
orders. I also construct the order-ﬂow imbalance measure based on options TAQ data.
IMBt (B, i ) =
∑
τ∈[t−h,t )
∑
K∈B
OFBUY(τ, i ,K ,T )−OFSELL(τ, i ,K ,T ) .
The sign of the order-ﬂow OF is determined using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Speciﬁ-
cally, the order is deﬁned as an aggressive buy if it is executed above the ‘mid’ quote and vice
versa.
Demand Pressure After calculating the order-ﬂow imbalance, I can deﬁne the demand
pressure measure. The ﬁrst demand pressure is on the level of the option prices,
IMBLEVELt =
∑
B
∑
i=C ,P
IMBt (B, i ) .
If the measure is positive, customers on average buy options from dealers. The next measure
is the demand pressure on the skewness of the option prices,
IMBSKEWt = IMBt (OTM,C )− IMBt (OTM,P ) .
Intuitively, customers’ net buy of OTM call options or net sell of OTM put options drives up
the skew. 34
Shape of Imbalance Shock To capture the shape of the imbalance shock, I use the following
measure,
IMBSHAPEt =
∣∣∑
B=OTM,ATM IMBt (B,C )
∣∣− ∣∣∑B=OTM,ATM IMBt (B,P )∣∣∣∣∑
B=OTM,ATM IMBt (B,C )
∣∣+ ∣∣∑B=OTM,ATM IMBt (B,P )∣∣ .
Motivated by the model, the larger the shape measure, the more positive the correlation
between the risk-neutral variance and the risk-neutral skewness.
33Filters employed: i) remove expired options; ii) remove day of trade/expiration pairs not found inOptionMetrics
database; iii) remove day of trade and option strike not found in OptionMetrics database; iv) remove options on
the expiration day.
34To be more precise, if the physical density is highly left-skewed, the call buying pressure needs to be reasonably
high in order to move the skew to the right.
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1.5.3 Demand Pressure?
The ﬁrst test is to show that, customers’ net option demand may drive down option prices
instead of driving them up. Formally, I run the following regression for each ETF in my sample,
VRPt = β0+β1IMBLEVELt +εt .
Table 1.3 shows that for XLI, SPY, EWJ and XOP, the correlation between the customers’ option
net demand and the VRP is negative. Hence, for certain ETF options, the demand pressure
theory is inconsistent with the empirically observed patterns.
In addition to the test on the variance risk premium, I run another test,
VarianceQt = β0+β1IMBLEVELt +γ1VariancePt ,t+30+εt .
Table 1.4 shows that, indeed, after controlling for the physical variance, the daily variation in
the risk-neutral variance is often negatively associated with the contemporaneous customers’
option demand.
For the demand pressure on the skewness risk premium, I run the following regression and
control for the realized skewness,
SkewQt = β0+β1IMBSKEWt +γ1SkewPt ,t+30+εt .
Table 1.5 shows that, compared to the risk-neutral variance, risk-neutral skewness is much
harder to explain. Indeed, even after including the controls, the adjusted R2 is not very large.
Importantly, we note that if the demand pressure theory holds, then the coefﬁcient β1 should
be signiﬁcantly positive. Clearly, for some of the options (two out of seven), this is not the case.
In light of the demand pressure puzzle, Chen et al. (forthcoming) propose that the dealers’
limited risk bearing capacity may be the cause of the negative correlation. In particular,
they consider an environment with negative jump risks in the asset returns. Dealers’ risk
aversion rises with the intensity of the disaster risk, inducing them to offer less risk-sharing to
customers at higher prices. However, in their model, the correlation between the risk-neutral
variance and the skewness is closely linked to the disaster risk. Precisely, when the intensity
of the disaster rises, the physical variance increases and the physical skewness decreases. In
turn, dealers require higher risk premium for bearing risks; therefore, the risk-neutral variance
increases and the risk-neutral skewness decreases. This suggests that the correlation in the
physical variance and skewness should go hand in hand with the correlation in the risk-neutral
variance and skewness.
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1.5.4 Correlation Puzzle
Table 1.6 shows that, the correlation between the realized skewness and the realized variance
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for most of the ETF options except for the long-term
bond (TLT), the commodity ETFs (UNG: natural gas; GDX: gold miner; USO: crude oil), and
the US dollar (UUP). This is broadly consistent with the fact that equity ETFs are subject to
negative jumps that occur simultaneously with high volatility.
In contrast, the correlation between the risk-neutral skewness and the risk-neutral variance
paints a rather different picture: The correlation is mostly positive and statistically signiﬁcant
(19 out of 34), suggesting that the state with a high level of option prices is associated with
expensive OTM call options. Hence, together with the negative correlation between the
realized variance and skewness, the data suggest the short-term variation in the correlation
between the variance and skewness premia cannot be purely driven by fundamentals.
My model provides an explanation for this puzzle. The main intuition is that customers’
nonlinear risk endowments may not be linearly aligned with the physical states of the world.
Speciﬁcally, some customers may want to buy OTM put options due to receiving nonlinear
shocks that resemble short OTM put positions, without any actual changes in the intensity
of disaster risk. Hence, empirically, we can look at the particular shape of customers’ option
demand. For example, if customers demand pressure (in absolute terms) is concentrated
on OTM calls rather than OTM puts, then we are likely to observe a positive correlation
between the variance and skewness risk premia. In addition, if the physical distribution has
not moved, then the correlation between the risk-neutral variance and skewness will also be
positive. Having said that, does the shape of the customers’ option demand actually affect the
correlation between the risk-neutral variance and the skewness?
Based on the empirical measure for the shape of customers’ net demand, IMBSHAPEt , I proceed
as follows. First, for each ETF option, I divide the time series into quintiles based on the value
of the shape measure. In particular, the ﬁfth quintile corresponds to the largest excessive call
trading activities by customers. Within each quintile, I compute the following correlations: 35
the correlation between the risk-neutral variance and skewness,
Corr
[
VarianceQt ,Skew
Q
t
]
;
the correlation between the realized variance and skewness,
Corr
[
VariancePt ,t+30,Skew
P
t ,t+30
]
;
the correlation between the two risk premia,
Corr[SRPt ,VRPt ] .
35The correlation is computed based on daily observations.
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According to the prediction of my model, the correlation between the risk-neutral variance
and skewness should increase with the shape parameter. My model does not restrict the
correlation between the realized variance and skewness; the correlation between the variance
risk premium and the skewness risk premium decreases in the shape measure.
Table 1.7 shows that for certain ETF options the results seem to align with my model’s pre-
diction. In particular, for equity sector ETFs (XLV, XLU, IYR, XLF), for index ETFs (SPY), for
international equity ETFs (ASHR, EWJ, EFA, EWZ, FXI), for commodity ETFs (UNG, OIH, GDX,
GLD, USO, XOP), and for currency options (FXE, UUP), there appears to be an uptrend while
increasing the shape measure.
Table 1.8 shows no particular relationship between the shape measure and the correlation
between the realized variance and skewness.
Table 1.9 shows that, except for index ETF options, most of other ETF options do not have a
strong correlation between the variance risk premium and the skewness risk premium. This
is likely because various shocks may work in the opposite direction, or the correlation varies
dramatically over time, leading to insigniﬁcant whole sample correlation. The index options
also may differ from other option categories in terms of the underlying risk dynamics. I leave
this question for future research.
Cross-Section Admittedly, a correlation measure requires a large volume of data. To circum-
vent this problem, I explore the cross-sectional properties of my data. Speciﬁcally, I compute
the correlation for the risk-neutral variance and risk-neutral skewness for each of the ETF op-
tions in my sample. Then I test whether the shape measure of customers’ option demand can
capture the variation across ETF options. Speciﬁcally, I run the following univariate regression,
Corro
[
VarianceQt ,Skew
Q
t
]
= β0+β1IMBSHAPEo +o , o = 34 ETF options.
Consistent with the prediction of my model, β1 is positive (= 0.12) and has a t statistic of
1.99. The adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.13. This result suggests that the cross-sectional
difference in the correlation between the two risk-neutral moments can be partially captured
by the difference in the trading activities across those ETF options markets.
Time Series Next, I run the following time series regression,
SkewQt = β0+β1VarianceQt +β2VarianceQt × IMBSHAPEt +γ1SkewPt ,t+30+εt .
In particular, I expect β2 to be positive and signiﬁcant, as the joint correlation between the
risk-neutral variance and skewness depends on β1+β2× IMBSHAPEt . When customers’ demand
is concentrated at the OTM call options, the model predicts that the correlation between the
risk-neutral variance and skewness will increase.
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Table 1.10 shows that β2 seems to be positive for most of the ETF options. However, only 6 out
of 34 ETF options have statistically signiﬁcant β2. In addition, most of these signiﬁcant results
come from the commodity-linked ETF options. It is thus deﬁnitely worth exploring further
the commodity options.
The insigniﬁcant results for other options may be due to the following fact: Certain customers
may trade competitively and, hence, their order-ﬂows do not create price pressure. Another
measure for the shape of the customers’ net demand is the ratio between the bid-ask spreads
for OTM call options vs. put options, as the model predicts that the large trading cost for
certain options is likely associated with a large imbalance in risk distribution and dealers’
market power. Hence, the bid-ask spreads measured using intra-day data, separately for buy
and sell orders, are valuable sources for explaining the patterns. I leave this for future research.
After the individual time series regression, I run the following panel regression with time and
ETF ﬁxed effects to estimate the coefﬁcient β2.
SkewQo,t = βi +β1VarianceQo,t +β2VarianceQo,t × IMBSHAPEo,t +γ1SkewPo,(t ,t+30)+γt +εo,t .
Table 1.11 summarizes the panel regression results. β2 is positive and signiﬁcant. Hence, the
model seems to explain a fraction of the within ETF variations for the correlation between the
two risk-neutral moments.
1.6 Conclusion
The real world option markets have a pronounced two-tier structure, whereby dealers trade
with customers in the D2C market segment, and then use the D2D market to rebalance their
inventories. For the ﬁrst time in the literature, I develop a model of option markets that
accounts for this two-tier structure. In my model, an endogenous structure of option implied
volatilities and bid-ask spreads arises because of dealers’ market power. This active role of
dealers and their price shading behavior allows me to generate patterns of trade that are
very different from other existing micro-structure models of option markets, including the
demand-based option pricing theory of Gârleanu et al. [2009]. In particular, my model can
explain a wide range of stylized facts about demand imbalance in option markets and its link
to skewness and variance risk premia.
Given my model’s ability to generate realistic option price behavior, it would be interesting
to see whether the model can be used to extract physical probabilities from option prices,
extending the ideas of Ross [2015]. Furthermore, while my model is static, it can easily
be extended to dynamic settings, in which case I can study the joint endogenous nonlinear
dynamics of imbalance and its impact on risk premia and the dynamics of the implied volatility
surface. I leave these important questions for future research.
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Table 1.3 – Regression of the variance risk premium on customers’ total option demand.
Data is from January 2010 to April 2016. The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily frequency. I
report the t-statistic for regressors based on White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
IMBLEVELt adj. R
2 Obs
Ticker
XRT 0.67 -0.00 1553
SMH 0.65 -0.00 611
XBI 2.85 0.01 552
XLY -1.07 0.00 1530
IBB 1.89 0.00 1249
XLV -0.10 -0.00 1520
XLI -2.80 0.00 1537
XLU -0.81 -0.00 1550
XLE 2.22 0.00 1560
IYR -1.57 0.00 1558
XLF -1.64 0.00 1558
DIA 0.27 -0.00 1561
IWM -0.66 -0.00 1561
SPY -3.04 0.00 1561
QQQ -1.71 0.00 1254
ASHR -0.69 -0.00 197
RSX 2.29 0.00 585
EWJ -2.40 0.00 1298
DXJ 0.08 -0.00 672
EFA 0.11 -0.00 1561
EWZ -1.24 -0.00 1560
FXI -0.45 -0.00 1560
EEM 1.68 0.00 1561
HYG -1.54 0.00 1270
TLT 0.10 -0.00 1560
UNG 0.01 -0.00 1558
OIH 1.61 0.00 1523
SLV 2.36 0.00 1560
GDX 0.35 -0.00 1560
GLD -0.07 -0.00 1561
USO -1.57 0.00 1561
XOP -2.03 0.00 1502
FXE 0.76 -0.00 1556
UUP 0.35 -0.00 1285
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Table 1.4 – Regression of risk-neutral variance on the demand pressure (level).
Control for the physical variance. The data is from January 2010 to April 2016. The bold numbers are sig-
niﬁcant at 5%. Daily frequency. I report the t-statistic for regressors based on White heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors.
IMBLEVELt Variance
P
t ,t+30 adj. R
2 Obs
Ticker
XRT -1.44 11.20 0.368 1553
SMH -0.47 7.06 0.122 611
XBI 2.50 14.25 0.310 552
XLY -3.52 11.55 0.336 1530
IBB -0.63 13.42 0.214 1249
XLV -0.66 11.33 0.226 1520
XLI -1.90 11.63 0.375 1537
XLU 0.02 12.11 0.191 1550
XLE -3.13 18.81 0.440 1560
IYR -4.08 14.79 0.415 1558
XLF -1.65 13.75 0.379 1558
DIA 0.01 12.29 0.303 1561
IWM -2.27 13.50 0.421 1561
SPY -2.58 12.09 0.330 1561
QQQ -0.77 10.80 0.311 1254
ASHR -2.13 -1.42 0.010 197
RSX -0.99 7.48 0.340 585
EWJ -2.76 5.25 0.020 1298
DXJ 0.34 8.05 0.198 672
EFA 0.26 12.25 0.386 1561
EWZ -0.40 23.89 0.453 1560
FXI -0.37 17.40 0.385 1560
EEM -1.97 16.68 0.423 1561
HYG -1.28 9.90 0.267 1270
TLT -1.83 13.41 0.365 1560
UNG -0.70 12.83 0.201 1558
OIH -1.64 21.50 0.493 1523
SLV -2.52 15.44 0.351 1560
GDX -2.47 21.19 0.376 1560
GLD -1.63 15.36 0.301 1561
USO -3.83 23.56 0.558 1561
XOP -1.03 27.91 0.512 1502
FXE -0.57 21.75 0.407 1556
UUP -1.21 19.03 0.346 1285
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Table 1.5 – Regression of risk-neutral skewness on the demand pressure (skew).
Control for the realized skewness. The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily frequency. I report the
t-statistic for regressors based on White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
IMBSKEWt Skew
P
t ,t+30 adj. R
2 Obs
Ticker
XRT 1.46 -0.17 0.000 1553
SMH 1.89 3.30 0.016 611
XBI -0.06 2.84 0.027 552
XLY 0.71 1.73 0.001 1530
IBB 1.05 2.33 0.007 1249
XLV -1.22 0.58 -0.000 1520
XLI 1.91 0.57 0.001 1537
XLU -1.29 4.15 0.011 1550
XLE 1.08 -0.04 -0.001 1560
IYR -0.07 -1.37 -0.000 1558
XLF 1.76 1.66 0.003 1558
DIA 0.76 0.21 -0.001 1561
IWM 0.94 1.04 -0.000 1561
SPY -5.84 2.12 0.020 1561
QQQ 0.53 5.01 0.015 1254
ASHR -0.11 -2.75 0.006 197
RSX 0.33 1.56 -0.001 585
EWJ -0.22 -0.47 -0.001 1298
DXJ 0.09 0.89 -0.002 672
EFA -0.05 1.60 0.001 1561
EWZ 2.08 3.19 0.010 1560
FXI -2.28 2.81 0.009 1560
EEM 0.72 1.04 -0.000 1561
HYG 0.55 0.14 -0.001 1270
TLT 2.80 1.02 0.005 1560
UNG -1.30 6.76 0.017 1558
OIH 3.10 1.35 0.006 1523
SLV 1.47 9.39 0.017 1560
GDX 2.48 4.50 0.012 1560
GLD -1.29 6.00 0.019 1561
USO -0.80 5.30 0.016 1561
XOP 3.35 3.09 0.012 1502
FXE 1.44 6.25 0.022 1556
UUP 1.21 0.88 0.001 1285
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Table 1.6 – Correlation for the skewness and variance risk premia, the realized variance and
skewness, the risk-neutral variance and skewness.
RP stands for the correlation of the risk premium. P stands for the correlation of the realized moments.
Q stands for the correlation of the risk-neutral moments. The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily
frequency.
Corr (RP) Corr (P) Corr (Q)
Ticker
XRT 0.17 -0.61 -0.23
SMH -0.07 -0.31 0.13
XBI 0.06 -0.43 0.48
XLY 0.26 -0.58 0.06
IBB 0.11 -0.57 0.17
XLV 0.09 -0.59 0.09
XLI 0.07 -0.58 0.11
XLU -0.11 -0.49 -0.01
XLE 0.20 -0.57 0.06
IYR 0.06 -0.44 0.10
XLF 0.16 -0.44 0.07
DIA 0.45 -0.63 0.13
IWM 0.39 -0.56 0.14
SPY 0.54 -0.53 0.18
QQQ 0.23 -0.58 -0.05
ASHR -0.11 -0.08 0.67
RSX -0.02 -0.24 0.17
EWJ -0.09 -0.28 0.14
DXJ 0.24 -0.42 -0.06
EFA 0.03 -0.55 0.12
EWZ 0.05 -0.18 0.37
FXI -0.06 -0.49 -0.43
EEM 0.07 -0.53 0.02
HYG 0.20 -0.60 -0.16
TLT -0.06 0.36 0.38
UNG -0.01 0.37 0.36
OIH 0.08 -0.50 0.23
SLV 0.01 -0.19 0.04
GDX -0.01 -0.01 0.37
GLD -0.03 -0.23 0.09
USO -0.11 -0.03 0.33
XOP 0.06 -0.40 0.29
FXE -0.05 -0.35 -0.46
UUP -0.05 0.24 0.21
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Table 1.7 – Correlation between the risk-neutral variance and risk-neutral skewness.
The quantile is based on the shape measure, IMBSHAPEt . The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily
frequency.
Quantile 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ticker
XRT -0.05 -0.13 -0.17 -0.22 -0.12
SMH 0.14 -0.09 0.06 0.07 -0.02
XBI 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.38 0.22
XLY 0.16 -0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.05
IBB -0.01 0.15 0.06 0.10 -0.09
XLV 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.14
XLI 0.12 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.05
XLU -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.03
XLE -0.01 0.15 -0.00 -0.02 0.09
IYR 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.14
XLF 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18
DIA 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.08
IWM 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11
SPY 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.19
QQQ -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.07
ASHR 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.35 0.61
RSX 0.21 0.27 0.09 0.13 0.27
EWJ 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.28
DXJ -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.12
EFA 0.07 0.08 0.16 -0.02 0.13
EWZ 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.33
FXI -0.36 -0.42 -0.26 -0.32 -0.32
EEM 0.08 0.14 0.02 -0.02 -0.02
HYG -0.18 -0.10 -0.21 -0.09 -0.06
TLT 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.25
UNG 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.50
OIH 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.13 0.22
SLV 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.08 -0.01
GDX 0.22 0.25 0.36 0.29 0.35
GLD 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.13
USO 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.22
XOP 0.04 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.26
FXE -0.25 -0.38 -0.19 -0.39 -0.27
UUP 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.17
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Table 1.8 – Correlation between the realized variance and realized skewness.
The quantile is based on the shape measure, IMBSHAPEt . The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily
frequency.
Quantile 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ticker
XRT -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.18 -0.24
SMH 0.08 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.15
XBI -0.01 0.17 0.11 0.12 -0.09
XLY -0.18 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.23
IBB -0.20 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.22
XLV -0.26 -0.18 -0.12 -0.19 -0.20
XLI -0.11 -0.23 -0.21 -0.35 -0.21
XLU -0.40 -0.43 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44
XLE 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17 -0.01
IYR 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.23
XLF 0.02 -0.16 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16
DIA -0.17 -0.29 -0.27 -0.33 -0.37
IWM -0.02 0.06 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05
SPY -0.19 -0.25 -0.19 -0.11 -0.19
QQQ -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.13 -0.04
ASHR 0.34 0.28 0.45 0.55 0.49
RSX -0.01 -0.16 -0.13 -0.04 -0.20
EWJ -0.30 -0.27 -0.33 -0.36 -0.28
DXJ 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.24
EFA -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.10
EWZ -0.04 -0.14 -0.14 -0.22 -0.10
FXI -0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.34
EEM -0.09 -0.19 -0.17 -0.27 -0.31
HYG -0.29 -0.18 -0.15 -0.23 -0.16
TLT 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.33
UNG 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.42
OIH 0.06 -0.08 -0.26 -0.15 -0.04
SLV -0.60 -0.58 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55
GDX -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07
GLD -0.32 -0.34 -0.40 -0.40 -0.47
USO 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.29
XOP -0.06 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.09
FXE -0.10 -0.16 -0.28 -0.22 -0.11
UUP 0.22 0.45 0.34 0.31 0.34
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Table 1.9 – Correlation between the variance and skewness risk premia.
The quantile is based on the shape measure, IMBSHAPEt . The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily
frequency.
Quantile 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ticker
XRT 0.27 -0.01 0.12 0.03 0.09
SMH 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.11
XBI 0.18 0.06 0.24 -0.08 0.03
XLY 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.28
IBB 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.28 -0.02
XLV 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.03
XLI 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.16
XLU 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.21
XLE 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.02
IYR 0.11 0.07 0.13 -0.02 0.09
XLF 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.11
DIA 0.46 0.47 0.34 0.43 0.30
IWM 0.19 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.28
SPY 0.59 0.42 0.42 0.52 0.63
QQQ 0.33 0.28 0.56 0.44 0.48
ASHR -0.09 -0.32 -0.18 -0.60 0.22
RSX 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.02
EWJ -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.10 0.00
DXJ 0.26 0.11 0.06 -0.13 0.00
EFA 0.35 0.19 -0.16 0.19 0.24
EWZ 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.06
FXI 0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.08
EEM 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.03
HYG 0.01 0.27 0.08 0.22 0.00
TLT 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08
UNG -0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.04
OIH 0.11 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.04
SLV 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 -0.07
GDX 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.02
GLD 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.00 -0.04
USO 0.15 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01
XOP 0.10 -0.06 0.12 -0.00 -0.07
FXE -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.07
UUP 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.13 0.06
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Table 1.10 – Regression of the risk-neutral skewness on the risk-neutral variance and the
interaction between the risk-neutral variance and the shape measure.
Data is from January 2010 to April 2016. The bold numbers are signiﬁcant at 5%. Daily frequency. I
report the t-statistic for regressors based on White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
VarianceQt Variance
Q
t × IMBSHAPEt adj. R2 Obs
Ticker
XRT -4.28 1.66 0.018 1548
SMH 0.65 0.52 0.006 515
XBI 9.59 -1.56 0.145 540
XLY 0.15 -0.78 0.000 1514
IBB 1.02 -1.31 0.006 1203
XLV 3.80 1.03 0.012 1511
XLI 2.19 0.53 0.002 1531
XLU 1.73 0.16 0.011 1554
XLE 1.67 1.67 0.002 1571
IYR 3.14 0.54 0.004 1566
XLF 5.37 2.25 0.034 1569
DIA 4.46 0.48 0.010 1572
IWM 5.02 0.98 0.013 1572
SPY 6.44 -0.26 0.020 1572
QQQ 0.06 1.48 0.016 1265
ASHR 7.62 -1.83 0.237 205
RSX 3.81 -0.74 0.026 588
EWJ 10.26 1.81 0.087 1259
DXJ -1.41 1.06 0.003 661
EFA 2.94 -0.05 0.007 1571
EWZ 12.05 1.32 0.094 1571
FXI -15.61 0.38 0.109 1571
EEM 1.57 0.63 0.001 1572
HYG -5.21 -0.44 0.015 1245
TLT 11.52 0.69 0.079 1570
UNG 16.51 2.42 0.203 1569
OIH 6.81 3.15 0.037 1527
SLV 3.04 1.18 0.021 1571
GDX 9.18 2.78 0.092 1571
GLD 2.60 1.64 0.026 1572
USO 10.05 1.19 0.092 1572
XOP 7.42 3.03 0.047 1507
FXE -8.21 0.08 0.106 1561
UUP 1.70 2.20 0.019 1282
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Table 1.11 – Panel regression with day and ETF ﬁxed effects.
Daily frequency from January 2010 to April 2016. The total number of observation is 46,148.
Variables T-stat
VarianceQo,t 7.6
VarianceQo,t × IMBSHAPEo,t 3.9
SkewPo,(t ,t+30) 4.3
R2 = 0.04 and within R2 = 0.0088
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2 The Demand for Commodity Options
Semyon Malamud1, Michael C. Tseng1, Yuan Zhang1
1 – EPFL and Swiss Finance Institute
We develop a simple equilibrium model in which commercial hedgers, i.e., producers and
consumers, use commodity options and futures to hedge price and quantity risk. We derive
an explicit relationship between expected futures returns and the hedgers’ demand for out-of-
the-money options, and show that the demand for both calls and puts are positively related to
expected returns, and the relationship is asymmetric, tilted towards puts. We test and conﬁrm
the model predictions empirically using the commitment of traders report from CFTC.
2.1 Introduction
In the original normal backwardation theory of Keynes and Hicks, producers take a short
position in the futures market to hedge their exposure to price risk. Speculators require a
positive risk premium for taking the other side of this trade, leading to positive expected futures
returns. While this theory generates clear predictions about the linear hedging instruments,
it is silent about the effects of hedging with non-linear instruments such as commodity
options. The goal of this paper seeks to ﬁll this gap and derive theoretical predictions about
the interaction of risk premia and hedging demand in the options market.
To this end, we develop a simple, two period general equilibrium model populated by three
types of agents: commodity producers, commodity consumers, and speculators. We assume
that, in addition to price risk, producers face quantity risk: In this case, producers may in fact
ﬁnd it optimal to take a long position in the futures contract,1 and expected futures returns
are positive if and only if price risk is higher than quantity risk. We assume that, in addition to
the futures contract, the agents have access to a full menu of out of the money (OTM) put and
1See, for example, Rolfo [1980].
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call options rendering the market complete. The simple, complete market setup allows us to
derive an explicit formula for the agents’ option demand. We ﬁnd that
(1) the hedgers’ (producers plus consumers) demand for both OTM puts and OTM calls
always has the same sign, and this demand is positively related to expected futures
returns
(2) there is an asymmetry in the demand for OTM puts versus that for OTM calls: the
demand for puts is signiﬁcantly higher in absolute value even if expected returns are
(moderately) positive
(3) the sensitivity of the log of the absolute size of the option demand to log option strike is
positively related to expected returns
(4) the net hedgers’ option demand in terms of OTM calls minus OTM puts is negatively
related to expected futures returns
The intuition behind these ﬁndings is as follows. Since markets are complete and all agents
have the same risk aversion, they linearly share the total revenue of producers and consumers.
This total revenue is either a globally convex or a globally concave function of the spot price,
and commercial hedgers (producers and consumers) jointly sell a fraction of these revenues
to speculators. When these revenues are convex, it involves selling OTM puts and calls; when
they are concave, it involves buying OTM options. Still, agents naturally worry more about the
downside risk, hence the results of item (2). The result of item (3) is a direct implication of
item (1) and (2): As puts dominate calls, the net option demand is driven by short OTM puts.
To test our model predictions empirically, we need to construct a measure of the net (signed)
commercial hedgers’ demand for options. We cannot directly use CFTC commitments of
traders (COT) reports because these data report options demand that is aggregated across
strikes and option types (for example, one cannot distinguish between a short position in
the put and long position in the call). Hence, we cannot directly test the implications (1)-(3).
However, CFTC data provides us a measure of OTM calls minus OTM puts, we then use this
measure to test the prediction (4). We ﬁnd strong support for the prediction on energy and
precious metal sector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews relevant literature. Section 2.3
derives the equilibrium model. Section 2.4 contains empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Our paper belongs to the literature that tries to understand the effects of hedging pressure in
commodity markets. Starting with Keynes [1923] and Hicks [1939], many papers have argued
that hedgers’ supply of futures contracts (hedging pressure) drives down the futures price
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relative to the expected value of the later spot price, and this way it generates a downward
bias (normal backwardation) in the futures price. See, for example, Stein [1961], Cootner
[1960], Cootner [1967], and Stoll [1979]. Subsequent papers have argued that the sign of the
hedging pressure can be ambiguous, for example, due to complementarities in consumer
preferences (see, Hirshleifer [1990]) or due to quantity risk (see, for example, Rolfo [1980],
Newberry and Stiglitz [1981], Newbery [1983], Anderson and Danthine [1983], Hirshleifer
[1988a], and Hirshleifer [1988b].2 The empirical evidence on the link between the commodity
futures hedging pressure and futures returns is mixed. For example, Chang [1985] ﬁnds that
futures prices for grains on average rise when hedgers are short, and fall when hedgers are long.
Consistent with the Keynes-Higgs normal backwardation theory, Kang et al. [2017] ﬁnd that
hedgers are indeed on average net short in most commodity futures markets, while Moskowitz
et al. [2012] and Cheng and Xiong [2014] provide evidence that hedger’s price pressure is an
important driver of the shape of the futures curve. However, Kang et al. [2017] ﬁnd that hedgers
follow short-term contrarian strategies and short-term ﬂuctuations in hedging pressure are
largely driven by the liquidity demands of speculators.3 Taking a longer-term moving average
of the hedging pressure eliminates these short term ﬂuctuations and recovers the validity of
Keynes’ normal backwardation theory. All these papers consider exclusively futures hedging
pressure. To the best our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst one to study the effects of the
hedging pressure in the commodity options market.4
In our model, hedging with options is optimal for producers and consumers because of the
interaction between quantity and price risk. This links our paper to Brown and Toft [2002]
and Gay et al. [2002, 2003] who show in a partial equilibrium setting that producers should
use convex (concave) hedging strategies if price and quantity risks are negatively (positively)
correlated.5 By contrast, we show that in general equilibrium, when both commodity spot
prices and option prices are determined by market clearing, the link between the hedging
strategy and the quantity-price risk correlation is much more subtle.6 The same interaction
between quantity and price risk implies that the shape of the implied volatility smile in our
model can be tilted both ways, depending on which risk dominates. In addition, we show
that the shape of this smile is closely related to expected futures returns: when OTM puts
(OTM calls) are expensive, expected futures returns are positive. These model predictions
are consistent with the ﬁndings of Ellwanger [2015]. Furthermore, our model is also able to
generate a negative commodity variance risk premium (that is, the difference between the risk
2In an inﬂuential paper, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz [1995], argued that backwardation can be attributed to
the option value of commodity production.
3Such effects are partially consistent with the theory of Hong and Yogo [2012] who show that open interest
growth rate is informative about futures returns due to under-reaction to news.
4The only exception is Woodard and Sproul [2016] who study the effects of hedging pressure in the options
market createded by the Federal Crop Insurance Program. See also Gârleanu et al. [2009] who ﬁnd evidence for the
effects of hedging pressure using demand shocks for options of different strikes, as well as Hitzemann et al. [2016]
who studies how hedging pressure impacts option returns in the presence of margin constraints.
5See also Lapan et al. [1991].
6Using a sample of US oil and gas producers, Mnasri et al. [2013] ﬁnd evidence that the correlation between
price and quantity risks is indeed important for hedging demand, but the relationship predicted by Brown and
Toft [2002] does not hold in general.
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neutral variance and the variance under the physical measure), consistent with the ﬁndings of
Doran and Ronn [2008] and Trolle and Schwartz [2010].
Our paper also belongs to the literature on the informational content of options volume for
expected returns. See, for example, Easley et al. [1998], Pan and Poteshman [2006b], Johnson
and So [2012], and Roll et al. [2010b]. While we cannot exclude the effects of asymmetric
information, our model implies that, for commodities, the net demand for calls and puts may
contain information about future returns even when information is symmetric.
Our paper is also closely related to Moskowitz et al. [2012] show that the proﬁtability of time
series momentum strategies arises because speculators proﬁt from time series momentum
at the expense of hedgers, in agreement with Keynes [1923] theory. Importantly, consistent
with Moskowitz et al. [2012], we ﬁnd that the hedging demand in the option markets follows a
one-year cycle, similar to that found in Moskowitz et al. [2012] for the futures market.
2.3 A Model for Commodity Options
There are two time periods, t = 0,1, and two perishable goods, a consumption good and an
investment good. The consumption good also serves as the numeraire and the prices of the
investment good are quoted in the units of the consumption good. There are three types of
agents in the model: producers, consumers, and speculators. All agents have the same CRRA
utility function up (c)= uc (c)=uI (c)= (1−γ)−1c1−γ with relative risk aversion γ. Consumption
takes place at period-1. For simplicity, we assume the exogenous interest rate is 0.
Commodity Market We model the spot commodity market in period-1 as follows: (i) Both
producers and consumers observe the spot price P for the commodity; (ii) Producers investing
κ at period-0, face a productivity shock εq and price uncertainty7 P = εpqδ−1 with some
δ ∈ (0,1). Their production function is q = κε1/δq . Thus, producers’ revenue is given by Pq =
εpqδ = εpεqκδ. (iii) The consumers have a technology to transform Q units of the investment
good into δ−1Qδεp units of consumption good, where εp is their productivity shock. Their
problem is to maximize the total revenue −PQ+δ−1Qδεp , which gives the demand curve
P = εpQδ−1.
Hence, their total revenue is (δ−1−1)PQ = (δ−1−1)εpεqκδ.
We summarize the result from the commodity market in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The producers’ total revenue in the commodity market is
Pq = εpεqκδ,
7This is the demand curve of the consumers.
48
2.3. A Model for Commodity Options
while the consumers’ total revenue is
(δ−1−1)PQ = (δ−1−1)εpεqκδ.
Commodity Options Market We assume that there is a continuum of commodity options
with strike price in the support of the spot commodity price P . The option market opens at
period-0, and as options complete the market, there is a unique pricing kernel M .
Producers In addition to the revenue from the commodity market, the producers receive
period-1 consumption good wp . At period-0, the producers observe the equilibrium pricing
kernel M in the options market and maximize
max
Xp
E [up (wp −κ+εpεqκδ+Xp )] s.t. E [MXp ]= 0.
Consumers In addition to the revenue from the commodity market, the consumers receive
period-1 consumption good wc . Like producers, consumers take positions in the options
market to smooth out consumption across shocks. Given producers’ investment κ and pricing
kernel M for the options market, the consumers’ problem is
max
Xc
E [uc (wc + (δ−1−1)εpεqκδ+Xc )] s.t. E [MXc ]= 0.
Intermediaries Finally, speculators take the other side in the options market and maximize
max
XI
E [uI (wI +XI )] s.t. E [MXI ]= 0.
In equilibrium, market clearing implies XI =−Xp −Xc .
Standard results for CRRA preferences imply that the agents will proportionally split the
aggregate endowment in period-1, wp+wc+wI −κ∗+εpεqδ−1κδ∗, where κ∗ is the equilibrium
production rate. The following is true
Lemma 2. Conditional on the production rate κ∗, the optimal demand for state contingent
claims are given by
Xp = λp (wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)− (wp −κ∗ +εpεqκδ∗)
Xc = λc (wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)− (wc + (δ−1−1)εpεqκδ∗),
whereas the constants λp and λc are consumption shares of producers and consumers, respec-
tively. The pricing kernel is
M =λM (wI +wp+wc−κ∗+εpεqδ−1κδ∗)−γ ,λM = E [(wI +wp+wc−κ∗+εpεqδ−1κδ∗)−γ]−1.
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The equilibrium futures price is
F = E [MP ] = λME
[
εpε
(δ−1)/δ
q κ
δ−1
∗ (wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)−γ
]
.
Since E [M ]= 1, we have
F−E [P ] =Cov(M ,P ) = λM Cov
(
εpε
(δ−1)/δ
q κ
δ−1
∗ , (wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)−γ
)
. (2.1)
Thus, we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 1. The following is true:
(1) If quantity shocks are small (i.e., εq has a small variance), we have
F < E [P ].
Thus, futures prices are expected to appreciate.
(2) If price shocks are small (i.e., εp has a small variance),
F > E [P ].
Thus, futures price are expected to depreciate.
The intuition is as follows: When price shock dominates, producers want to short futures
contract, creating a downward pressure in the futures market. Hence, we have the claim of
item (1). On the other hand, when quantity shock dominates, producers want to long futures
contract, creating an upward pressure in the futures market.
The scenario of item (1) is commonly viewed as the situation when futures prices are in normal
backwardation: Assuming that the spot futures price follows a martingale, E [P ] coincides
with the time zero spot price, P0, in which case (1) implies that P0 > F. Similarly, under the
same martingale condition, item (2) implies that futures prices are in contango: P0 < F. Note
however that this link strongly relies on the assumption that spot prices follow a martingale.
However, within our model, spot prices are almost never martingales because production
decisions themselves depend on the equilibrium risk premium.
2.3.1 Futures Return and Options Demand
Our next goal is to understand the link between futures prices and the demand for options. To
this end, we will assume that both εp , εq are powers of a common stochastic shock Z : εp = Zα
and εq = Zβ for some positive random variable Z . This speciﬁcation allows us to uniquely
map the realizations for the shock Z to spot prices P = εpε(δ−1)/δq κδ−1∗ = κδ−1∗ Zα+β(δ−1)/δ.
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Here, α and β have an intuitive interpretation: They measure the sensitivity of logεp and
logεq to the common shock logZ . Deﬁne
ψ ≡ α+β
α+β(δ−1)/δ . (2.2)
The following result is a direct consequence of (2.1).8
Corollary 2. Expected futures return, E [P ]/F −1, is positive if and only ifψ> 0.
The result of Corollary 2 is very intuitive: In agreement with Proposition 1, futures prices are
expected to appreciate if and only if price shocks dominate quantity shocks. In particular, this
is the case when |α| > |β|. By Lemma 2, we have
Xp (P ) = (δ−1λp −1)(Pκ1−δ∗ )ψκδ∗ + constc ,
Xc (P ) = (δ−1λc − (δ−1−1))(Pκ1−δ∗ )ψκδ∗ + constp .
(2.3)
Market completeness implies that producers can replicate the desired state-contingent con-
tract (2.3) using options. We will assume that agents only trade simple, European calls and
puts with maturity t = 1. Given the time zero spot price, we refer call (put) options with strikes
above (below) F out-of-the-money (OTM). Put-Call parity implies that in the money (ITM)
options are redundant if the agents can trade the underlying futures contract as well as OTM
options. Thus, the optimal trading strategy is not uniquely deﬁned. Everywhere in the sequel,
we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. Agents only trade futures as well as OTM options.9
Given an arbitrary twice continuously differentiable claim W (x), integration by parts implies
that the following is true:10
W (x)=W (F )+W ′(F )(x−F )+
∫F
−∞
W ′′(K )(K −x)+dK +
∫∞
F
W ′′(K )(x−K )+dK ,
and we arrive at the following result.
Lemma 3. Suppose that P takes values in (Pmin,Pmax). Then, producers’ optimal demand for
8 Corollary 2 can be shown by directly substituting P into (2.1):
Cov[M ,P ]=λM Cov[(wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +δ−1(Pκ1−δ∗ )ψκδ∗)−γ,P ]
This is negative, as long asψ> 0. Hence, the futures market is in backwardation.
9The open interest and volume in OTM options is several times higher than that in ITM options for all com-
modities in our sample.
10See, for exampple, Carr and Madan [2001] and Demeterﬁ and Zou [1999].
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options of strike K is given by
∂2X ∗p (K )
∂K 2
dK = ψ(ψ−1)(δ−1λp −1)κ(1−δ)ψ+δ∗ Kψ−2dK ,
∂2X ∗c (K )
∂K 2
dK = ψ(ψ−1)(δ−1λc − (δ−1−1))κ(1−δ)ψ+δ∗ Kψ−2dK ,
(2.4)
while, the joint demand of commercial hedgers (consumers plus producers) for OTM puts
(respectively, OTM calls) is given by
DPut = δ−1(λc +λp −1)ψκψ(1−δ)+δ∗ (Fψ−1−Pψ−1min )
DCall = δ−1(λc +λp −1)ψκψ(1−δ)+δ∗ (Pψ−1max −Fψ−1) .
(2.5)
The consumers hold the most of the variable (risky) part of the endowment, hence, their
option demand aligns perfectly with the hedgers’ option demand. Meanwhile, the producers
may trade differently comparing to the hedgers. In particular, if the producers’ wealth wp is
large, then in equilibrium, they absorb a fraction of option orders from the consumers, leaving
the rest being absorbed by the speculators.
Empirically, we do not observe the separate order-ﬂows for producers and consumers. In-
stead, the information available is on the aggregate order-ﬂows for the commercial hedgers
(producers plus consumers). Hence, in the sequel, we focus on the hedgers’ option demand.
Combining Lemma 3 with Corollary 2, we arrive at the following important result.
Proposition 3. The following is true:
• when ψ < 0, both DPut , DCall (insurance, i.e., puts, seller) are positively related to ex-
pected futures returns (contango)
• when 0 <ψ < 1, both DPut , DCall (insurance buyer) are positively related to expected
futures returns (backwardation)
• when 1 <ψ < 2, both DPut , DCall (insurance seller) are negatively related to expected
futures returns (backwardation)
• when ψ > 2, both DPut , DCall (covered call seller) are negatively related to expected
futures returns (backwardation)
The intuition is as follows: First,ψ reﬂects the relative importance of price shock and quantity
shock, whenψ> 0, the price shock dominates the quantity shock, and the futures market is in
backwardation. Second,ψ also reﬂects the relationship between the aggregate endowment
and commodity price P . In particular, when 0<ψ< 1, the aggregate endowment is a concave
function of the commodity price (more so when the price realization is low), meaning that a
drop in the price reduces disproportionately more aggregate consumption, hence hedgers
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buy options from speculators to hedge this risk, especially puts; when 1<ψ< 2, the aggregate
endowment becomes a convex function of the commodity price, i.e., a drop in the price
reduces disproportionately less aggregate consumption, hence hedgers supply put options to
speculators, i.e., think of an insurance seller; in the extreme case whenψ> 2, an increase in
the commodity price increases disproportionately more aggregate consumption, hedgers sell
call options to speculators, i.e., think of a covered call selling strategy.
We can derive one more corollary from Proposition 3. We will see in the next section, that
CFTC aggregates hedgers’ options demand across puts and calls, and they assign a negative
weight (the options’ Black-Scholes delta) to long positions in put options. Hence, we need
predictions on the relation between expected futures return, and hedgers’ option demand in
terms of DCall −DPut .
Corollary 4. The following result is true:
• whenψ< 0, DCall−DPut (puts seller dominates) are negatively related to expected futures
returns (contango)
• when 0<ψ< 1, DCall −DPut (puts buyer dominates) are negatively related to expected
futures returns (backwardation)
• when 1<ψ< 2, DCall −DPut (puts seller dominates) are positively related to expected
futures returns (backwardation)
• whenψ> 2, both DCall −DPut (covered call seller dominates) are negatively related to
expected futures returns (backwardation)
In fact, we argue that the ﬁrst two cases correspond usually to commodity markets in practice.
For example, for Crude Oil markets, we can ﬁnd periods of contango (the price boom before
the ﬁnancial crisis due to positive demand shock), as well as periods of normal backwardation
(commodity index funds earn positive returns for decades). In addition, the trading volume
in OTM puts is almost always larger than that in OTM calls, suggesting the last item rarely
happens. The third item is also rare for energy and metal market, as when the market is
in backwardation, hedgers buy options instead of selling. Hence, in the empirical section,
we mainly seek to test the ﬁrst two items of Corollary 4. Before proceed to empirical tests,
we want to know whether this result is robust when the production rate κ∗ is endogenously
determined.
2.3.2 Endogenous Production Rate
In this section, we determine the production rateκ in equilibrium, and examine the robustness
of our results, Proposition 3. To do so, we assume that producers are small (continuum of
measure 1), hence their individual production rate does not alter the aggregate production
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rate. Then from Lemma 2, we know the optimal demand of the contingent claims for the
producer is
Xp (κ;κ∗)=λp (κ)(wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)− (wp −κ+εpεqκδ),
given his own production rate κ and the equilibrium production rate κ∗. Speciﬁcally, the
producer’s decision κ only affects the consumption share he receives in equilibrium through
λp (κ) by increasing his individual wealth wp −κ+εpεqκδ. The aggregate endowment instead
is unaffected by κ. From the budget constraint E [MXp ]= 0, we get that
λp (κ)= E [M(wp −κ+εpεqκδ)]/E [M(wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)].
Hence, the producer maximizes his indirect utility function
max
κ
(1−γ)−1λp (κ)1−γE
[
(wI +wp +wc −κ∗ +εpεqδ−1κδ∗)1−γ
]
.
As κ only shows up in the consumption shares λp (κ), we get the ﬁrst-order condition for κ∗ as
κ1−δ∗ = δE [M(κ∗)εpεq ]. (2.6)
This is a ﬁxed point problem to determine κ∗. As we do not have an explicit formula for κ∗,
this makes the comparative statics cumbersome. To have a cleaner prediction, we perturb
the price shock α from a benchmark where the futures price does not exhibit contango nor
normal backwardation, and the option demand is zero.
Benchmark: no aggregate endowment risk Suppose thatα+β= 0, and without loss of gen-
erality, we assume thatα> 0. In this case, the price risk εp and the quantity risk εq are perfectly
negatively correlated, meaning a negative price shock is associated with a positive quantity
shock with the same size. Hence, the aggregate endowment in the economy becomes risk-less,
although the commodity price is still risky. Note that, the producers have no incentives to
hedge the risks in commodity price, as the quantity risk is a nature hedge for price risk. In this
particular example, the pricing kernel M becomes a constant
M = 1,
for any realization of the common shock Z . Hence, from equation (2.6), we have that
κ∗ = δ1/(1−δ).
The consumption share of the producer is
λp =
wp −κ∗ +κδ∗
wI +wc +wp −κ∗ +δ−1κδ∗
,
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and that of the consumer is
λc =
wc + (δ−1−1)κδ∗
wI +wc +wp −κ∗ +δ−1κδ∗
.
For the speculators, we know that their share is 1−λp −λc . The futures price is
F = E [MP ]= E [P ].
Hence, we know that the expected futures return is
E [P ]/F −1= 0.
The equilibrium future spot commodity price P is
P =κδ−1∗ Zα/δ.
Interestingly, the commodity price is risky, but no agents would hedge it.
Perturbation onα We assume that the price risk changes by a small quantity α(1)
α =α+α(1).
The optimal production rate now becomes κ = κ∗ +κ(1). The following is true.
Lemma 4. The optimal production rate is
κ = κ∗ + δ
1−δκ
δ
∗E [logZ ]α
(1). (2.7)
Hence, as long as the price risk increases, i.e., α(1) > 0, we have that the producer increases the
production rate. Next, we use Lemma 3 to get
Proposition 5. The optimal option demand per strike for producer is
Dp,(K )= 
δ−λp
α
κδ∗K
−2α(1)dK , (2.8)
and that for the consumer is
Dc,(K )= 1−δ−λc
α
κδ∗K
−2α(1)dK . (2.9)
Corollary 6. Hence, we know that hedgers’ aggregate option demand per strike is
D(K )= 
1−λp −λc
α
κδ∗K
−2α(1)dk. (2.10)
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Meanwhile, the option demand for OTM puts is
DPut = 
1−λp −λc
α
κδ∗(P
−1
min−F−1)α(1), (2.11)
and the demand for OTM calls is
DCall = 
1−λp −λc
α
κδ∗(F
−1−P−1max)α(1). (2.12)
Lemma 5. The ﬁrst-order expansion of the pricing kernel is
M (1) = γκ
δ∗
−δκ+δw +κδ∗
(E [logZ ]− logZ )α(1). (2.13)
We deﬁne w ≡wI +wp+wc . Thus the difference between the futures price and futures spot price
is
F−E [P]=−
γκδ∗
−δκ∗ +δw +κδ∗
Cov[logZ ,P ]α(1). (2.14)
Note that P = κδ−1∗ Zα/δ.
Hence, we learn that when α> 0, a ‘small’ positive shock to the price risk (ψ> 0) immediately
induce hedgers to buy put options from the speculators, and the expected futures return is
positive (normal backwardation). This implies a positive correlation between expected futures
return and aggregate option demand, consistent with Proposition 3. On the other hand, a
positive wealth shock to the speculators capital wI , assuming α(1) > 0, increases the expected
return for the futures contract, and increases the demand for options for both calls and puts.
Hence, we conﬁrm that our previous results still hold for endogenous production rate κ∗,
when the aggregate endowment risk is ‘small’. In the next section, we test these theoretical
predictions empirically.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we test the model’s predictions on the relationship between the hedgers’ option
demand and the expected futures return.
Empirically, hedgers’ option demand is hard to measure for the following reasons: (i) most of
the commercial hedgers are small and hence they hedge their production risk via dealer banks
(over-the-counter trading); (ii) for large hedgers, they might trade options for reasons other
than hedging the risk of their business; (iii) options trading on exchange (such as Chicago
Mercantile Exchange) is anonymous.
We use the CFTC commitment of traders report to build our proxy for hedgers’ option de-
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mand. This data can partially resolve the issues being mentioned. However, it has its own
shortcomings, which we will discuss now.
CFTC Hedgers’ Option Demand The CFTC disaggregated commitment of traders’ report
provides information on open interest for US exchange-traded futures and options. The data is
generated each Tuesday. The advantages of this data are: (i) the report classiﬁes open interest
by traders’ types: Commercials, Swap Dealers, Money Managers, Other Reportable; (ii) the
data dates back to June, 2006 for the disaggregated version, and to even earlier dates for the
old reporting format; (iii) the report distinguishes long and short positions for each traders’
category.
However, the disadvantages are: (i) the report does not separate options into puts and calls,
nor strikes and maturities; (ii) the report only comes out once a week on Tuesday; (iii) although
the disaggregated format corrects some problems in traders’ classiﬁcation, there are still some
traders being assigned to the wrong group. Speciﬁcally, the puts and calls are transformed
into the equivalent futures open interest by multiplying the corresponding Black-Scholes
delta. Hence, when we see a report with open interest on the long side, it does not tell whether
the group of traders is holding calls, or is selling puts. To circumvent this issue, as we have
already mentioned in the previous section, we compute the net option positions for the group
of traders, which is approximately calls minus puts. The last problem is hard to address, as
we cannot see the identities of traders within each group besides the group name. However,
we know at least that for energy and metal, Commercials include mainly producers and
consumers of the commodity; Swap Dealers might represent the aggregate positions of small
hedgers, or part of speculators’ positions; Money Managers usually represent speculators;
Other Reportable (e.g., pension funds, sovereign funds, high-frequency traders) contains
everyone else.
We compute the option demand measure as follows: For each group of traders, we compute
its option open interest of the long-side and the short-side, by removing the futures positions.
OOILongt =OILong , f utures+optionst −OILong , f uturest .
Then we take the difference between the long side and the short side to get the net option
position
NOOIt =OOILongt −OOIShor tt .
However, to measure the hedgers’ option demand related to shocks, we compute the innova-
tions in the net option positions
DCall−Putt−k,t =NOOIt −k−1
k∑
τ=1
NOOIt−τ,
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for k = 12,24,36,50 weeks. We compute this measure for Commercials, Swap Dealers, Money
Managers, and Other Reportable separately. We expect that Commercials category captures
the option demand of hedgers as deﬁned in our model, while Swap Dealers might capture
partially hedgers and partially speculators’ option demand. For the other two categories, we
sum up their positions, and call them Financials, which is a proxy for the speculators’ option
demand.
According to Corollary 4, we expect the Commercials’ option demand being negatively corre-
lated with the realized futures return, while the Financials’ option demand being positively
correlated with the realized futures return. Formally, we run the following test
Rt ,t+h = β0+β1DCall−Putt−k,t +β2Rt−h,t +β3Rt−k,t + slopet +εt ,t+1 , (2.15)
with h = 1,2,4,12 weeks.
We are mainly interested in the sign of β1. We also control for the following variables to
isolate the information content of our measure: (i) lagged returns, as commodity futures
returns exhibit positive auto-covariance (see, e.g., Moskowitz et al. [2012]); (ii) lagged returns
corresponding to the option demand measure, as option demand and underlying futures
returns are correlated contemporaneously; (iii) slope of the futures term structure, i.e., the log
difference between the front month futures contract and the next period futures contract.
Tables below conﬁrm our main predictions: the hedgers’ net option demand negatively
predicts future returns for energy and metal. In particular, Table 2.1 shows that for energy
sector, the Commercials’ net option demand indeed negatively forecast front month futures
return. Interestingly, in Table 2.2, we see that for metal sector, the Commercials’ net option
demand has the right sign, but does not show much statistical signiﬁcance. Hence, we need to
understandwhether this is due tomeasurement error, or due to ourmodel’s lack of explanation.
We proceed by looking at the Swap Dealers’ option demand, which might capture partially
the hedgers’ demand. If a signiﬁcant fraction of gold hedgers use swap dealers to facilitate
hedging, we should expect that the Swap Dealers’ option demand negatively predicts futures
return. Table 2.3 conﬁrms our conjecture. In addition, if we cannot accurately measure the
hedgers’ option demand, we may look directly at the speculators’ option demand. Table 2.4
shows that indeed, the Financials’ option demand positively predicts the futures return.
2.5 Conclusions
We develop an extension of Keynes-Higgs normal backwardation theory that incorporates
hedging using commodity options. Our model predicts that hedgers’ net demand for op-
tions is negatively related to expected futures returns. We use CFTC data on commodity
options to construct net demand measures for energy and metal sector and conﬁrm the model
predictions empirically.
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Table 2.1 – CFTC Commercials’ (Energy) Option Demand v.s. Expected Futures Return.
The numbers shown are the t-statistics, and the data ranges from 2006.06-2018.04. The regressions
errors are corrected according to Newey-West with lags equal to the forecasting horizon.
Horizon (#Weeks) 1 2 4 12
Lag (#Weeks)
Crude Oil (CL) 12 -2.26 -3.54 -4.78 -1.79
24 -2.36 -3.08 -3.42 -1.57
36 -2.32 -2.84 -3.03 -1.34
50 -2.22 -2.62 -2.65 -1.20
Natural Gas (NG) 12 -1.81 -1.60 -1.91 -1.51
24 -1.91 -1.60 -1.92 -2.27
36 -2.03 -1.78 -1.95 -1.95
50 -1.85 -1.56 -1.65 -1.83
Gasoil (RB) 12 -2.63 -1.63 -0.97 -2.03
24 -2.91 -2.10 -1.48 -2.80
36 -3.09 -2.25 -1.54 -1.97
50 -2.99 -2.27 -1.53 -2.32
Heating Oil (HO) 12 -2.34 -2.35 -1.62 -1.44
24 -2.36 -2.26 -1.51 -1.49
36 -2.49 -2.42 -1.66 -1.64
50 -2.63 -2.63 -1.86 -1.66
Table 2.2 – CFTC Commercials’ (Metal) Option Demand v.s. Expected Futures Return.
The numbers shown are the t-statistics, and the data ranges from 2006.06-2018.04. The regressions
errors are corrected according to Newey-West with lags equal to the forecasting horizon.
Horizon (#Weeks) 1 2 4 12
Lag (#Weeks)
Gold (GC) 12 -1.25 0.27 -1.47 -0.27
24 -0.99 0.12 -1.80 -0.96
36 -0.92 -0.02 -1.74 -0.31
50 -0.93 -0.15 -1.84 -0.47
Silver (SI) 12 0.78 0.52 -0.78 -0.41
24 -0.09 -0.42 -1.80 -1.06
36 -0.56 -0.93 -2.18 -1.29
50 -0.80 -1.14 -2.31 -1.55
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Table 2.3 – CFTC Swap Dealers’ (Metal) Option Demand v.s. Expected Futures Return.
The numbers shown are the t-statistics, and the data ranges from 2006.06-2018.04. The regressions
errors are corrected according to Newey-West with lags equal to the forecasting horizon.
Horizon (#Weeks) 1 2 4 12
Lag (#Weeks)
Gold (GC) 12 -2.25 -1.96 -1.98 -1.62
24 -1.79 -1.55 -1.96 -1.36
36 -1.64 -1.45 -1.78 -1.22
50 -1.49 -1.35 -1.79 -1.16
Silver (SI) 12 -1.52 -1.36 -1.40 0.27
24 -1.42 -1.49 -1.39 0.36
36 -1.43 -1.55 -1.37 0.37
50 -1.43 -1.55 -1.32 0.14
Table 2.4 – CFTC Financials’ (Metal) Option Demand v.s. Expected Futures Return.
The numbers shown are the t-statistics, and the data ranges from 2006.06-2018.04. The regressions
errors are corrected according to Newey-West with lags equal to the forecasting horizon.
Horizon (#Weeks) 1 2 4 12
Lag (#Weeks)
Gold (GC) 12 2.50 1.65 2.43 1.58
24 1.97 1.36 2.40 1.84
36 1.80 1.31 2.15 1.47
50 1.69 1.26 2.24 1.56
Silver (SI) 12 1.00 1.22 1.52 -0.27
24 1.28 1.65 1.83 0.04
36 1.46 1.85 1.92 0.19
50 1.53 1.90 1.91 0.34
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We model a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading
platform with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor’s
order is informative about the asset’s payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor
use this information in the interdealer market. Increasing the number of contacted dealers
lowers markups through competition but increases the dealers’ costs of providing the asset
through information leakage. We then compare a centralized market in which investors can
trade among themselves in a central limit order book to a market in which investors have to
use the electronic platform to trade the asset. With imperfect competition among dealers,
investor welfare is higher in the centralized market if private values are strongly dispersed or if
the mass of investors is large.
3.1 Introduction
Trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets is traditionally done over the phone, i.e. an investor
who wants to trade an asset has to call a dealer and negotiate the price bilaterally. A recent
trend in OTC markets is the growing electroniﬁcation. Instead of calling dealer by dealer
separately, an investor can use electronic trading platforms to send a request-for-quote (RFQ)
to many dealers at once to obtain quotes at which the dealers are willing to trade. Some
estimates suggest that in 2015, more than 40% of OTC-traded credit default swaps and more
than 60% of OTC-traded interest rate swaps were traded electronically.1
Electronic trading platforms can potentially increase the connectedness between market
1See for instance Stafford [2016] for a brief overview of recent developments in OTC markets.
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participants and thereby make OTC markets more exchange-like. However, there remains a
fundamental difference between centralized exchanges and electronic trading platforms in
OTC markets. Whereas exchanges can be viewed as all-to-all platforms, electronic trading
platforms in OTC markets are one-to-many platforms. On exchanges, each market participant
can trade through a central limit order book with all other market participants. On electronic
trading platforms, the RFQ trading protocol prescribes that only one investor can initiate
a trade at a time and choose one dealer to trade with. Therefore, electronic trading still
incorporates many of the features of traditional bilateral trading in OTC markets.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we model the trading process on trading
platforms via an RFQ protocol. In our model, an investor who has some information about the
asset’s payoff can choose a quantity to trade on the platform. In equilibrium, this quantity is
informative about the asset’s payoff. Our model therefore provides a theoretical foundation of
information leakage on electronic trading platforms that is examined in empirical studies such
as Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] or Hagströmer and Menkveld [2016]. Increasing the
number of dealers who are contacted by an RFQ has three competing effects on trading costs:
If an RFQ is sent to more dealers, (i) competition among dealers lowers the expected markup
the investor has to pay, (ii) the investor is more likely to receive a quote in the ﬁrst place, since
each dealer’s response is uncertain and (iii) information leakage about the asset’s fundamental
value increases the dealer’s cost of providing the asset, which results in worse prices for the
investor. If dealers respond very frequently to each RFQ, the cost of information leakage
dominates the beneﬁts of more competition and contacting only few dealers maximizes the
investor’s payoff. Only if the dealers’ RFQ response rate is sufﬁciently low, an RFQ has to be
sent to a certain minimum number of dealers in order for an equilibrium to exist in the ﬁrst
place. In an off-equilibrium analysis, we deal with the price impact an investor faces on the
platform. The presence of adverse selection makes the permanent price impact on the trading
platform larger than the permanent price impact in the interdealer market. This result is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017].
Second, we determine conditions under which investors are better off trading on a centralized
exchange among themselves and when they are better off in the two-tiered market structure
with an electronic trading platform and an interdealer market. In our model, all investors
are equally informed about the asset’s fundamental value and beneﬁts from trade in the
centralizedmarket only arise due to private values of obtaining the asset (e.g. hedging beneﬁts).
Since dealers are less informed about the asset’s value, investors can also beneﬁt from their
information about the asset in the OTC market structure. The dealers are willing to trade with
the more informed investor, because they expect to be able to partially offset the trade at a
favorable price in the interdealer market. If private values of obtaining the asset are small,
investors are better off in the OTC market structure where they can beneﬁt from information
asymmetries between them and the dealers. On the other hand, if the total mass of investors
is large, information about the asset’s fundamental value quickly leaks into the interdealer
market. In this case, the price investors have to pay on the platform is approximately the
sum of the fundamental value and a markup. Then, investors are better off in the centralized
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exchange where they can avoid the dealers’ markups and uncertainty about transactions. Only
if competition among dealers is very high, investors will prefer to trade in the OTC markets. In
this case, markups are very low, a trade is very likely and dealers efﬁciently intermediate trades
between their customers. Additionally, investors can beneﬁt from their information advantage
over dealers in the OTC market. These results extend previous research on the comparison
between OTC markets and exchanges in terms of investor welfare [Babus and Parlatore, 2017,
Glode and Opp, 2017]. In this strand of literature, our study is the ﬁrst one to speciﬁcally look
at electronic trading platforms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 relates our paper to previous research. In Section
3.3, we explain the basic setup that is studied in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we slightly modify
this setup to accommodate a continuum of investors and compare the two-tiered market
structure to a centralized market. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.6. All proofs
are in Appendix A.
3.2 Related Literature
Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017] empirically study the two-tiered index CDS market in the US.
In the market for the most liquid index CDSs, the Dodd-Frank Act required trading via swap
execution facilities (SEFs). As a result, investors trade with dealers almost exclusively via
RFQs on electronic trading platforms. Dealers, on the other hand, trade among themselves
via a continuous limit order book.2 This market structure very closely corresponds to the
setup we assume in our paper. The results of Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017] suggest that the
permanent price impact in the D2C segment, i.e. when the investor trades on the platform, is
higher than the permanent price impact in the interdealer market. These results justify our
assumption that investors have some information about the asset that dealers do not have and
are consistent with our result that there is information leakage from the trading platform to the
dealers. Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] empirically study what kind of bonds are traded
over the phone and which bonds are traded on an electronic trading platform. Controlling
for endogenous venue selection, they examine the trading costs on these two trading venues.
Hagströmer and Menkveld [2016] estimate information ﬂows between dealers and provide
further empirical evidence for information leakage on trading platforms in OTC markets.
Bjønnes et al. [2008] and Bjønnes et al. [2016] argue that dealers in the foreign exchange
market learn from their clients’ order ﬂow and exploit this information in the interdealer
market.
Babus and Parlatore [2017] and Glode and Opp [2017] theoretically study investor welfare in
OTC markets and centralized markets. Our model is different from those studies, since we
speciﬁcally assume an RFQ trading protocol in the OTC market. Moreover, the information
structure in ourmodel differs from that in Babus and Parlatore [2017], sincewe have a common
2Block trades are exempt from the requirement to be traded on SEFs. However, most trades in the interdealer
market are executed in the continuous limit order book, which also allows for mid-market matching and workup.
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value of the asset for both investors and dealers. Compared to Glode and Opp [2017] we
allow the investor to trade continuous quantities of the asset in the OTC market. Malamud
and Rostek [2017] show that decentralized exchange markets may be more efﬁcient than
centralized ones. Lester et al. [2017] show in a search-theoretic model that competition in
fragmented markets may decrease welfare.
In modeling the information leakage on trading platforms, our paper relates to a large strand
of literature that models how information is shared between economic agents. Notable papers
in this strand of literature include Dufﬁe and Manso [2007], Dufﬁe et al. [2009], Andrei and
Cujean [2017] and Babus and Kondor [2016]. Traditionally, OTC markets are modeled as pure
search markets as for instance in Dufﬁe et al. [2005], Weill [2007], Lagos and Rocheteau [2009],
Gârleanu [2009], Lagos et al. [2011], Feldhütter [2005], Pagnotta and Philippon [2011] or Lester
et al. [2015]. Zhu [2012] and Dufﬁe et al. [2017] explicitly model dealer markets. Our paper
differs from all of those those papers since we consider an electronic trading platform.
Our assumption that dealers’ responses on trading platforms are uncertain has been used by
Jovanovic and Menkveld [2015] and Yueshen [2017] to model the behavior of market makers
in central limit order books to derive similar random-pricing strategies.3
We also draw on the techniques of noisy rational-expectations models of Grossman and Stiglitz
[1980], Hellwig [1980] and Diamond and Verrecchia [1981]. These models assume that agents
behave competitively. Kyle [1989] showed that those models can be extended to allow for
strategic traders that take their price impact into account. However, few closed-form solutions
are available in this case. Since the competitive case is generally viewed as a reasonable
approximation to the strategic case in large markets [Vives, 2010], we will model a competitive
dealer market.
As Pagano and Röell [1996] argue, auction markets are in many ways more transparent than
bilateral dealer markets. Naik et al. [1999] show that increased post-trade transparency has an
ambiguous effect on dealers risk-sharing ability in two-tiered markets. Other papers who study
the effects of transparency include De Frutos and Manzano [2002] and Yin [2005]. In this paper,
however, we do not consider any speciﬁc disclosure policies that are enforced by regulators.
In our model, information is disseminated through the different trading mechanisms.
3.3 Model
There are two periods and two types of agents. In the ﬁrst period, an investor can contact a
number of dealers via an RFQ trading protocol on an electronic trading platform to buy or sell
a quantity of an asset. In the second period, dealers trade with each other in a central limit
order book. After period 2, the dividend is paid. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3Random-pricing strategies in turn have their origin in the consumer search literature. See for instance Varian
[1980], Burdett and Judd [1983], Stahl [1989] and Janssen et al. [2005, 2011].
64
3.3. Model
Figure 3.1 – Timeline
RFQ on platform interdealer market
period 1 period 2
dividend payment
The asset pays an uncertain dividend D = θ+ε after the second period, where θ and ε are
both independent and normally distributed random variables with zero mean and variances
σ2ε > 0 and σ2θ > 0, respectively. The informed investor knows the realization of θ already in the
beginning of period 1. The investor also receives a private beneﬁt δ∼N (0,σ2
δ
), with σ2
δ
≥ 0
for holding one unit of the asset. This private beneﬁt is realized in the beginning of period 1
and is independent from all other random variables. Only the investor can observe δ.
There are N ,N N ≥ 2 dealers. On the trading platform, the investor can specify the quantity
x of the asset he wants to trade. The investor also selects M dealers, with N  M ≤ N from
which he wants to obtain prices at which they are willing to offer quantity x of the asset. The
dealers respond independently with probability q ∈ (0,1] to the RFQ. That dealers do not
necessarily respond may reﬂect the cost of paying attention. We will throughout this paper
assume that the number of contacted dealers M is exogenously given, i.e. the trading protocol
speciﬁes that the investor has to contact exactly M dealers. This is a slight simpliﬁcation of
RFQ protocols in real-world markets where investors can often freely choose a number of
dealers to contact.
The dealers are ex ante identical and hold zero initial inventory in the beginning of period 1.
In period 2, the aggregate supply of the asset in the interdealer market is noisy. We denote
the aggregate supply of the asset in the interdealer market by W . This aggregate supply is
normally distributed: W ∼N (0,σ2W ) and σ2W > 0. A noisy aggregate supply is necessary in
order to prevent uninformed dealers from observing the information of informed dealers. One
can interpret noise in the aggregate supply as demand from noise traders or inventory shocks
to dealers’ portfolios, even though there is a slight difference between inventory shocks and
noisy aggregate supply. Both dealers and the investor have mean-variance preferences. There
is no discounting and each agent’s utility is linear in the payments made when trading the
asset. Letωk denote dealer k’s ﬁnal inventory in the end of period 2 and let Zk denote the sum
of all payments made or received by dealer k from trading the asset. Then dealer k’s utility in
the end of period 2 with ﬁnal inventory ωk is given by
Ud (ωk ,Z )=ωk ·E(D|Ik )−
γd
2
·ω2k ·V(D|Ik )−Zk , (3.1)
where γd > 0 is the dealers’ risk-aversion parameter. The expectation and the variance in
equation (3.1) are taken with respect to each dealer k’s speciﬁc information setIk , which will
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be determined later. Equation (3.1) says that dealers care linearly about the mean of their
expected dividend payment in the end of period 1 and sum they have to pay in both period 1
and 2. They also have to pay an inventory cost which is increasing in the expected variance of
the dividend payment. This inventory cost depends on the risk-aversion parameter γd > 0.
It is clear that equation (3.1) can be derived from a ﬁrst-order condition of an exponential
utility function. We speciﬁcally do not assume exponential utility because an exponential
utility function and the functional form speciﬁed in equation (3.1) have different implications
for the equilibrium on the platform. On the platform, a dealer has to take into account the
possibility of being undercut by another dealer when giving quotes to the investor. The model
becomes more tractable, if the dealers’ utility is linear in the payments made when trading.
We will assume that the dealers follow symmetric strategies on the platform and symmetric
and linear strategies in the interdealer market.
Similar to the dealers, the investor has mean-variance preferences. The investor, however, also
receives the private beneﬁt δ per unit of the asset held. If the investor buys a quantity x1 ∈R
on the platform at price p1, the investor’s utility is given by
UI (x1,p1)= x1 · (θ+δ)− γI
2
· x21 ·σ2ε−p1x1, (3.2)
where γd > 0 is the investor’s risk-aversion parameter. Comparing (3.1) and (3.2), note that
the investor’s expectation of the dividend payment and its variance is given by θ and σε,
respectively. On the other hand, dealers potentially learn about the dividend from the other
agents and thus have a less trivial information set Ik for each dealer k. Also, dealers trade
with each other, which results in a more complex ﬁnal inventory ωk and more complex total
payments Zk for each dealer k.
When dealing with the case of one investor in Section 3.4, we need to make a technical
assumption in order to keep the model tractable. In Section 3.4, we will assume the presence
of an “outside agent”. If the investor contacts M < N ,M > 0 dealers on the platform, these
M dealers will learn from the investors about the the realization of θ. Thus, there will be
informed and uninformed dealers in the interdealer market. In the interdealer market, the
uninformed dealers may then make inferences about the dividend level from the observed
market price. It will turn out that this price is affected by both the dealers’ inventories and
the informed dealers’ expectation of the dividend payment. In order to keep this inference
problem tractable, we make the dealers’ inventory independent of the expected dividend level.
To this end, we assume that a dealer who traded on the platform with the investor offsets this
trade with the outside agent, who does not participate in the interdealer market. The outside
agent does not behave strategically. The price at which the dealer offsets his trade with the
investor is such that the dealer is indifferent between trading with the outside agent and going
directly to the interdealer market. This way, we keep the dealers’ inventories independent of
the dividend level and still keep the key economic trade-offs that the dealers and the investor
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face in our model. This setup is summarized in Figure 3.2. After the trader has offset his trade
with the outside agent, all dealers start to trade in the interdealer market. A version of our
model without the outside agent will be studied in Section 3.5.
Figure 3.2 – The outside agent
interdealer marketdealer
outside agent
outside option
offset trade
reference price
3.4 Equilibrium with one investor
The equilibrium is determined by backward induction. The ﬁrst step is to establish the
equilibrium in the interdealer market. We will assume and later verify that the investor reveals
a noisy signal about the dividend level θ to the dealers he contacts. After an equilibrium in the
interdealer market has been established, dealers on the platform can anticipate their expected
ﬁnal payoff conditional on the quantity they trade on the platform. This payoff will ultimately
be a key determinant of the expected price for the asset on the platform which is derived by
standard auction-theoretic arguments. Using the derived quoting strategies of the dealers and
assuming that the quantity the investor wants to trade is linear in θ+δ, an equilibrium on the
trading platform can be constructed.
3.4.1 The equilibrium in the interdealer market
The equilibrium in the interdealer market considered in this paper is a rational expectations
equilibrium in linear demand schedules as ﬁrst studied by Grossman and Stiglitz [1980].
This means that dealers behave competitively. Even though not completely realistic, this
assumption can be viewed as a rather good approximation in the case of large interdealer
markets.
Let xk denote the quantity of the asset that dealer k buys in the interdealer market. Since we
assume that a dealer who trades on the platform offsets his trade with a outside agent, the
ﬁnal inventoryωk of dealer k is equal to the traded quantity in the interdealer market: ωk = qk
for all k ∈ {1, ...,N }.
Since M ≤N dealers have been contacted on the platform, there will be M informed dealers,
who observe θ+δ from the investor’s demand. The other N −M dealers are uninformed and
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will use the market price to make inferences about the dividend level. In the following, we will
represent all dealers by the set {1, ...,N } and say that dealer k is informed if k ≤M . Conversely,
we say that dealer k is uninformed if k >M .
Let p2 denote the price for the asset in the interdealer market. Differentiating the dealer’s
utility (3.1) with respect to qk and using
∂Zk
∂qk
= p2 gives the ﬁrst-order condition
E(D|Ik )−γdωkV(D|Ik )−p2 = 0. (3.3)
Since ωk = qk , the second order condition is −γdV(D|Ik)< 0. The second order condition
always holds, since γd > 0 and V(D|Ik)≥ σ2ε. If dealer k receives the signal sd := θ+δ, one
obtains by standard Bayesian updating that
ξ := E(D|sd )=
σ2
θ
sd
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
. (3.4)
Similarly, one obtains
τξ :=
1
σ2
ξ
:= 1
V(D|sd )
= 1
σ2
θ
σ2
δ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
+σ2ε
, (3.5)
where we deﬁned τξ and σ
2
ξ
as the precision and the variance of the dividend payment based
on the informed dealers’ information that includes the signal sd .
The ﬁrst order condition (3.3) now implies the following demand schedule:
qk =
τξ(ξ−p2)
γd
for k ≤M . (3.6)
If dealer k is uninformed, his demand is assumed to be of the form
qk =
E(D|p2)−p2
γdV(D|p2)
for k >M . (3.7)
Equation (3.7) takes into account that uninformed dealers can only learn about the conditional
distribution of D by observing the market price p2. We will use the standard approach to
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conjecture a price that is linear in ξ and the aggregate supply of the asset W :
p2 = aξ+bW, (3.8)
with a,b ∈R. Then, uninformed dealers can use the normal projection theorem to calculate
E(D|p2) and V(D|p2).
In equilibrium, also the market clearing condition
N∑
k=1
qk =W (3.9)
has to be satisﬁed. Using (3.6) and (3.7) in (3.9) determines the market clearing price. Matching
of coefﬁcients in the obtained expression for the market clearing price with the coefﬁcients
in the conjectured expression (3.8) then gives the rational expectations equilibrium price
function. This price function in turn determines the uninformed dealers’ equilibrium demand
schedules.
The following Proposition conﬁrms the existence of an equilibrium in the interdealer market
and states the corresponding expressions for equilibrium price.
Proposition 1. There is always a rational expectations equilibrium such that the market clear-
ing price is given by (3.8). Deﬁne
ρ : = σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
, (3.10)
τu : = 1
Var (D|p2)
= 1
σ2
θ
+σ2 −ψρσ2θ
, (3.11)
ψ : = a
2ρσ2
θ
a2ρσ2
θ
+b2σ2W
= ρ
ρ+ γ
2
dσ
2
W
M2τ2
ξ
σ2
θ
(3.12)
Then a and b are given by
a = Mτξ+ (N −M)ψτu
Mτξ+ (N −M)τu
(3.13)
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and
b =− γd
Mτξ
a, (3.14)
One has a > 0 if M > 0. One also has a ≤ 1 with strict inequality if M <N.
The fact that a < 1 for M <N means tha the price in the interdealer market is inefﬁcient in the
sense that the price does not fully reﬂect the informed dealers’ information. In the absence
of private beneﬁts for the investor (σ2
δ
= 0), dealers are only willing to trade with the investor
because of this informational inefﬁciency in the interdealer market.
3.4.2 The equilibrium on the trading platform
The equilibrium on the trading platform is derived as follows. We will assume that dealers
who are contacted by the investor can observe sd = θ+δ and therefore form a conditional
expectation of θ given by ξ as deﬁned in (3.4). We will then use Proposition 1 and the optimal
demand schedules (3.6) to determine the lowest price at which a dealer is willing to sell (or the
highest price at which he is willing to buy) a given quantity of the asset. The dealers then infer
from the investor’s utility function the maximum markup they can charge. In equilibrium,
dealers will charge a random markup on the platform. The expectation of this price can be
used to determine the investor’s equilibrium strategy that reveals sd .
Assume an investor submitted an RFQ to M dealers on the platform to buy x units of the asset
(if x < 0, the investor wants to sell). If a dealer is contacted on the platform, but does not
trade the asset, he will observe sd and will therefore be informed in the interdealer market,
expecting a dividend level of ξ. LetVd ,1 :R
2 →R denote the function that maps the expectation
ξ and dealer k’s traded quantity to dealer k’s expected utility that he will get after period 2. The
dealer will anticipate that the price p2 is a linear function of ξ and W as stated in Proposition
1. Now, the optimal demand schedule (3.6) and the dealers utility function (3.1) imply the
following payoff from not trading (i.e. from trading quantity 0):
Vk,1(θ,0) := Ek
[
qk (D−p2)−
γd
2
σ2ξq
2
k
]
= ξ
2(1−a)2+b2σ2W
2γdσ2ξ
.
We now consider the case in which dealer k sells quantity x to the investor4 and goes directly
to the interdealer market, while other dealers think that dealer k already offset his trade with
the outside agent. Now, dealer k has the initial inventory −x in the beginning of period 2.
However, only dealer k knows that.
4If x < 0 the dealer is buying from the investor.
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The following result states the expected price in the interdealer market for dealer k and dealer
k’s optimal demand.
Lemma 1. Assume dealer k traded quantity x 	= 0 with the investor on the platform and directly
goes to the interdealer market. Let the other dealers believe, dealer k offset his trade before going
to the interdealer market. Then, according to dealer k’s information, the price in the interdealer
market is given by
p2 = aξ−bx+bW
and his optimal demand schedule is given by
qk =
ξ−p2
γdσ
2
ξ
+x,
where a and b are deﬁned as in Proposition 1.
Using Lemma 1, one can calculate dealer k’s expected utility if he goes directly to the inter-
dealer market holding a quantity −x 	= 0 and having expectation about the dividend payment
ξ.
Vk,1(ξ,x) := Ek
[
D(qk −x)−p2qk −
γd
2
σ2ξ(qk −x)2
]
= ξ
2(1−a)2+2(1−a)bξx+b2σ2W +b2x2
2γdσ2ξ
− (aξ−bx)x.
Comparing Vk,1(ξ,x) and Vk,1(ξ,0) one can observe that the dealer expects a different re-
turn from holding a ﬁnal inventory due to a different expected price. The second term in
Vk,1(ξ,x) represents the additional payment a dealer has to make to offset his inventory x in
the interdealer market. We deﬁne
pc (x) :=
Vk,1(ξ,0)−Vk,1(ξ,x)
x
k ≤M (3.15)
as the break-even price for any contacted dealer k. A dealer who charges pc (x) per quantity
of the asset and sells x units to the investor, does not change his ﬁnal utility. The payment
from the investor exactly matches the difference in utility due to different inventory holdings.
71
Chapter 3. Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange
Analogously, we deﬁne
pv (x) := θ+δ− γI
2
xσ2ε =
ξ(σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
)
σ2
θ
− γI
2
xσ2ε (3.16)
as the price at which the investor is indifferent between trading and not trading the asset. As
one can immediately verify, equation (3.2) impliesUI (x,pv (x))= 0. One can interpret pc (x) as
the cost for each contacted dealer of supplying x units of the asset. Analogously, pv (x) is the
investor’s value of acquiring x units of the asset. The investor can only trade a certain quantity
x > 0 with a dealer if pv (x)≥ pc (x). Analogously, it has to hold that pc (x)≥ pv (x) if x < 0.
In the following, we assume that dealers follow symmetric strategies when giving a quote to
the investor. This approach is standard, since dealers are ex-ante identical. In the appendix
we show that standard search-theoretic arguments imply that the price a dealer quotes on the
platform for a certain quantity x has to be a continuous random variable if pv (x) 	= pc (x). Let
Fx :R→ [0,1] denote the distribution of the price a dealer quotes on the platform conditional
on the quantity x that the investor wants to trade. If x > 0 and pv (x)> pc (x), then pv (x) will
turn out to be the supremum of the support of Fx . That quoting a higher price than pv (x)
cannot be optimal follows fromUI (x,p)< 0 for p > pv (x) and x > 0. The investor would not be
willing to buy the asset at such a price since doing so would make him worse off. Analogously,
pv (x) is the inﬁmum of the support of the distribution of quoted prices if x < 0. The investor
would not be willing to sell the asset at a lower price.
Dealers are only willing to quote random prices if the expected proﬁt they make is the same
for any price in the support of Fx . If pv (x) is in the support of Fx , this indifference condition
means that
x(p−pc (x))
M−1∑
j=0
(
M −1
j
)
(1−q)M−1− j q j (1−Fx(p)) j = (1−q)M−1(pv (x)−pc (x))x (3.17)
has to hold for all p ∈ supp(Fx). The left-hand side of equation (3.17) describes the expected
proﬁt a dealer makes by quoting any p ∈ supp(Fx). The payment x(p −pc (x)) in excess of
the indifference level xpc (x) is weighted by the probability that the dealer has the best quote
among all dealers that respond to the RFQ. Since the response of a dealer is uncertain and
occurs with probability q < 1, one has to consider the cases in which j = 0, ...,M −1 other
dealers respond. The right hand side describes the expected proﬁt for a dealer that quotes
pv (x). Since Fx is continuous, this dealer will only sell the asset if no other dealer responds to
the RFQ. This happens with probability (1−q)M−1. In this case, the dealer’s utility will increase
by x(pv (x)−pc (x))> 0.
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The following result gives the closed-form expression for the distribution function Fx that
solves (3.17) for any x with x(pv (x)−pc (x))> 0. The last inequality is a necessary condition
for the existence of strictly positive beneﬁts of trade between dealers on the platform and the
investor. In the statement of Lemma 2, we will leave implicit that pc and pv depend on x. In
Section 3.5, we will study a version of the model in which the dealers’ cost pc does not depend
on x. Since Lemma 2 holds irrespective of what variables pv and pv depend on, we will state it
without reference to any of those variables.
Lemma 2. Let pc be the dealers’ cost of providing a certain quantity x ∈R\ {0} of the asset and
let pv denote the investor’s value of acquiring x units of the asset. Let the investor submit an
RFQ to M ≥ 2 dealers on the platform to trade quantity x with x(pv −pc )> 0. Let q < 1. Assume
that dealers who get contacted know θ.
If a dealer responds to an RFQ, he will charge a random price that is distributed according to
the distribution function Fx. This function is deﬁned by
Fx(p) := 1
q
− 1−q
q
(
pv −pc
p−pc
)1/(M−1)
. (3.18)
If x > 0, the support of Fx is given by [px ,pv ], where px is determined by Fx(px)= 0 and satisﬁes
px > pc .
If x < 0, the support of Fx is given by [pv ,px ], where px is again determined by Fx(px)= 0 and
satisﬁes px < pc .
In this case, the expected price the investor has to pay for the asset conditional on at least one
response to the RFQ is given by
P (x) := E(p1 | x,at least one response)=
∫
supp(Fx )
pdGx(p)= pc +κ(pv −pc ), (3.19)
where the distribution Gx :R→ [0,1] is deﬁned by
Gx(p) := 1− (1−qFx(p))
M
1− (1−q)M
and
κ := Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M ∈ [0,1) (3.20)
If q = 1, Bertrand competition implies that dealers have to set a price that equal to their cost pc .
Thus, the above expression for P (x) holds for all q ∈ (0,1].
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Equation (3.19) states that the expected price the investor receives on the platform is equal
to the dealers cost pc plus a fraction of the total gains from trade pv −pc . The fraction of this
surplus that the investor has to pay is equal to κ, deﬁned as in (3.20). Thus, κ can be viewed as
the endogenously determined bargaining power of the dealers. By taking derivatives, it can
be shown that κ is decreasing in M and q , which is consistent with economic intuition. As
M becomes larger, competition among the dealers for the business of the investor increases.
This competition is also higher, if the presence of other dealers on the platform becomes more
likely.
Note that the results in Lemma 2 required the assumptions that x(pv − pc ) > 0 and that
contacted dealers observe θ+δ. In the remaining part of this section we will derive an optimal
strategy of the investor that allows both assumptions to hold in equilibrium. We will restrict
the possible strategies of the investor to strategies that are linear in the sum θ+δ. This means
that the quantity the investor wants to trade is a (positive) multiple of θ+δ. It is obvious that
dealers then can infer θ+δ from the quantity the investor wants to trade. However, it is a
nontrivial result that the investor ﬁnds it indeed optimal to reveal θ+δ and the associated
information about θ through his choice of the quantity x. The reason why such an equilibrium
is possible, even as the private value δ becomes negligible, lies in the fact that the parameter a
as deﬁned in 1 is generally less than one. If the investor reveals a given value of θ+δ to the
dealers, the dealers expect a dividend payment equal to ξ as deﬁned in (3.4). The price for
the asset in the interdealer market will be ξa < ξ in expectation. This price in the interdealer
market determines the cost for dealers of providing the asset, which according to Lemma 2
determines the expected price the investor receives on the platform. If a < 1, the quotes the
investor gets on the platform are less sensitive to θ than the investor’s utility. This makes an
equilibrium possible in which the investor partially reveals his information θ to the dealers.
We now conjecture that the investor’s demand for the asset on the platform is given by
x =α(θ+δ), (3.21)
for some α ∈R. In the appendix we show that the expected price P (x) from Proposition 2 is
linear in x and ξ:
P (x)=β1ξ+β2x, (3.22)
with β1,β2 ∈ R. From the investor’s conjectured strategy (3.21), the contacted dealers infer
74
3.4. Equilibrium with one investor
θ+δ= xα . Using (3.2), (3.22) and (3.4), the investor’s problem therefore becomes
max
x∈R
[
(θ+δ)x−x2γI
2
σ2ε−x
(
β1
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
x
α
+β2x
)]
. (3.23)
Note that (3.23) considers the investor’s expected payoff conditional on at least one response
to the RFQ. Since the probability of this event is exogenous and always gives a zero payoff, it
can be neglected. The ﬁrst-order condition for (3.23) implies the investor’s optimal demand
schedule
x = (θ+δ) α(σ
2
θ
+σ2
δ
)
2αβ2(σ2θ+σ2δ)+αγIσ2ε(σ2θ+σ2δ)+2β1σ2θ
. (3.24)
Therefore, the investor’s optimal demand is indeed linear in θ+δ. Matching the coefﬁcient in
(3.24) with the conjectured strategy (3.21) gives
α= σ
2
θ
+σ2
δ
−2β1σ2θ
(2β2+γIσ2ε)(σ2θ+σ2δ)
. (3.25)
The following proposition summarizes these results and states formal conditions under which
the equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. The expected price on the platform P (x) from Lemma 2 is linear in ξ and x, as
stated in (3.22). Let M ≥ 2. If
κ< 1
2
, (3.26)
with κ as in (3.20), there is a threshold a > 0, such that the equilibrium on the platform described
below exists if and only if a < a. The last condition holds as N →∞ and σ2W →∞ or as σδ→∞.
The inequality in (3.26) will always hold for all M ≥ 2,σ2
θ
,σ2
δ
> 0 if q → 1. If (3.26) does not hold,
the equilibrium does not exist.
The equilibrium is characterized as follows. The investor submits a demand x as determined in
equations (3.21) and (3.25). The dealers quote independently with probability q according to
the distribution function Fx in (3.18).
One furthermore has 0<β1 < 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
, β2 >−γI2 σ2ε and α> 0 in each such equilibrium.
With the RFQ trading protocol, an equilibrium with linear strategies described in Proposition
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2 is possible even though a linear equilibrium in double auctions and two strategic traders
would not exist due to correlated values as Du and Zhu [2017] show. With the RFQ trading
protocol, only the investor has the option to avoid price impact by reducing his demand. The
dealers have to take the traded quantity as given and can merely charge a markup in addition
to their cost of providing the asset.
We will illustrate the results derived so far with an example.
3.4.3 A brief example
For illustrative purposes we ﬁx the exogenous parameters as follows: N = 100, M = 10, σε = 1,
σW =N , σθ = 1, γd = 1, γI = 1, q = 0.3. To illustrate the economic mechanism of our model,
we ﬁrst consider the case in which θ+δ= 1, which corresponds to a realization one standard
deviation above the mean. Afterwards we consider the case when θ+δ=−1. It is sufﬁcient to
only consider the sum of the common value and the investor’s private, since both the investor’s
demand and the dealars’ inferences depend only on this sum.
In Figure 3.3, θ+δ has the high realization. In Panel (a) we plot the price pv (x) that the
investor is willing to pay for x units of the asset. If the absolute value of x is small, this price
is approximately equal to θ+δ, since the cost of bearing risk is small. The price pv (x) is
linearly decreasing in x because of the quadratic cost of bearing risk. We also plot the dealer’s
cost pc (x) of providing x units of the asset, if they believe the dividend payment is normally
distributed with mean ξ and precision σ2
ξ
, as deﬁned in (3.4) and (3.5). One can see that this
cost is slightly increasing in x, which represents the difﬁculty of offsetting the trade in the
interdealer market or with the outside agent, respectively. The average price the investor can
expect conditional on at least one response to the RFQ, P (x), is between the other two curves.
In Panel (b) of Figure 3.3 we keep the investor’s reservation price pv (x), but now look at
the average price dealers quote when they the expected dividend level ξ from the investors
demand x one can see that this price increases faster in x than the cost pc (x) in Panel (a). We
also plot the proﬁt the investor investor gets for demanding a certain quantity x. This proﬁt
is the solution to problem (3.23) weighted by the probability of at least one response to the
RFQ. We see that the optimum is approximately at x = 0.69. This also turns out to be the value
of α. Thus, Panel (b) illustrates, that the investor has indeed no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy determined in the last section.
In Figure 3.4, we consider the low realization of θ+δ. Comparing panel (a) to Panel (a) in
Figure 3.3, we observe that all curves have been shifted downwards by a constant. The curve
of pv (x) has been shifted downwards more than the curve of pc (x). This has two reasons. First,
the dealers expectation ξ is a weighted average between θ+δ and zero, as (3.4) shows. Second,
the dealers do not ﬁnd it as costly to hold a bad asset as the investor does. The dealers expect
to be able to resell the asset again at a favourable price, since there are many uninformed
dealers in the interdealer market. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4 shows a similar picture as Panel (b) of
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Figure 3.3 – High realization of θ+δ
(a) Expected and reservation prices if ξ is held ﬁxed.
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(b) Dealers infer ξ from the investor’s demand.
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Figure 3.4 – Low realization of θ+δ
(a) Expected and reservation prices if ξ is held ﬁxed.
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(b) Dealers infer ξ from the investor’s demand.
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Figure 3.3. In Figure 3.4, however, the investor sells the asset at a negative expected price. The
investor ﬁnds it proﬁtable to do so, since pv (x) indicates that he would be willing to sell the
asset at an even lower price due to the negative expected dividend. The equilibrium strategies
have not changed in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Therefore, the optimal demand in Figure 3.4
is the negative of the optimal demand in Figure 3.3, since the respective realizations of θ+δ
have the same absolute value in both cases.
3.4.4 Competition vs. information leakage
In this section we take a closer look at the equilibrium described in Proposition 2. Speciﬁcally,
we take a look how the investor’s proﬁts from trading on the platform are affected by varying
the number of dealers who are contacted on the trading platform.
We deﬁne πI as the investor’s ex-ante expected payoff in the equilibrium described in Proposi-
tion 2. By the investor’s utility function (3.2), his equilibrium strategy (3.25) and (3.22), one
has
πI = E
[
(1− (1−q)M )(θ+δ)2 1
2
α
]
. (3.27)
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Equation (3.27) takes into account that the investor does not receive any quote with probability
(1−q)M and that dealers infer ξ from the investor’s demand.
Our ﬁrst goal is to study the role of M , the number of recipients of each RFQ. Increasing M
has three major effects that determine the investor’s proﬁt:
• As is evident from (3.27) a higher M increases the probability of a trade 1− (1− q)M ,
whenever q < 1. Holding everything else equal, this increases expected proﬁts.
• A higher M increases the fraction of informed dealers in the interdealer market. One can
verify that a as deﬁned in (3.13) is strictly increasing in M for M <N . This makes prices
in the interdealer market more informative and it therefore becomes more difﬁcult to
offset any inventory that was acquired on the platform.
• A higher M decreases κ, as mentioned in the discussion after Lemma 2. Therefore, the
bargaining power of the investor increases, which has a positive effect on his proﬁt.
Considering these three bullet points, the investor’s proﬁt should be maximal for M = 2, if
q = 1. If q = 1, one has κ= 0 and 1−(1−q)M = 1, i.e. the investor’s bargaining power is maximal
and a trade happens with probability 1. Then the ﬁrst and third bullet point above become
irrelevant and increasing M is only associated with the cost of information leakage, discussed
in the second bullet point. The following proposition formally conﬁrms that the conclusion of
the above heuristic reasoning is indeed true. Since we focus on the cost of information leakage
we assume for better algebraic tractability that there are no private beneﬁts, i.e. σδ = 0.
Proposition 3. Let 2≤ M and q = 1 and σδ = 0. The equilibrium described in Proposition 2
exists if and only if a is below a certain threshold a, with a < 12 . In this equilibrium, one has
β1,β2,α> 0.
Furthermore, the equilibrium exists for any other choice of the number M ′ of dealers to contact
with 2 ≤ M ′ < M. If M = 2, the payoff for the investor is higher than in any other possible
equilibrium with M > 2.
When q < 1, the investor has incentive to contact more dealers, i.e. M ≥ 2. Because when q 	= 1,
the ﬁrst and third effects turn out to be relevant: increasing M will improve the probability
of trading , as well as the bargaining power of the investor. But at the same time, the cost of
information leakage is also increased (second bullet point).
The following proposition states that M sometimes has to be larger than a certain threshold in
order for an equilibrium to exist in the ﬁrst place. If q is relatively small, the bargaining power
κ of dealers may be so high that investors do not want to incur any price impact they have on
the trading platform. Increasing M lowers this bargaining power. Under the condition that
prices in the interdealer market remain sufﬁciently uninformative, an equilibrium exists for a
sufﬁciently large M . On the other hand, there is a clear upper bound on the possible number
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of dealers that are contacted on the platform for which an equilibrium exists. In particular, if
more than half of the dealers are contacted and there is strong asymmetric information about
the asset’s payoff (σδ = 0), an equilibrium cannot exist, because information leakage on the
platform is too strong.
Proposition 4. Let σ2
δ
= 0. If M > 12N, there is no equilibrium on the trading platform as
described in Proposition 2.
If q <
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 , there is no such equilibrium with M = 2. If furthermore a < a¯, for an
a¯ ∈ (0, 12 ), then there is such an equilibrium with M ≥ 3.
3.4.5 Price impact
In this section we want to relate our theoretical results to the empirical ﬁndings of Collin-
Dufresne et al. [2017]. In particular, we want to study the price impact that an investor faces
on the trading platfrom and the price impact that dealers face in the interdealer market. The
total price impact a trader faces can be decomposed as
price impact= permanent impact+ transitory impact.
Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017] ﬁnd that price impact in the D2C segment is higher than in the
D2D segment. This difference is largely due to a differene in the permanent price impact.
We now want to derive the price impact and ﬁnd analogues in our model that correspond to
a permanent component and a transitory component. As commonly argued in theoretical
studies [Sannikov and Skrzypacz, 2016, Kyle et al., 2017], the study of price impact is an off-
equilibrium analysis. We will therefore assume an equilibrium as described in Proposition 2
and examine how the price a trader faces changes if the demanded quantity changes.
Equation (3.19) in Lemma 2 directly provides an expression of the expected price an investor
receives on the platform. If the investor changes his demanded quantity x, then pv and pc
in (3.19) and consequently the expected price for this quantity will change. Since the model
presented in this paper is static, we have to ﬁnd a decomposition of this price impact that
would correspond to a decomposition into a permanent and a transitory component in a
dynamic model. In empirical studies in Market Microstructure, it is generally assumed that the
transitory component reﬂects a markup of the dealers, whereas the permanent component
reﬂects the cost of the dealers of providing the asset due to future price changes. In our
following analysis, we adopt this interpretation. We say that the price impact is permanent, if
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it was caused by a change in the dealers’ cost of providing the asset.5 Therefore, we deﬁne
PI := ∂
∂x
pc (x) (3.28)
as the permanent price impact of the investor, because (3.28) reﬂects the change in the price
that is due to an increase in the dealers’ cost of trading the asset.
In the following, we will consider pc as deﬁned in (3.15). Due to adverse selection, we also need
to take into account that the dealers form their expectation ξ about the dividend payment
based on (3.4) and (3.21). The following proposition contains some statements about the price
impact on the platform and in the interdealer market.
Proposition 5. The (permanent) price impact an informed dealer faces in the interdealer
market is given by −b, where b is deﬁned as in Proposition 1. Without adverse selection (dealers
do not update their belief ξ), one has
PI <−b,
i.e. the permanent impact on the trading platform is smaller then the permanent impact the
dealers face in the interdealer market. In the presence of adverse selection and ρ = σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
> 1/4,
one has
PI >−b.
The dealers’ permanent price impact −b derived in Proposition 5 is due to a change in the
uninformed dealers’ belief about the dividend payment and a permanent change in the
aggregate inventory held by other dealers in the interdealer market. Proposition 5 shows
that the permanent price impact on the trading platform higher than the permanent impact
in the interdealer market if and only if investors know more about the asset than dealers
do. If there is no adverse selection and dealers do not update their belief about the asset’s
payoff, the dealers’ cost of providing the asset changes by a lower rate than the price in the
interdealer market would when trading the same quantity. This result is due to the dealers’
optimal portfolio choice in period 2. A dealer could always offset the investor’s demand in
the interdealer market with price impact −b. If the investor however changed his demanded
quantity, the dealer would, due to risk sharing considerations, in general not offset the total
amount of this quantity in the interdealer market. Due to optimality of the dealer’s portfolio
choice, the dealer must be able to provide the quantity at a lower price than the one he would
pay for this quantity in the interdealer market.
In the presence of adverse selection, however, the permanent price impact on the trading
5This assumes that changes in the dealers’ cost have no transitory component. Transitory changes in the dealers’
cost may arise due to inventory holding costs or order processing costs. In our model, dealers can immediately
offset their inventory and the interdealer market is competitive. Order processing is costless. Therefore, such
transitory components of dealers’ costs are not present in our model.
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platform is higher than the permanent price impact the dealers face in the interdealer market.
This makes our model (which assumes information asymmetries) consistent with the ﬁndings
of Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017] that the permanent price impact is higher on the trading
platform than in the interdealer market.
3.5 Centralized trading vs. electronic trading via RFQs
This section develops the market-design implications of our model. Our ﬁnal goal is to
characterize situations in which investors are better off trading in a centralized market and
when an OTC market can improve their utility. In order to do this, we extend our previous
model from to the case in which there is a is a continuum of investors of measure μ6 who all
know the realization of θ in the beginning of period 1. The investors’ utility function is still
give by (3.2). The risk-aversion parameter γI is the same for all investors. The investors receive
a private beneﬁt δi , where as before δi ∼N (0,σ2δ). The private beneﬁts for different investors
are essentially pairwise independent for different investors. This assumptions lets us apply
the exact law of large numbers of Sun [2006]. The model assumptions about the dealers are as
in Section 3.3, except that we do not assume the presence of an outside agent in this section.
Before we establish an equilibrium in the OTC market, we quickly describe how the investors
would trade in a centralized market.
3.5.1 The centralized-market benchmark
Investors trade through double auctions in the centralized market. In these double auctions,
each investor speciﬁes a demand schedule, i.e. conditional on each price p ∈R the investor
speciﬁes a quantity he wants to trade. The equilibrium price in the centralized market will
be the market-clearing price. The market clearing price will be the unique price for which
the investors’ aggregate demand is equal to the aggregate supply of the asset (zero). The
speciﬁcation of the investor’s utility function (3.2) gives the following maximization problem
for each investor for each p ∈R:
max
xi∈R
[
xi (θ+δi −p)−
γIσ
2

2
x2i
]
,
where xi denotes the quantity the investor demands given the price p on the exchange.
The sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order condition for the above optimization problem gives
xi = θ+δi −p
γIσ
2

,
6Formally, let (Ω,F ) denote the measurable space of investors. Then there is a bijective measurable map
Φ :Ω→ [0,μ] and the measure of any set of investors F ∈F is equal to the Lebesgue measure of the setΦ(F ).
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To determine the market-clearing price, we substitute each investor’s demand schedule xi
into the market clearing condition,
∫
xidi= 0.7 We get
0 = μ θ
γIσ
2

−μ p
γIσ
2

⇔ p = θ ,
where we have used the fact that
∫
δidi= 0 almost surely by the exact law of large numbers.
Using each investor’s optimal demand schedule, the utility function (3.2) and the fact that the
market clearing price is given by θ, we can deﬁne each investor’s ex-ante payoff:
πci := E
(
1
2
(θ+δi −p)2
γIσ
2

)
= 1
2
σ2
δ
γIσ
2

. (3.29)
Equation (3.29) states that the centralized market realizes all the gains from trade that arise due
to dispersed private values. When all investors have the same valuation of the asset (σ2
δ
= 0),
no trade happens and the investor’s proﬁts become zero. Each investor’s proﬁt decreases if the
cost of bearing risk increases.
3.5.2 Electronic trading with a continuum of investors
The model with a continuum of investors is very similar to the model with one investor.
It will turn out that a continuum of investors allows us to derive an equilibrium without
the assumption of an outside agent. We will let the mass of investors have a measure μ ∈
(0,∞). In period 1, all investors submit RFQs to M dealers. Afterwards, dealers trade in the
interdealer market. All investors contact the same M dealers at the same time. The dealers
then independently respond with a probability q to each RFQ. As before, we will determine
the equilibrium in this model by backward induction.
Since there is no outside agent anymore in this section, uninformed dealers in the interdealer
market take into account that the aggregate supply of the asset is correlated with the investors’
information about the dividend level θ. We will conjecture that each investor demands a
quantity xi on the trading platform, where
xi =α1θ+α2δi , (3.30)
for some α1,α2 ∈R. As in Section 3.4, it will turn out that an investor always trades the asset
if he receives a quote on the trading platform. Since each dealer responds independently
with probability q to each RFQ, the an investor is able to trade the asset with probability
P(tr ade)= 1− (1−q)M . By the exact law of large numbers and (3.30), the investors’ aggregate
7The notation di means that we integrate with respect to the measure on set of investors deﬁned in Footnote 6.
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demand traded on the platform given by
X agg :=
∫
P(tr ade)(α1θ+α2δi )di = (1−(1−q)M )
∫
(α1θ+α2δi )di = (1−(1−q)M )μα1θ, (3.31)
where the last equality holds almost surely. By symmetry, each dealer gets an equal fraction of
this aggregate demand. We deﬁne Xk :=− X
agg
M as the inventory of each dealer k ≤M who gets
contacted on the trading platform. From the dealers’ utility function (3.1), one obtains the
optimal demand schedule qk for each dealer k ≤M :
qk =
θ−p2
γdσ
2
ε
+XK . (3.32)
Notice that Xk is a multiple of θ, this will simplify the inference problem that the uninformed
dealers face in the interdealer market. Analogously to Section 3.4, we conjecture that the
market-clearing price in the interdealer market is given by
p2 = aθ+bW, (3.33)
where W is the noise in the aggregate supply of the asset. The uninformed dealers use the
normal projection theorem obtain the distribution of the dividend payment conditional on
the market-clearing price p2. The dealers’ utility function (3.1) now gives the optimal demand
qk =
E(D|p2)−p2
V(D|p2)
(3.34)
for the uniformed dealers who do not get contacted on the trading platform. Analogously
to Proposition 1, we now state the equilibrium in the interdealer market, conditional on the
investors’ trading strategy (3.30).
Proposition 6. For any given α1, there is a rational expectations equilibrium such that the
market clearing price is given by (3.33). Deﬁne
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ϕ : = (1− (1−q)M )μ, (3.35)
τu : = 1
Var (D|p2)
= 1
σ2
θ
+σ2 −ψσ2θ
, (3.36)
ψ : = a
2σ2
θ
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
= σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+
(
γd
Mτ+γdϕα1
)2
σ2W
(3.37)
Then a and b are given by
a = Mτ+γdα1ϕ+ (N −M)ψτu
Mτ+ (N −M)τu
(3.38)
and
b =− γd
Mτ+γdϕα1
a, (3.39)
One has a > 0. One also has a ≤ 1 with a strict inequality if M <N.
Lemma 2 gives the dealers optimal quoting strategy for any aggregate quantity Xk that dealer
k trades with the investors and any demand xi they face from an individual investor i . There is
only a slight difference between the case in Section 3.4 and the setup considered here. Whereas
the aggregate demand a dealer faced was equal to the demand by the single investor in Section
3.4, the quantities xi and Xk are different here. Using Lemma 2 and taking account of this
difference gives the expected price P (xi ), investor i gets for his demand xi conditional on at
least one response to the RFQ:
P (xi )= pc (Xk )+ (pv (xi )−pc (Xk )
Mq(1−q)M−1
1− (1−q)M . (3.40)
We already determined in (3.30) which form each investor’s demand xi takes. We also know
the quantity Xk given these individual demand schedules. We now determine the values of
pv (xi ) and pc (Xk ), so that we can use (3.40) to determine the expected price that each investor
faces for his demand.
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We deﬁne this dealer’s value function that maps his inventory after period 1 Xk to expected
utility as
Vk,1(θ,Xk ) := Ek
[
D(qk −Xk )−p2qk −
γd
2
σ2ε(qk −Xk )2
]
, (3.41)
where we used the dealer’s utility function (3.1).
Having obtained the dealer’s utility Vk,1(θ,Xk ) when holding Xk units of the asset, we deﬁne
the dealer’s break even price pc (X ) such the payment compensates for the marginal cost of
holding an additional marginal unit of the asset. The resulting expression is stated in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Conditional on the equilibrium inventory of dealer k ≤M, the dealer’s equilibrium
break-even price for for the asset is given by
pc (Xk ) :=−
∂
∂Xk
Vk,1(ξ,X )= aθ−b
(1−a)θ
γdσ
2
ε
+b ϕ
M
α1θ, (3.42)
where a,b,ϕ are deﬁned as in Proposition 6.
Given that a dealer inferred the realization of θ from the investors’ demand, a dealer can infer
the private value δi of investor i from this investor’s individual demand and (3.30). Given the
investor’s demand for xi units of the asset, a dealer can infer the maximum price the investor
is willing to pay for these xi units by using (3.2):
pv (xi ) := θ+δi − γI
2
xσ2ε. (3.43)
Using (3.31), (3.42) and (3.42), one can rewrite (3.40) as
P (xi )=β1θ+β2xi , (3.44)
for some β1,β2 ∈R stated in the appendix. We now determine the optimal amount xi that an
investor wants to demand given that the expected price he faces on the platform is given by
85
Chapter 3. Electronic Trading in OTC Markets vs. Centralized Exchange
(3.44). The maximization problem of investor i is given by
max
x∈R
[
(θ+δi )xi −x2γI
2
σ2ε−xi
(
β1θ+β2xi
)]
. (3.45)
The expression in (3.45) considers the investor’s expected payoff conditional on at least one
response to the RFQ, since the investor’s payoff is maximized when his payoff conditional on
at least one response is maximized. The ﬁrst-order condition to the problem in (3.45) gives
the investor’s optimal demand schedule
x = θ 1−β1
2β2+γIσ2ε
+δ 1
2β2+γIσ2ε
. (3.46)
One can immediately determine α1 and α2 from (3.30) by looking at (3.46):
α1 = 1−β1
2β2+γIσ2ε
, (3.47)
α2 = 1
2β2+γIσ2ε
. (3.48)
We are now ready to establish the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 7. The expected price on the platform P (xi ) that an investor gets on the platform
for his demand xi is given by (3.44) for some β1,β2 ∈R. Let M ≥ 2. There is an equilibrium on
the platform described below if and only if M <N and
κ= Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M <
1
2
.
The equilibrium is characterized as follows. The investor submits a demand xi as determined in
equations (3.30) with α1,α2 ∈R, with 0<α1 < 1 and α1 ≤α2. The dealers quote independently
with probability q according to the distribution function F in (3.18) with pc (Xk) and pv (xi )
given by (3.42) and (3.43).
3.5.3 Market design
In this section we will use the results derived in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2 and study
when investors prefer the centralized market and when they prefer the OTC market with an
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electronic trading platform. Proposition 7 states that there cannot be an equilibrium on the
electronic trading platform if κ≥ 12 or N =M . In this case, there is only an equilibrium in the
centralized market. Therefore, we restrict our further discussion to the case in which κ< 12
and M <N . The following claim follows from (3.29) and Proposition 7.
Proposition 8. Let 0 < κ < 12 and 2 ≤ M < N. As σ2δ → 0, investors prefer to trade in on the
trading platform in the OTC market. As σ2
δ
→∞, investors prefer to trade in the centralized
market.
If σ2
δ
→ 0, equation (3.29) implies that investors’ gains from trading in the centralized market
go to zero. However, due to information asymmetries between dealers and investors, investors
can still beneﬁt from trading in the OTC market.
Suppose on the other hand, that σ2
δ
> 0 and the mass of investors μ becomes very large. Then
holding everything else constant, the investors’ demand will be very sensitive to variations in
θ. In this case, an equilibrium is only possible if α1, the coefﬁcient in the investors’ demand
on θ is very small and investors will mainly trade based on their private value of holding the
asset. If markups in the interdealer market are positive, investors will therefore prefer to trade
in the centralized market instead. The following proposition proofs this statement formally.
Proposition 9. Let 0<κ< 12 , 2≤M <N and σ2δ > 0. As μ→∞, investors prefer to trade in the
centralized market.
The proof of Proposition 9 shows that α1 → 0 as μ→ 0. According to (3.47), this is equivalent
to β1 → 1, holding everything else equal and noting that by (C.27), β2 is unaffected by μ. Thus,
(3.44) implies that the expected price an investor receives on the platform when μ→∞ is
approximately the sum of the common value θ of the dividend payment and a markup. In this
case, the investors’ gains from trade are derived mostly from their private values.
So far, we assumed that κ> 0, which lead to positive expected markups for the dealers when
quoting on the trading platform. In the following we consider the case in which q → 1, which
leads to κ→ 0. If κ→ 0, these markups become negligible and dealers efﬁciently intermediate
trades between their customers as if these customers were trading in a centralized market.
Furthermore, the probability of not receiving a quote goes to zero as q → 1. Thus, all the gains
from trade that could be realized in the centralized market would also be realized in the OTC
market. However, investors can still beneﬁt from information asymmetries between them and
the dealers in the OTC market. As q → 1 investors therefore prefer to trade in the OTC market.
This claim is formally proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 10. Let 2≤M <N. As q → 1, investors prefer to trade on the trading platform.
3.6 Discussion and concluding remarks
Electronic trading platforms play a central role in today’s OTC markets. The implications of our
model are consistent with recent empirical research that studies OTC markets with electronic
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trading platforms. One important feature of our model is information leakage which is studied
in Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] and Hagströmer and Menkveld [2016]. We also showed
that information asymmetries between dealers and investors are a sufﬁcient and necessary
condition to generate the price impact patterns observed in Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017].
Therefore, the ﬁrst part of this paper can be viewed as a theoretical foundation of several
empirical ﬁndings in recent research. The model can also be used to evaluate the impact of
recent ﬁnancial regulation on investors’ trading proﬁts. The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that
the most liquid index CDS in the US are trades on electronic platforms. An RFQ furthermore
should be sent to at least three dealers.8 We show that increasing the number of contacted
dealers may decrease investor’s proﬁts if the cost of information-leakage is high. On the other
hand, the number of contacted dealers has to be sufﬁciently high in order for an equilibrium
to exist, if competition among dealers on the platform (in terms of response rates) is low.
In the second part of the paper, we considered a hypothetical scenario in which there is
either a centralized exchange or an OTC market and studied the respective implications on
investor welfare. Some of our results are consistent with the recent theoretical literature in the
area of market design. That investor welfare is generally higher on exchanges if the investors
associate strong private values with holding the asset, can be viewed as an analogue to the
result of Babus and Parlatore [2017] that there is only a centralized-market equilibrium if the
investors’ values of holding the asset are sufﬁciently independent. We also emphasize the
role of information asymmetries that becomes important in OTC markets. In this respect
our paper is related to Glode and Opp [2017]. However, the speciﬁc trading protocol on
electronic trading platforms features some aspects that are not present in other models of OTC
markets. As the RFQ response rate q of dealers becomes high, our model shows that electronic
trading platforms indeed become similar to exchanges, in the sense that dealers efﬁciently
intermediate the demand from their customers. This result justiﬁes the common opinion that
electronic trading platforms represent a natural compromise between exchanges and OTC
markets.9
To conclude, we want to make some general remarks on our model assumptions. As every the-
oretical model, also the one presented in this paper is build on some simplifying assumptions
trading-off analytical tractability against appropriate representation of the real world. The fact
that all investors are equally informed about the asset’s payoff is certainly not completely real-
istic, but should capture the general information asymmetry between investors and dealers
that in many markets seem to exist. To justify the way we model trading in the interdealer
market, we want to refer to the event that made both the academic world and international
regulatory authorities focus so much on OTC markets in the ﬁrst place: the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. Arguably, demand for certain credit derivatives originated from informed hedge funds
who wanted to bet against a credit bubble in the US credit market. Some investment banks
may have learned about the value of certain securities from this informed demand and may
have tried to use this knowledge against other less informed investment banks or other clients
8See Collin-Dufresne et al. [2017] for an overview of the regulatory changes in the US CDS market.
9See Stafford [2016].
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(which may be represented by noise traders in our model).
This example also suggests to interpret the welfare results derived from our model with a slight
grain of salt. In this paper, we exclusively focused on investor welfare. While this approach
may be viewed as standard in market design, it does not take into account ﬁnancial stability
considerations that may be important when determining the optimal level of transparency in
the market. If losses to dealers or noise traders are large, the ﬁnancial system may very well
be affected in ways that cannot be captured in the model presented here. While the trade-off
between the efﬁcient allocation of assets and ﬁnancial stability is a common theme in banking,
examining the trade-off between investor welfare and ﬁnancial stability in OTC markets may
be a theme for future research.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Micro-Found the Trading Protocol
In this section, I micro-found the trading protocol by incorporating the fact that in practice,
customers have uncertainty regarding the degree of competition in the market. Speciﬁcally, I
split the D2C trading round into two sub periods. In the ﬁrst sub-period, customer can decide
whether to direct the order to a dealer (monopolistic pricing), or start a ﬂash auction with
uncertainty on the number of participants. If customer decides to have a ﬂash auction, then
with probability 1−θ, the auction is competitive, and customer’s order is able to trade at the
centralized inter-dealer pricing kernel M D2D. However, with probability θ, there is only one
response and customer has to trade at the monopolistic pricing kernel Mˆ D2C(i,j) . Hence, ex-ante,
customer’s utility from a ﬂash auction is given by,
(1−θ)ν(i,j)[M D2D]+θν(i,j)[Mˆ D2C(i,j) ] .
Now, in sub-period one, the dealer then quotes a pricing kernel, M D2D(i,j) , such that customer
breaks even between a directed order and a ﬂash auction. I assume that in case of break-even,
customer trades with the dealer using directed orders. The dealer’s quoting problem is again
a monopolistic pricing rule, and he maximizes his indirect utility, subject to the customer’s
participation constraint
ν(i,j)[M
D2C
(i,j) ] ≥ (1−θ)ν(i,j)[M D2D]+θν(i , j )[Mˆ D2C(i,j) ] ,
as well as the two no-arbitrage constraints. Interestingly, the ﬁrst-order condition of this maxi-
mization problem coincides with the optimal condition in the relaxed problem (1.12), with
π(i,j) being endogenized as the Lagrange multiplier of the customer’s participation constraint.
A.2 Expansion
I use log-utility agents as an example. For other utility functions, the steps are similar.
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Deﬁnition 4. The linear operator on a nonlinear risk function F is deﬁned as
M [F ] ≡ M (0)
(
M (0)F −E [M (0)F ]− (M (0)−E [M (0)]) Cov[M (0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
)
= M (0)εF .
Lemma 6. The linear operatorM [·] satisﬁes: (i)M [F ]= 0 if F is linear in X ; (ii) E [M [F ]X ]=
E [M [F ]]= 0.
For ease of notation, I omit the exchange subscript (i , j ) and the superscript D2C and D2D.
Instead, I refer the D2D exchange pricing kernel to be N , and any D2C exchange pricing kernel
to be M (There are many D2C exchanges, however they share the same ‘kind’ of pricing kernel
formula.).
The following lemma help me to further reduce the number of endogenous parameters. It
reads the Lagrange multipliers for the two no-arbitrage conditions, (1.6) and (1.7), are linearly
related.
Lemma 7. The Lagrange multiplier for the no-arbitrage conditions satisfy
μ(i,j),r =−er sμ(i,j),s .
Assumption 5. I assume the subsistence parameter c is chosen such that the customer’s out-side
option has an interior solution in the fragmented equilibrium with competitive D2C exchanges.
I make the following change of variables: w =λ−1 for all D2C pair (i , j ). Then the F.O.C. of the
bargaining problem (1.12) becomes,
0 = −M−1πw +M−2Nw − (F +c)(κ−π)−μ(X − ser ) .
For each D2C exchange, the endogenous parameters satisfy (1.8), (1.13), (1.7):
w = E [M(F +c)] ,
κ= E [M−1N ] ,
e−r = E [M ] .
Next, for the D2D exchange, the global endogenous parameters satisfy
s = E [NX ] ,
s =

[0,1]2
κw did j +wD −2ce−r .
Monopolistic Dealers
Proposition 9. When F (0) =αX and π(0) = 0, the fragmented equilibrium with monopolistic
dealers coincides with the centralized, competitive equilibrium.
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Lemma 8. The future price of the risk security is
er s(0) = 1
E [(X +2c)−1] −2c .
Hence, when dealers are option sellers, the shape of the mid-pricing kernel is determined by
the option buyers nonlinear endowments, implying a positive variance risk premium.
Proposition 10. When the nonlinear risk F (1) is small, there exist a unique equilibrium. The
D2D pricing kernel is N =M (0)+F N (1), in which 1
N (1) = 1
s(0)+2ce−r +w (0)D
M
[
−F (1)J
]
.
The pricing kernel for each of the D2C exchanges is M (1) =M (0)+F M (1), in which
M (1) = − 1
2w (0)
M
[
F (1)
]+ 1
2
N (1) .
Corollary 2. The ﬁrst-order effect of nonlinear exposures and market power on the risk premium
of the underlying asset is zero. The effect would be non-zero if either the risk-free asset or the
risky asset is not available to all customers.
Lemma 9. For each of the customers, the equilibrium demand on the risky security based on
the outside option is,
b(1) = 1
er s(0)+2c
Cov
[
M (0),F (1)M (0)
]
Var
[
M (0)
] = μ(1) .
CompetitiveDealers For simplicity, assume the dealers have the samemarket powerπ(1) > 0,
in an ‘almost’ competitive D2C exchange, I have π= 1−ππ(1).
Proposition 11. When the market power shock is small, there exists a unique equilibrium. The
D2C pricing kernel is N =M (0)+πN (1), in which
N (1) = 1
s(0)+2ce−r M [−FJ ]π
(1) .
The pricing kernel for each of the D2C exchange is M =M (0)+πM (1), in which
M (1) = − 1
w (0)
M [F ]π(1)+N (1) .
Lemma 10. Suppose the nonlinear risk F is a convex, and continuous twice differentiable
1I deﬁne F (1)J ≡−

[0,1]2 F
(1) did j .
93
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1
function deﬁned on [Xmin,Xmax], and satisﬁes
lim
X→Xmin
(
−F + (X +2c)F ′ + Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
)
< 0,
lim
X→Xmax
(
−F + (X +2c)F ′ + Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
)
> 0,
then the following results hold
• the linear operatorM [F ] has only one critical point X ∗ ∈ [Xmin,Xmax];
• the equationM [F ]= 0 has two roots X1,X2 ∈ [Xmin,Xmax]; 2
• the linear operatorM [F ] is positive for X < X1 or X > X2, and is negative for X ∈ [X1,X2];
• M [F ] is decreasing for X ∈ [Xmin,X ∗], and increasing in X ∈ [X ∗,Xmax];
Proof. The critical point of linear operatorM [F ] can be determined by
−(X +2c)−2F + (X +2c)−1F ′ + (X +2c)−2 Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
= 0.
As the pricing kernel M (0) > 0, I multiply both sides by (X +2c)2 to get
−F + (X +2c)F ′ + Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
= 0.
The left-hand side is monotonic as its ﬁrst-order derivative is
−F ′ + (X +2c)F ′′ +F ′ = (X +2c)F ′′ .
Hence, F ′′ determines whether the equation is increasing or decreasing. For convex F , the
left-hand side is monotonically increasing. Hence, for the system to have a solution X ∈
[Xmin,Xmax], I need
lim
X→Xmin
−F + (X +2c)F ′ + Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
< 0,
as well as
lim
X→Xmax
−F + (X +2c)F ′ + Cov[M
(0),M (0)F ]
Var[M (0)]
> 0.
Therefore, M [F ] ﬁrst increases then decreases. As E [M [F ]] = 0, there are two solutions
X1,X2 ∈ [Xmin,Xmax] to the following equation
M [F ] = 0.
2Without loss of generality, I assume X1 < X2.
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In practice, customers can buy OTM puts and sell OTM calls, which is covered by this lemma.
The net effects depend on the particular choice of the physical density, as well as the shape
of the two functions. For example, if the dealers long OTM puts and short OTM calls, then in
equilibrium, customers buy OTM puts and sell OTM calls; this demand creates downward
pressure on the skewness of the risk-neutral density (measured by the ‘mid’ price), while the
risk-neutral variance depends on the relative selling pressure between the calls and the puts.
Lemma 11. For small nonlinear risk, the equilibrium price for the risky security is
s = s(0)+2s(2) ,
in which
s(2) = −er Cov
[
M (0), (M (0))−2
(
(M (1))2w (0)did j + (N (1))2w (0)D
)]
.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the claim holds, then M D2C(i,j) = M D2D for all D2C exchanges.
Then from the inter-dealer market clearing condition I get,
X =
∫1
0
J (λ(i,j)M
D2D)did j +
∫1
0
J (λ(j,i)M
D2D)did j ,
where the two Lagrange multipliers are given by their corresponding budget constraints,
0= E [M D2D J (λ(i,j)M D2D)]−E [M D2DF Ci ],
0= E [M D2D J (λ(j,i)M D2D)]−E [M D2DF Dj ]+E [M D2DG∗(i,j)].
Note that as the pricing kernels are the same across exchanges, the last term in the dealer j ’s
budget constraint becomes customer i ’s budget constraint, which is zero.
Next, I need to verify that indeed M d2d solves the Nash bargaining problem (1.5). This is indeed
the case.
Hence, I conclude that the fragmented equilibrium is equivalent to the all-to-all competitive
equilibrium. Furthermore, this equilibrium allocation is unique. To see this, Suppose now
that there is another solution that also solves the Nash bargaining F.O.C., then multiply M D2D
on both sides, and take expectation to obtain,
E
[
J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )M
D2C
(i,j) M
D2D
]2 = E [J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(M D2D)2]E [J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(M D2C(i,j) )2] ,
where I have used Lemma 7. Hence, by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, the equality holds only
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when M D2C(i,j) ∝M D2D (i.e., M D2C(i,j) =M D2D).
Proof of Theorem 1. Then the inter-dealer market clearing condition is
X =
∫
[0,1]2
(λ(i,j)M
D2C
(i,j) )
−1did j + (M D2D)−1
∫
[0,1]2
(λ(j,i))
−1did j −2c .
Suppose there are only two types of customers, then
X = ∑
i=1,2
αi (λ(i,j)M
D2C
(i,j) )
−1+ (λDM D2D)−1−2c ,
where αi is the population of type i customer, and
λ−1D ≡
∑
i=1,2
αiλ
−1
(j,i) .
0 = A2(M D2D)4+2AB(M D2D)3+D(M D2D)2+EM D2D +F .
A = (X +2c)2 ,
B = − (X +2c)
(
α1π(1,j)
λ(1,j)
+ α2π(2,j)
λ(2,j)
+ 2
λD
)
+ Z(1,j)α
2
1
λ(1,j)
+ Z(2,j)α
2
2
λ(2,j)
,
C = α1π(1,j)α2π(2,j)
2λ(1,j)λ(2,j)
+ α1π(1,j)
λDλ(1,j)
+ α2π(2,j)
λDλ(2,j)
+ 1
λ2D
,
D =B2+2AC − 4Z(1,j)Z(2,j)α
2
1α
2
2
λ(1,j)λ(2,j)
,
E = 2BC + Z(1,j)α
2
1α
2
2π
2
(2,j)
λ(1,j)λ
2
(2,j)
+ Z(2,j)α
2
1α
2
2π
2
(1,j)
λ2(1,j)λ(2,j)
,
F =C2− α
2
1α
2
2π
2
(1,j)π
2
(2,j)
4λ2(1,j)λ
2
(2,j)
.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma 10, there exists a point K ∗, such that
∫K ∗
0 M [F ]dX= 0.
Suppose the two roots are given by K1 < K ∗ < K2, then a call option with strike K ∈ (K ∗,K2)
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has price increment
E [M [F ](X −K )+]=
∫Kmax
K
M [F ](X −K )dX,
=
∫K2
K
M [F ](X −K )dX+
∫Kmax
K2
M [F ](X −K )dX,
=
∫K2
K
M [F ](X −K2)dX+ (K2−K )
∫Kmax
K
M [F ]dX+E [M [F ](X −K2)+] .
All the three terms are positive in the last expression. The argument is similar for any K ∈
(K1,K ∗). This proofs that option prices are all positive. As the variance risk premium is the
positively weighted-sum of all available option prices [Bakshi et al., 2003], this immediately
suggests a positive variance risk premium.
m(1)2 = er E
[
M[F ]
(
logX −m(0)1
)2]> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The ﬁrst-order effect of a ‘small’ nonlinear shock FJ on the skewness
risk premium derived from the average D2C pricing kernel is proportional to
E
[
M [FJ ]
((
log
X
s(0)
−mQ1
)3
−3mQ2 log
X
s(0)
)]
.
Then take the functional derivative with respect to FJ to obtain
PM
[(
log
X
s(0)
−mQ1
)3
−3mQ2 log
X
s(0)
]
.
As P is positive, only the second term matters at determining the sign of the ﬁrst-order effect
on the skewness risk premium. The derivative of the second term with respect to X yields a
cubic equation for log Xs(0) . Hence, the second term of the functional derivative has at most
three critical points (i.e., M shape) and at least one critical point. Furthermore, when X → 0,
the functional derivative converges to −∞. Therefore, demand on options that are far out-of-
the-money pushes down the skewness risk premium.
Next, as the linear operatorM [·] has mean of zero, suggesting that at least one critical point
has to be above zero. Hence, options’ demand nearby this point may push up the skewness
risk premium.
Now, assume P is log-normally distributed, then direct computation shows that the second
term satisﬁes the following properties: (i) when X →∞, the functional derivative converges to
a negative constant; (ii) for σ smaller than a threshold σ¯, demand on OTM call options with
strikes slightly above the future price, er s(0), pushes up the skewness risk premium; (iii) for the
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same threshold, the last time the functional derivative crosses x-axis at Xˆ  er s(0), hence call
option demand at that resion has negligible effects on the skewness risk premium.
Proof of Proposition 4. See proofs for Proposition 5 and 6.
Proof of Proposition 5. For an almost competitive D2C exchange, s.t. π, the customer’s option
demand is
−F ′′ +π
(
−M
(1)w (0)
(M (0))2
)′′
= −F ′′ +π
(
F ′′π(1)+ w
(0)
s(0)+2ce−r F
′′
J π
(1)
)
.
Aggregate over all customers to get,
F ′′J +π
(
− w
(0)
D
s(0)+2ce−r F
′′
J π
(1)
)
.
For convex FJ , customers overall buy more options when dealers’ wealth is reduced. Mean-
while, the mid pricing kernel is,
M (0)+π
(
1
s(0)+2ce−r
w (0)D
s(0)+2ce−r −w (0)D
M [FJ ]π
(1)
)
.
Hence, for convex FJ , reducing dealers’ wealth reduces the average price for customers to buy
options.
Proof of Proposition 6. According to the Carr-Madan formula, customer’s option demand is
the second-order derivative of the demand function G ,
G ′′ = F
(
− w
(0)
(M (0))2
M (1)−F
)′′
.
Plug-in the formula for M (1) to get,
F
(
−1
2
F ′′ + 1
2
w (0)
s(0)+2ce−r +w (0)D
(
F (1)J
)′′)
.
Then aggregate among all customers to get customers’ net buy of options,
F
(
s(0)+2ce−r
s(0)+2ce−r +w (0)D
(
F (1)J
)′′)
.
The ﬁrst term in the product is decreasing in w (0)D , hence customers buy more options when
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dealers’ wealth decreases, for a convex F (1)J . Meanwhile, the mid pricing kernel is
M (0)+F
(
[0,1]2 w
(0)M (1)did j
s(0)+2ce−r −w (0)D
)
.
Plug-in the deﬁnitions to get
M (0)+F
(
w (0)D
(s(0)+2ce−r )2− (w (0)D )2
M
[
F (1)J
])
.
Similarly, for a convex F (1)J , customers pay less to buy options from dealers, if w
(0)
D is reduced.
Proof of Proposition 7. It follows directly from Proposition 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 8. When the D2C exchanges are ‘almost’ competitive, the effective per-
centage bid-ask spreads are given by
π
|E [(M (1)− M¯ (1))O(K )]|
E [M (0)O(K )]
+O (2π) .
Plug-in the deﬁnitions to get the difference in the pricing kernel,(
− 1
w (0)
M [F ]+ 1
s(0)+2ce−r −w (0)D
M [−FJ ]
)
π(1)
When the nonlinear risk is ‘small’ and dealers are monopolists, the spreads are given by
F
|E [(M (1)− M¯ (1))O(K )]|
E [M (0)O(K )]
+O (2F ) .
Plug-in the deﬁnitions to get the difference in the pricing kernel,
1
2
(
− 1
w (0)
M
[
F (1)
]+ 1
s(0)+2ce−r −w (0)D
M
[
−F (1)J
])
.
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Proof of Proposition 9. The endogenous parameters are solved explicitly, 3
w (0) =αs(0)+ce−r ,
κ(0) = 1,
μ(0) = 0,
s(0) = E [M (0)X ] ,
w (0)D =αDs(0)+ce−r .
Proof of Corollary 2. First-order expand on the ﬁrst-order condition (1.12) of the bargaining
problem to get
0= 1
(M (0))3
(
M (0)M (0)w (1)+M (0)N (1)w (0)−2M (1)M (0)w (0))
− 1
(M (0))2
(
M (0)π(0)w (1)+M (0)π(1)w (0)−M (1)π(0)w (0))
−F (0)κ(1)+F (0)π(1)−F (1)κ(0)+F (1)π(0)−Xμ(1)−κ(1)c+erμ(0)s(1)+erμ(1)s(0)+π(1)c .
Given that κ(0) = 1, μ(0) = 0 and M (0) =M (0), I simplify the equation to get,
0= 1
(M (0))2
(
M (0)w (1)−2M (1)w (0)+N (1)w (0))
− 1
(M (0))2
(
M (0)π(0)w (1)+M (0)π(1)w (0)−M (1)π(0)w (0))
−F (0)κ(1)+F (0)π(1)+F (1)π(0)−F (1)−Xμ(1)−κ(1)c+erμ(1)s(0)+π(1)c .
Then suppose the D2D exchange is monopolistic, then π(0) =π(1) = 0.
0= 1
(M (0))2
(
M (0)w (1)−2M (1)w (0)+N (1)w (0))
−F (0)κ(1)−F (1)−Xμ(1)−κ(1)c+erμ(1)s(0) .
Rearrange and solve for M (1) to get,
M (1) = 1
2w (0)
(
(M (0))2(−F (0)κ(1)−F (1)−Xμ(1)−κ(1)c+erμ(1)s(0))+M (0)w (1)+N (1)w (0)) .
The customer budget constraint implies
w (1) = E [F (0)M (1)+F (1)M (0)+M (1)c] .
3I deﬁne αD ≡ 1−

[0,1]2 αdid j .
100
A.3. Proofs
From the no-arbitrage conditions, we know that E [M (1)]= 0 and E [M (1)X ]= s(1). Hence
w (1) = αs(1)+E [F (1)M (0)] .
The deﬁnition for the endogenous parameter κ implies
κ(1) = −E
[
1
M (0)
(
M (1)−N (1))] .
Hence κ(1) = 0, then I get
M (1) = 1
2w (0)
(
(M (0))2(−F (1)−Xμ(1)+erμ(1)s(0))+M (0)w (1)+N (1)w (0)) .
From the fact that E [M (1)]= E [N (1)]= 0, I get
μ(1) = E [M
(0)w (1)− (M (0))2F (1)]
E [(M (0))2(X −er s(0))] .
Under the D2D market clearing condition
0 =
(
M (0)w (1)D −N (1)w (0)D
)
+

[0,1]2
(
M (0)w (1)−M (1)w (0)) did j .
Take expectation to get
w (1)D = −

[0,1]2
w (1)did j .
Multiply by X and take expectation on the D2D market clearing condition to get
s(1) = 0.
Then solve for the D2D pricing kernel,
N (1) = ((1+αD ) s(0)+3ce−r )−1
×

[0,1]2
(M (0))2(F (1)+μ(1)(X −er s(0)))−M (0)w (1)did j .
The D2C pricing kernel is,
M (1) = 1
2w (0)
(
(M (0))2(−F (1)−μ(1)(X −er s(0)))+M (0)w (1)+N (1)w (0)) .
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The endogenous parameters are given by
w (1) = E [F (1)M (0)] ,
κ(1) = 0,
μ(1) = 1
er s(0)+2c
Cov
[
M (0),M (0)F (1)
]
Var
[
M (0)
] ,
s(1) = 0.
w (1)D =−

[0,1]2
w (1)did j .
Proof of Proposition 11. From the bargaining ﬁrst-order condition
0= − 1
(M (0))2
(
M (0)π(1)w (0)+M (1)w (0)−N (1)w (0))
−Fκ(1)+Fπ(1)−Xμ(1)−κ(1)c+erμ(1)s(0)+π(1)c
We get κ(1) = 0 from its deﬁnition. Next we solve for the D2C exchange pricing kernel,
M (1) = 1
w (0)
(
(M (0))2
(
(F +c)π(1)−Xμ(1)+erμ(1)s(0))+w (0) (−M (0)π(1)+N (1)))
From the customer’s budget constraint, I get
w (1) = E [FM (1)] .
From the no-arbitrage condition, I get
μ(1) = π(1) E [(M
(0))2(F +c)]−E [M (0)]w (0)
E [(M (0))2X ]−E [(M (0))2]er s(0) .
From the D2D market-clearing condition
N (1) = (s(0)+2ce−r )−1
×
(
−

[0,1]2
(M (0))2
(
(F +c)π(1)−μ(1)(X −er s(0)))−w (0)M (0)π(1)did j) .
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The endogenous parameters are given by
w (1) = E [FM (1)] ,
κ(1) = 0,
μ(1) = π
(1)
er s(0)+2c
Cov[M (0),M (0)(F +c)]
Var[M (0)]
,
s(1) = 0.
w (1)D =−

[0,1]2
w (1)did j .
Proof of Lemma 11. The ﬁrst-part comes directly from the ﬁrst-order expansion. The second-
part comes from the second-order expansion for the D2D market clearing condition, For the
customer’s consumption,
(
2(M (0))2w (2)−2M (0)M (1)w (1)−2M (0)M (2)w (0)+2(M (1))2w (0)) .
For the dealer’s consumption,(
2(M (0))2w (2)D −2M (0)N (1)w (1)D −2M (0)N (2)w (0)D +2(N (1))2w (0)D
)
.
Lemma 12. The functional derivatives for the indirect utilities are
δν(i,j)[M D2C(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
= −Pλ(i,j)(J (λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )−F Ci ),
δν(j,i)[M D2C(i,j) ]
δM D2C(i,j)
= Pλ(j,i)κ(i,j)(J (λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )−F Ci )
+Pλ(j,i)λ(i,j) J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(κ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) −M D2D).
where κ(i,j) is deﬁned in (1.13).
Proof. Direct calculation yields the results.
Lemma 13. Dealer j ’s proﬁt from D2C trading is −E [M D2DG∗(i,j)(M D2C(i,j) )], and it is decreasing in
the inverse market power π(i,j).
Proof. From the Nash bargaining ﬁrst-order condition, I get
G∗(i,j) = −
λ(i,j) J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )(κ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) −M D2D)
κ(i,j)−π(i,j)
.
103
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1
Taking expectations and plug-in the deﬁnition to get
−E [M D2DG∗(i,j)] = λ(i,j)
E [M D2C(i,j) M
D2D J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )]2−E [(M D2D)2 J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )]E [(M D2C(i,j) )2 J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )]
(κ(i,j)−π(i,j))E [M D2C(i,j) J ′(λ(i,j)M D2C(i,j) )]
> 0
The inequality comes from Holder inequality. Also, dealer will agree to trade only when this
term is positive, hence, I need that κ(i,j) >π(i,j).
A.4 Miscellaneous
The ETF sample is selected based on the average daily volume during 2015 on ISE exchange.
• Equity Sector: XRT, SMH, XBI, XLY, IBB, XLV, XLI, XLU, XLE, IYR, XLF;
• Equity Index: DIA, IWM, SPY, QQQ;
• Equity International: ASHR, RSX, EWJ, DXJ, EFA, EWZ, FXI, EEM;
• Fixed-income: HYG, TLT;
• Commodity: UNG, OIH, SLV, GDX, GLD, USO, XOP;
• Currency: FXE, UUP;
Risk-Neutral Moments According to the Bakshi et al. [2003], the risk-neutral variance is
given by
VarianceQt (T ) =
er (T−t )Vt (T )−μt (T )2
T − t
The risk-neutral skewness is given by
SkewQt (T ) =
er (T−t )Wt (T )−3μt (T )er (T−t )Vt (T )+2μt (T )3(
er (T−t )Vt (T )−μt (T )2
)3/2 .
The time t prices of the time T quadratic, cubic and quartic payoffs are given as the weighted
sum of OTM calls and puts,
Vt (T )=
∫∞
St
2
(
1− log KSt
)
K 2
Ot (C ,K ,T )dK +
∫St
0
2
(
1+ log StK
)
K 2
Ot (P,K ,T )dK ,
Wt (T )=
∫∞
St
6log KSt −3
(
log KSt
)2
K 2
Ot (C ,K ,T )dK −
∫St
0
6log StK +3
(
log StK
)2
K 2
Ot (P,K ,T )dK ,
Xt (T )=
∫∞
St
12
(
log KSt
)2−4(log KSt )3
K 2
Ot (C ,K ,T )dK +
∫St
0
12
(
log StK
)2+4(log StK )3
K 2
Ot (P,K ,T )dK .
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and
μt (T ) ≈ er (T−t )−1− e
r (T−t )
2
Vt (T )− e
r (T−t )
6
Wt (T )− e
r (T−t )
24
Xt (T ) .
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix contains all proofs for Chapter 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that the variance of εq goes to zero, then we have that the co-
variance between pricing kernel and the spot price P being solely determined by the variation
in εp . In this case, we know that the pricing kernel is a decreasing function in εp , while the
price is an increasing function. Hence, we conclude that the covariance is negative.
Suppose that the variance of εp goes to zero, then we have that the covariance between pricing
kernel and the spot price P being solely determined by the variation in εq . In this case, we
have that both the pricing kernel and the spot price being a decreasing function of the quantity
shock q . Hence, the covariance is positive.
Proof of Lemma 4. The ﬁrst-order expansion for equation (2.6) gives
(
E [M (1)]κ∗ −δκ(1)+κ(1)
)
e−δ log(κ∗) = E [M (1)δ+α(1)δ log(Z )].
Note that E [M (1)]= 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that
Xp, = Xp,+X (1)p .
Expand the optimal consumption demand of the producer to the ﬁrst-order, we get
X (1)p (P )=−
δ−λp
α
κδ∗ logPα
(1)+constp .
For the consumer, similarly, we can ﬁnd his optimal consumption demand as
X (1)c (P )=
δ−1+λc
α
κδ∗ logPα
(1)+constc .
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Then, we take the second-order derivative with respect to P to get the claim.
Proof of Corollary 6. The aggregate put option demand from the hedgers is
∫F
Pmin+P (1)min
D(P )dP = 
1−λp −λc
α
κδ∗
(
P−1min−F−1
)
α(1).
The aggregate call option demand from the hedgers is
∫Pmax+P (1)max
F
D(P )dP = 
1−λp −λc
α
κδ∗
(
F−1−P−1max
)
α(1).
Note that we don’t need to compute the ﬁrst-order terms for F and P, as they would show up
only in the second order terms after the integration.
Proof of Lemma 5. The ﬁrst-order perturbation for the pricing kernel is
M (1) =λ−1M λ(1)M −
α(1)γκeδ log(κ) log(Z )−δγκκ(1)+δγκ(1)eδ log(κ)
−δκ2+δκw +κeδ log(κ)
Then we compute the λ(1)M ,
λ(1)M =λM
α(1)γκeδ log(κ)E [log(Z )]−δγκκ(1)+δγκ(1)eδ log(κ)
−δκ2+δκw +κeδ log(κ)
Then, plug the result in the pricing kernel, we get the claim.
108
C Appendix to Chapter 3
This appendix contains all proofs for Chapter 3.
Proof of Proposition 1. By the conjecture (3.8), the market clearing price p2 is jointly normally
distributed with θ. By the deﬁnition of ξ in (3.4), one has
Cov(D,p2)=Cov
(
θ+ε,a σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
(θ+δ)
)
= aρσ2θ. (C.1)
Furthermore, one has
V(ξ)=V
(
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
(θ+δ)
)
= ρσ2θ. (C.2)
Now (C.1), (C.2) and the normal projection theorem give
E(D|p2)=
aρσ2
θ
a2ρσ2
θ
+b2σ2W
p2 = ψ
a
(aξ+bW ), (C.3)
V(D|p2)= 1
τu
=σ2θ+σ2ε−
a2ρ2σ4
θ
a2ρσ2
θ
+b2σ2W
=σ2θ+σ2ε−ψρσ2θ. (C.4)
Plugging (C.3) and (C.4) into (3.7), using the result with (3.6) in the market-clearing condition
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(3.9):
Mτξ(ξ−p2)
γd
+ (N −M)τu(ψξ+
ψb
a W −p2)
γd
=W
solving for p2 and matching coefﬁcients with (3.8) yields
Mτξ+ (N −M)ψτu = [Mτξ+ (N −M)τu]a (C.5)
(N −M)τuψb
a
−γd = [Mτξ+ (N −M)τu]b. (C.6)
Substituting ψ = a
2ρσ2
θ
a2ρσ2
θ
+b2σ2W
into equations (C.5) and (C.6) and solve for a and b gives the
expressions in (3.13) and (3.14).
It is immediately clear from (3.13) that a > 0 if M > 0, since both numerator and denominator
are always positive in this case. Sinceψ> 0 it follows also that a ≤ 1, with an equality only if
N =M .
Proof of Lemma 1. The dealer’s optimal demand schedule follows directly from the ﬁrst-order
condition (3.3) by substituting ωk = qk −x. The demand schedules of other informed dealers
do not change, since they do not make inferences from the price in the interdealer market.
The dealers who have not been contacted by the investor perform inferences as described
in Proposition 1. One can now conjecture p2 = aξ+b(W −x). Thus using dealer k’s demand
schedule and demand schedules (3.6) and (3.7) for the other dealers in the market clearing
condition and following the exact procedure described in the proof of Proposition 1 determines
a and b as in 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Fx denote the dealers’ optimal quoting strategy. This means dealers
quote a price p0 that is a random variable with the distribution function Fx .
Let x > 0. Then x(pv −pc )> 0 implies pv > pc . If the dealers’ optimal strategy were such that
there is a p∗ ∈ (pv ,pc ) such that dealers quote a price p ≤ p∗ with a probability of 1, then
a dealer could proﬁtably deviate from this strategy by quoting pv . This would contradict
optimality. On the other hand, quoting a prices greater than pv with any positive probability
cannot be optimal, since the investor would not buy the asset at that price. Thus, one obtains
supsupp(Fx)= pv .
Now we show that Fx must be continuous, i.e. there cannot be any atoms in the distribution
of p0. Clearly, quoting a price less than or equal to pc with any positive probability cannot be
optimal, since a dealer would not make any positive proﬁt by doing so, whereas he would make
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a positive expected proﬁt by quoting pv . Now, suppose there is a price p ′ with pv ≥ p ′ > pc
that is quoted with probability ρ > 0 by all dealers.
Then a single dealer could again proﬁtably deviate from this strategy which contradicts opti-
mality. The proﬁtable deviation is constructed as follows. Since the number of prices charged
with positive probability must be countable, one can ﬁnd for each δ > 0 an εδ, such that
δ≥ εδ > 0 and the price p ′ −εδ is charged with probability zero by all dealers. The deviating
dealer can now charge price p ′ −εδ with probability ρ and charge price p ′ with probability
zero. Using the fact that limδ→0Fx(p ′ −εδ)= Fx(p ′)−ρ, one can express the difference Δ in
proﬁts between the original strategy and the proposed deviation as follows. A dealer quoting
p ′ only makes a positive proﬁt if no other dealer on the platform quotes a lower price. If no
other dealer quotes a lower price, there might be j = 0,1, ...,M −1 dealers who quote p ′ as well.
In the latter case, each of the j +1 is equally likely to be chosen by the investor for trading
the asset. The calculation below considers the cases in which j dealers quote price p on the
platform separately.
Δ = (1−qFx(p ′ −εδ)−qρ)M−1(p ′ −εδ−pc )x
−(1−qFx(p ′))M−1(p−c)x
+
M−1∑
j=1
(
M −1
j
)
(1−qFx(p ′ −εδ)−qρ)M−1− j (qρ) j (p ′ −εδ−pc )x
−
M−1∑
j=1
(
M −1
j
)
(1−qFx(p ′))M−1− j (qρ) j (p ′ −pc ) x
j +1.
The ﬁrst two lines in the above expression compare expected proﬁts from quoting p ′ −εδ and
expected proﬁts from quoting p ′ in the event that all other dealers quote a price above p ′.
Since limδ→0Fx(p ′ −εδ)= Fx(p ′)−ρ, the difference in these two lines goes to zero as δ goes to
zero. The last two lines compare the respective proﬁts in the cases in which j > 0 other dealers
quote p ′. Since M ≥ 2, the deviating dealer can get a jump in expected trading volume in this
case, since he can avoid ties with other dealers. Therefore one obtains
Δ→
M−1∑
j=1
(
M −1
j
)
(p ′ −pc ) j x
j +1(1−qFx(p
′))M−1− j (qρ) j > 0 as δ→ 0.
Thus, the proposed deviation is proﬁtable for a small δ. In equilibrium, Fx cannot have any
atoms.
If x < 0, one veriﬁes analogously to the case of x > 0, that infsupp(Fx)= pv must hold for any
optimal strategy. That the distribution cannot have any atoms follows analogously as well.
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The dealers are only willing to randomize over prices if they earn the same proﬁt in expectation
with each price in the support of Fx . This proﬁt must be equal to the proﬁt in which the dealer
quotes pv (x). This gives the indifference condition expressed in (3.17).
Using the binomial formula (x+ y)n =∑nk=0 (nk)xn−k yk , (3.17) simpliﬁes to
(p−pc )x(1−qFx(p))M−1 = (1−q)M−1(pv (x)−pc )x,
which can be solved for Fx . The solution is given by (3.18).
Using (3.18) and solving Fx(px)= 0 for px gives
px = pc + (pv −pc )(1−q)M−1.
Since x(pv −pc )> 0, one obtains px > pc for x > 0 and px < pc for x < 0.
The event that at least one dealer is on the platform happens with probability 1− (1−q)M ,
since all dealers respond independently with probability q . The unconditional probability
that no dealer quotes above p ∈ supp(Fx) can be expressed by (1−qFs(p))M . Therefore, the
conditional distribution Gx has to satisfy G(p)(1− (1−q)M )= 1− (1−qFx(p))M . Performing a
change of variables p = pc + (pv−pc )(1−q)
M−1
(1−(1−(1−q)M )u)(M−1)/M , one can calculate
∫
supp(Fx )
pdGx(p)=
∫1
0
[
pc + (pv −pc )(1−q)
M−1
(1− (1− (1−q)M )u)(M−1)/M
]
du = pc + (pv −pc )(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M Mq.
The claim that 0≤ κ< 1, can be shown as follows. That 0≤ κ is immediately clear from the
deﬁnition (3.20). The other inequality can be seen as follows.
• κ as a function of q is strictly decreasing in q for all q ∈ (0,1], since
∂κ
∂q
= −M(1−q)
M−2 [(1−q)M +Mq−1]
(1− (1−q)M )2 < 0
for q ∈ (0,1].
• By L’Hospital’s rule, one has
lim
q→0κ=
limq→0(M(1−q)M−1−M(M −1)q(1−q)M−2)
limq→0 M(1−q)M
= M
M
= 1.
The last two bullet points imply κ< 1 for all q ∈ (0,1].
This proves all statements in the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Claim 1: The expected price on the platform is linear in ξ and x. Deﬁne
β1 :=
[
1− Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M
][
a− (1−a)b
γdσ
2
ξ
]
+ Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M
(
1+ σ
2
δ
σ2
θ
)
(C.7)
and
β2 :=
[
1− Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M
][
−b− b
2
2γdσ2ξ
]
+ Mq(1−q)
M−1
1− (1−q)M
(
−γIσ
2

2
)
. (C.8)
Using the deﬁnitions of pc (x) and pv (x), it follows by direct computation that P (x) as deﬁned
in Lemma 2 is given by (3.22).
Claim 2: Let M(1−q)
M−1
1−(1−q)M < 12 . An equilibrium exists if and only if a < a for some a ∈R.
To verify the existence of the described equilibrium, there are several things to check. The
strategy (3.25) is well-deﬁned if
2β2+γIσ2ε 	= 0. (C.9)
Furthermore, the investor’s second-order condition from the maximization problem (3.23)
requires
−γIσ2ε−
(
2
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
α
+2β2
)
< 0. (C.10)
In order to apply Lemma 2 we also need to verify that
x(pv (x)−pc (x))> 0 (C.11)
for holds for any x 	= 0 demanded by the investor in the proposed equilibrium.
If (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) hold, one can use Lemma 2 to see that there exist optimal strategies
for the dealers that yield P (x) as the expected price on the platform conditional on at least one
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response. As demonstrated in the text, the stated strategy for the investor (3.25) indeed solves
the ﬁrst order condition (3.24), given that dealers rationally infer θ+δ from the investor’s
demand. Thus, both dealers and the investor behave optimally given the strategies of the
others and an equilibrium is established.
The strategy of the proof of this claim is as follows. We will assume that the average price is
given by the expression in Lemma 2. We then show that the investor’s strategy is well-deﬁned
so that the ﬁrst-order and second-order conditions of the maximization problem (3.23) are
satisﬁed. We that verify that in this case
In order to prove our claim, we ﬁrst note that (C.11) is satisﬁed in this case, so that dealers
indeed ﬁnd it optimal to quote as described in Lemma 2.
For the following proof, it is worth noting that Lemma 2 states that
0≤κ< 1 (C.12)
for all q ∈ (0,1] and M ≥ 2.
„⇒”: Proof that equilibrium exists under the stated conditions.
Let now κ< 12 .
We rewrite (C.7) and (C.8) as using b =−γdσ
2
ξ
M a:
β1 = (1−κ)
(
a+ (1−a)a
M
)
+κσ
2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
> 0, (C.13)
β2 = (1−κ)
(
γdσ
2
ξ
M
a−
a2γdσ
2
ξ
2M2
)
−κ
(
γIσ
2

2
)
>−γIσ
2

2
, (C.14)
where the inequalities follow from (C.12) and 1≤ a > 0.
Deﬁne
Ψ := σ
2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
1
2 −κ
1−κ > 0
and deﬁne a as the smaller solution to the quadratic equation
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a+ (1−a)a
M
=Ψ,
if there is a real solution to the equation. Set a = 1 otherwise. Then it follows from (C.13) that
β1 < 1
2
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
,
if a < a.
Thus, all that remains to show is that there is an equilibrium if the last inequality involving
β1 holds. As described above it is sufﬁcient to check that (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) hold. It is
immediatly clear from (C.14) that (C.9) always holds for any set of parameters.
Regarding (C.10), note that using (3.25), (C.14) and the assumption on β1 imply α> 0. Using
(C.13), one therefore obtains
−γIσ2ε−
(
2
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
α
+2β2
)
< 2 σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
α
+2β2 < 0.
Thus, the investor’s second-order condition holds if β1 < 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
.
Lastly, we check that (C.11) holds which justiﬁes the use of Lemma 2 for determining the
expected price on the platform. Note that by optimality of the investor’s choice of x and α> 0,
it follows that the investor makes a positive proﬁt if x 	= 0 This can be seen, since the investor
could always make a zero proﬁt by not trading, but instead chooses a different x. By the
convexity of the maximization problem (3.23), the optimal quantity is uniquely determined
and therefore must give a positive proﬁt. This implies
x(pv (x)−pc (x))≥ x(pv (x)−pc (x))(1−κ)= x(pv (x)−P (x))> 0.
Therefore (C.11) indeed holds and Lemma 2 can be used to determine the dealer’s quoting
strategies on the platform.
Since (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) indeed hold, the equilibrium exists.
„⇐”: Proof that equilibrium does not exist if a ≥ a.
The deﬁnition of a and β1 imply that β1 ≥ 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
if a ≥ a. If the last inequality is an equlity, it
follows that α= 0. This means, the investor does not trade and the quoting strategies of the
dealers are not deﬁned. Let the inequality be strict. Note that by (C.13), κ ∈ [0,1] and a ∈ [0,1],
one has β1 ≤ a+ (1−a)= 1. This in turn implies
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1
1−2β1 σ
2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
>−1.
One now obtains
−γIσ2ε−
(
2
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
α
+2β2
)
= −γIσ2ε+2β2−2
2β2+γIσ2ε
1−2β1
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
> −γIσ2ε+2β2+2(2β2+γIσ2ε)
σ2
θ
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
β1
> −γIσ2ε+2β2+ (2β2+γIσ2ε)= 0.
Therefore, the second-order condition for the investor’s maximization problem (3.23) is not
satisﬁed. Thus, the investor’s strategy is clearly not optimal and the described equilibrium
does not exist.
Claim 3: The equilibrium does not exist if κ≥ 12
In this case, a ≥ 0 and (C.13) imply β1 ≥ 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
. The prove that the equilibrium doe not exist
is identical to the proof in Claim 2.
Claim 4: a → 0 as N →∞ and σW →∞.
By equation (3.13), one can see that
lim
σW →∞
lim
N→∞
a = lim
σW →∞
lim
N→∞
Mτξ
N−M +ψτu
Mτξ
N−M +τu
= lim
σW →∞
ψ
= 0.
Claim 5: An equilibrium exist if κ< 12 and σδ→∞. As σδ →∞, one hasΨ→∞. This means
a+ (1−a)a2M <Ψ for all a ∈R and in particular for all a ∈ (0,1] As shown in the proof of Claim 2,
this implies β1 < 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
and the equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 3. We divided this proof into several steps. The ﬁrst step is an auxiliary
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result that will be used later in the proof.
Step 1: ∂a∂M ≥ 1M a(1−a).
Since σδ = 0, we get σξ =σε and ρ =σ2θ. We now rewrite a as deﬁned in (3.13) as
a = 1− γ
2
dσ
4
εσ
2
W (N −M)
M2Nσ2
θ
+γ2dMσ2εσ2θσ2W +γ2dNσ4εσ2W
(C.15)
Using the expression in (C.15), one obtains by direct calculation and simplifying terms that
∂a
∂M
− 1
M
a(1−a) = γ
2
dMσ
4
εσ
2
W
(
γ2dσ
2
εσ
2
W
(
σ2ε+σ2θ
)+N2σ2
θ
)
(
M2Nσ2
θ
+γ2dMσ2εσ2θσ2W +γ2dNσ4εσ2W
)2
≥ 0.
This proves the ﬁrst step
Step 2: The equilibrium exists if and only if a is below a certain threshold.
This result follows directly from Proposition 2 by noting that κ as deﬁned (C.12) is equal to
zero if q = 1. Furthermore, since q = 1, one has Ψ = 12 , where Ψ is deﬁned in the proof of
Proposition 1. Deﬁning a as in the proof of Proposition 1, one gets that a is the smaller real
solution to
a+ (1−a)a
M
= 1
2
,
which is always greater than zero and less than 12 .
Step 3: There is an equilibrium for all M ′ <M.
In the proof of Proposition 2 it was established that the described equilibrium exists if and
only if β1 < 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
. If an equilibrium exists when M dealers get contacted, it consequently
must be the case that β1 < 12 . If furthermore, β1 < 12 for all M ′ <M , the result follows. The last
claim will be shown next. If q = 1, one has
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∂β1
∂M
= (1−2a)
∂a
∂M
M
+ ∂a
∂M
− (1−a)a
M2
= M +1−2a
M
∂a
∂M
− (1−a)a
M2
≥ M +1−2a
M
1
M
a(1−a)− (1−a)a
M2
> (3(1−a)+a2) (1−a)a
M2
> 0.
The third line follows from Step 1. Therefore, one has 0≤ β1 < 12
σ2
θ
+σ2
δ
σ2
θ
for all M ′ < M . Note
that event though M represents an integer in the model, β1 can be interpreted as a function in
C1(R).
Step 4: The investor’s payoff is highest if M ′ = 2 compared to all other M ′′ ≤M.
Since we know that a nonzero-trade equilibrium exists for all M ′ < M , we can calculate the
investor’s equilibrium payoff as deﬁned by (3.27).
Using the expressions for β1 and β2 stated in Step 2 and using the deﬁnition of α from (3.25),
one gets
πI =
σ2
θ
M
(
2a2−2a(M +1)+M)
2σ2ε
(
2aγdM +γI M2−a2γd
) .
In equilibrium, one has πI > 0. Since a < a, the numerator in the above expression for πI is
positive. Therefore, the denominator must be positive as well. Interpreting πI as a function
in C1(R), one can show that πI is strictly decreasing in M by showing that ln(πI ) is strictly
decreasing in M . It then follows that the lowest possible M ′, i.e. M ′ = 2 is proﬁt maximizing
among all possible values less than M .
∂
∂M
lnπI =
M
(
4a ∂a∂M −2(M +1) ∂a∂M −2a+1
)
+ (2a2−2(M +1)a+M)
M
(
2a2−2(M +1)a+M)
−2γdM
∂a
∂M −2γda ∂a∂M +2γda+2γI M
2γdMa−γda2+γI M2
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Collecting terms gives
∂
∂M
lnπI = 1
M
+ 1
2a2−2(M +1)a+M −
2a
2a2−2(M +1)a+M
− 2γI M
2γdMa−γda2+γI M2
− 2γda
2γdMa−γda2+γI M2
+
+ ( 4a
2a2−2(M +1)a+M −
2(M +1)
2a2−2(M +1)a+M
2γda
2γdMa−γda2+γI M2
− 2γdM
2γdMa−γda2+γI M2
) ∂a
∂M
Since a < a one has a2−a(M +1)+M/2> 0. One can now see that the term in front of ∂a∂M is
negative. Therefore, one can obtain an upper bound for the ∂a∂M lnπI by plugging in the result
from Step 1 for ∂a∂M . Simplifying gives
∂
∂M
≤ −2a
(−2a2(γd −γI M)+Ma(γd −γI (M +2))+γda3+γI M2)(
2a2−2(M +1)a+M)(2γdMa−γda2+γI M2) .
The denominator is positive due to a < a. Simplifying the numerator gives
−2γI a
(
2Ma2− (M +2)Ma+M2)−2γda (a3−2a2+Ma)< 0.
Therefore one has ∂∂M lnπI < 0 and the claim follows.
Step 5: M = 2 is proﬁt-maximizing among all possible values.
Assume there would be an M ′ > 2 such that M = M ′ gives a higher proﬁt than M = 2 in
equilibrium. By Step 3, it must be the case that a < a for M =M ′. Now it follows by Step 3 that
having M = 2 gives a higher proﬁt for the investor than having M =M ′. Thus, contacting only
2 dealers is indeed proﬁt-maximizing.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is shown in proposition 3 that equilibrium exists when a < a¯ < 12 . We
now replace a as deﬁned in equation (3.13):
M2Nσ2
θ
+γ2dσ2σ2θσ2W M+γ2dσ4σ2W M
M2Nσ2
θ
+γ2dσ2σ2θσ2W M+γ2dσ4σ2W N
< 12 . Equivalently,
M < 1
2
M2Nσ2
θ
+γ2dσ2σ2θσ2W M +γ2dσ4σ2W N
MNσ2
θ
+γ2dσ2σ2θσ2W +γ2dσ4σ2W
< 1
2
N .
Therefore, if M > 12N , one has a ≥ a¯, which implies that the equilibrium does not exist from
proposition 3.
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Figure C.1 – a(M) and a¯(M ,q)
(a) a(M) and a¯(M ,q = 1) (b) a(M) and a¯(M ,q = 0.9,0.5,0.2)
In the following, we show that the equilibrium existence condition a < a¯ is equivalent to
M ∈ (M¯1,M¯2), where M¯1 and M¯2 are roots to the equation a(M)= a¯(M).
First, a(M) is an increasing function of M and lim
M→N
a(M) = 1. In terms of a¯(M ,q), one can
calculate the two derivatives
∂a¯
∂M
= 1−
2M + κ(1−κ)+
M∂κ
∂M
(1−κ)2√
4M2+1+4M(1−2Ψ)
,
where ∂κ∂M = κ
[
1
M +
ln(1−q)
1−(1−q)M
]
< 0, so ∂a¯∂M > 0.
And
∂a¯
∂q
=−
M
(1−κ)2
∂κ
∂q√
4M2+1+4M [ κ1−κ −
σ2
δ
σ2
θ
]
,
where ∂κ∂q =
M(1−q)M−2(1−Mq−(1−q)M )
(1−(1−q)M )2 < 0, so ∂a¯∂q > 0. Thus, a¯ is an increasing function of both M
and q .
Moreover, comparing the the value of a(M) and a¯(M ,q) at the limits, one gets
lim
M→N
a(M)= 1 > 1
2
> lim
M→N
a¯(M ,q),
lim
M→2
a(M) < lim
M→2,q→1
a¯(M ,q),
lim
M→2
a(M)> 0 > lim
M→2,q→0
a¯(M ,q).
So there are maximum two roots to the equation a(M)= a¯(M ,q) for M ∈ [2,N ]. As has been
shown and demonstrated by ﬁgure (C.1) that there exists at least one root when q = 1, since
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a¯(M ,q) decreases when q decreases, the larger root M¯2 also decreases. Note that
∂2 a¯(M ,q)
∂q2 < 0,
implies that the concavity of a¯(M ,q) becomes larger , so the smaller root M¯1 increases when
q decreases. More speciﬁcally,
(1) When q = 1, M¯1 < 0 and M¯2 > 2.
(2) When q ∈ (
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 ,1], M¯1 < 2 and M¯2 > 2.
(3) When q =
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 , M¯1 = 2 and M¯2 > 2.
(4) When q ∈ (q ,
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 ), M¯1 > 2 and M¯2 > M¯1 > 2.
(5) When q = q , M¯1 =N , where q is the solution to the equation Nq(1−q)
N−1
1−(1−q)N = 12 .
(6) When q ∈ [0,q), there is no solution to a(M)= a¯(M) and a(M)> a¯(M).
The existence of equilibrium is summarized in ﬁgure (C.2).
0
No equilib-
rium
q
2 ≤ M¯1 ≤ M ≤ M¯1
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2
2 ≤ M ≤ M¯2
1 q
Figure C.2 – The existence of equilibrium
The above results show that when q <
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 , the equilibrium exists when M¯1 <
M < M¯2. But M¯1 ≥ 2, so there is no equilibrium when M = 2. Moreover, the minimum
value of M such that the equilibrium exist is 3. Overall, we can conclude that when q <
1+
√
1− 2(a(2)
2−5a(2)+2)
a(2)2−5a(2)+4
2 , there exists an equilibrium with M ≥ 3.
Proof of Proposition 5. Using the optimal demand schedule (3.6) for M −1 informed dealers
and demand schedule (3.7) for the uninformed dealers, where the the conditional beliefs of
uninformed dealers are formed as described in the proof of Proposition 1, the market clearing
condition
qk +
∑
l≤M ,l 	=k
ql +
N∑
lM+1
=W
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can be rearranged as
p2 = b
(
W − (M −1)ξ
γdσ
2
ξ
−qk
)
.
therefore, one has ∂∂qk p2 =−b, whenever dealer k is informed.
If dealers do not update their belief about ξwhen the investor changes his demanded quantity
x, taking the derivative of (3.15) w.r.t. x gives the following permanent price impact
∂
∂x
pc =− b
2
2γdσ2ξ
−b <−b.
Using (3.15) and taking into account that the dealers form their expectation ξ about the
dividend payment based on (3.4) and (3.21), one obtains
∂
∂x
pc = aρ
α
−b− 2(1−a)b
ρ
α +b2
2γdσ2ξ
= ρβ˜1
α
+ β˜2
≥ ρβ˜1
α˜
+ β˜2,
where α˜, β˜1 and β˜2 denote the value of α, β1 and β2 when q = 1, respectively. The inequality
holds since α= α˜− κ1−κ 12β˜2+γIσ2 . Replacing α˜ by (3.25), one has
∂
∂x
pc ≥ ρβ˜1
1−2ρβ˜1
(2β˜2+γIσ2)+ β˜2
> ρβ˜1
1−2ρβ˜1
2β˜2+ β˜2
= β˜2
1−2ρβ˜1
=
−b− b2
2γdσ2ξ
1−2ρ
[
a− (1−a)b
γdσ
2
ξ
]
= −b
(
1− a2M
)
1−2ρa (1− 1−aM )
> −b.
The last inequality holds since 1− a2M > 1−2ρa
(
1− 1−aM
)
, that is equivalent to a > 0> 1−M +
1
4ρ .
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Proof of Proposition 6. By the conjecture (3.33), themarket clearing price p2 is jointly normally
distributed with θ. One has
Cov(D,p2)=Cov(θ+ε,aθ)= aσ2θ. (C.16)
Now (C.16), (3.37) and the normal projection theorem give
E(D|p2)=
aσ2
θ
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
p2 = ψ
a
(aθ+bW ), (C.17)
V(D|p2)= 1
τu
=σ2θ+σ2ε−
a2σ4
θ
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
=σ2θ+σ2ε−ψσ2θ. (C.18)
Plugging (C.17) and (C.18) into (3.34), using the result with (3.32) in the market-clearing
condition (3.9):
Mτ(θ−p2)
γd
+MXk +
(N −M)τu(ψθ+ ψba W −p2)
γd
=W
solving for p2 and matching coefﬁcients with (3.33) yields
Mτ+ (N −M)ψτu +γdϕα1 = [Mτξ+ (N −M)τu]a (C.19)
(N −M)τuψb
a
−γd = [Mτξ+ (N −M)τu]b. (C.20)
Solving for a and b gives the expressions in (3.38) and (3.39).
It is immediately clear from (3.38) that a > 0, both numerator and denominator are always
positive. Sinceψ> 0 it follows also that a ≤ 1 with a strict inequality only if N =M .
Proof of Lemma 3. To show the second equality in (3.42), we note that the equilibrium price
in the interdealer market depends on the aggregate inventory by market clearing. If market
clearing holds, then
M∑
l=1
ql +
N∑
k=M+1
ql +W,
where the demand schedules are deﬁned as in (3.32) and (3.34). Using these deﬁnitions, the
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normal projection theorem to determine the conditional expectations gives and solving the
previous equation for p2 gives
p2 =
W −∑Ml=1 Xl − θMγdσ2ε
aσ2
θ
(N−M)
γd
(
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
)(− a2σ4θ
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
+σ2ε+σ2θ
) − N−M
γd
(
− a
2σ4
θ
a2σ2
θ
+b2σ2W
+σ2ε+σ2θ
) − M
γdσ
2
ε
.
Using the deﬁnition of a and b in Proposition 6, some algebra yields that the denominator on
the right-hand side of the previous equation is equal to 1b . Therefore, it follows that
∂
∂Xk
p2 =−b. (C.21)
Using E(p2)= aθ, one can now calculate
∂
∂Xk
Ek
[
D(qk −Xk )−p2qk −
γd
2
σ2ε(qk −Xk )2
]
= aθ−b (1−a)θ
γdσ
2
ε
+bXk .
Since in equilibrium, one has Xk = ϕMα1θ, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. Step 1: expressions of β1 and β2
Substituting equation pc (xi ) and pv (x) into the price P (x) formula gives
β1 = κ
(
1− α1
α2
)
+ (1−κ)
[
a+ b(1−a)
γdσ
2

− bϕα1
M
]
(C.22)
β2 = κ
(
1
α2
− γIσ
2

2
)
. (C.23)
Step 2: Solving α1, α2, β1 and β2
Combing the equations (3.47), (3.48), (C.22) and (C.23) and solving α1, α2, β1 and β2 leads to
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the following:
α1 =
1−a− b(1−a)
γdσ
2

1− bϕM 1−2κ(1−κ)γIσ2
1−2κ
(1−κ)γIσ2
, (C.24)
α2 = 1−2κ
(1−κ)γIσ2
, (C.25)
β1 =
a+ b(1−a)
γdσ
2

− bϕM 1−2κ(1−κ)γIσ2
1− bϕM 1−2κ(1−κ)γIσ2
, (C.26)
β2 = κ
2(1−2κ)γIσ
2
 . (C.27)
Note that when κ< 12 , one gets α2 > 0 and β2 > 0.
Step 3: Show the existence of α1 ∈ (0,α2] and a ∈ (0,1]
We ﬁrst show that α1 is a decreasing function of a. Secondly, show that a is an increasing
function of α1, then prove that the two curves insect at {α1×a : (0,α2]× (0,1]}. Replacing b by
equation (3.39) into formula (C.24) and derive the expression of α1 as a function of a:
α1 = 1
2γdϕ
[
−Mτ−γdϕα2
( a
M
+a−1
)
+
√
[Mτ+γdϕα2
( a
M
+a−1
)
]2+4γdϕα2Mτ(1−a)
( a
M
+1
)]
(C.28)
Once a ≤ 1, one could derive that α1 > 0 and further α1 is monotonically decreasing on a.
Since
∂α1
∂a
=
α2
2 (
1
M +1)
[
Mτ+γdϕα2( aM +a−1)−
√
[Mτ+γdϕα2
( a
M +a−1
)
]2+4γdϕα2Mτ(1−a)
( a
M +1
)]
√
[Mτ+γdϕα2
( a
M +a−1
)
]2+4γdϕα2Mτ(1−a)
( a
M +1
)
+ α2Mτ(
−2a
M + 1M −1)√
[Mτ+γdϕα2
( a
M +a−1
)
]2+4γdϕα2Mτ(1−a)
( a
M +1
)
< 0.
Moreover, one has
lim
a→0α1 =
1
2γdϕ
[
−Mτ+γdϕα2+
√
(Mτ−γdϕα2)2+4γdϕα2Mτ
]
=α2,
lim
a→1α1 =
1
2γdϕ
[
−Mτ−γdϕα2+
√
(Mτ+γdϕα2)2
]
= 0.
Since α1 is monotonically decreasing on a, one gets α1 ∈ [0,α2).
In terms of a, one can rewrite a as a function of α1 by substituting ψ and τu by equations
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(3.37) and (3.36), and rearranging:
a = (Mτ+γdϕα1)
2(Nτ+γdϕα1)+γ2dσ2W (τθ+τ)(Mτ+γdϕα1)
(Mτ+γdϕα1)2Nτ+γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
Next, one can compute the derivatives of a in terms of α1 as
∂a
∂α1
= (Mτ+γdϕα1)
4Nτ+2γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+γdϕα1)2(Mτ+Nτθ)+γ4dσ4W τ(τθ+τ)(Mτ+Nτθ)[
(Mτ+γdϕα1)2Nτ+γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
]2
+ γ
2
dσ
2
W (N −M)τ2(Mτ+γdϕα1)(Mτ+2Nτθ−γdϕα1)[
(Mτ+γdϕα1)2Nτ+γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
]2
> 0.
Moreover, the values at the two bounds:
lim
α1→0
a = M
2Nτ3 +Mγ2dσ2W τ(τθ+τ)
M2Nτ3 +γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
< 1,
lim
α1→+∞
a = +∞,
where the inequality above inequality follows from M <N . So, one gets that a is a monotoni-
cally increasing function of α1 and a ∈ ( M
2Nτ3+Mγ2dσ2W τ(τθ+τ)
M2Nτ3+γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
,+∞)
Since α1(a) is monotonically decreasing on a and α1 ∈ [0,α2), a(α1) is monotonically in-
creasing on α1 and a ∈ ( M
2Nτ3+Mγ2dσ2W τ(τθ+τ)
M2Nτ3+γ2dσ2W τ(Mτ+Nτθ)
,+∞), by the ﬁxed point theorem, there exists
one unique solution (α∗1 ,a
∗) to the problem
{
a(α1)= a
α1(a)=α1
as demonstrated in ﬁgure(C.3).
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Figure C.3 – The curves of α1(a) and a(α1)
Step 4: prove that 0<α∗1 ≤α2 and 0< a∗ < 1
First, it’s obvious that α∗1 > 0, we only need to prove that α∗1 ≤α2. Suppose that α∗1 >α2, then
a(α∗1 )> a(α2), since a is an increasing function of α1. Note that when α1 =α2, we have β1 = 1
by equation(3.47), which implies that a+ b(1−a)
γdσ
2

= 1. Further, we get that either a = 1, or a 	= 1
and b = γdσ2 . But neither of the solution is consistent with the properties ofα1 and a function.
On one hand, if a = 1, then a(α∗1 )> a(α2)= 1, which is contrary to a∗ ≤ 1. On the other hand,
if b = γdσ2 , then a < 0 by the equation (3.39), which is also contrary to a > 0. So α∗1 ≤α2.
Next, we prove that a∗ < 1. Assuming a∗ ≥ 1, then we should have α1(a∗)≤α1(1)= 0, which is
contrary to α∗1 > 0. So a∗ < 1. As in the equilibrium, 0<α1 <α2, one could get that 0<β1 < 1
since α1 = (1−β1)α2.
Last, we verify that the second order condition of the maximization problem (3.45) is satisﬁed
when κ< 12 :
−(2β2+γIσ2)=−
( κ
1−2κγIσ
2
 +γIσ2
)
=− 1−κ
1−2κγIσ
2
 < 0
The fact that Lemma 2 is applicable in order to derive the dealers’ quoting strategies is proved
as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Step 5: Show the equilibrium does not exist when κ≥ 12
First, when κ= 12 , one has α1 = 0, α2 = 0 and β2 =+∞ from equation (C.24), (C.25) and (C.23).
That is, the investor does not trade, and the price is not deﬁned since P (xi )=∞. Thus, the
equilibrium does not exist.
Second, when κ > 12 , one has β2 < 0, and the second order condition of the optimization
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problem (3.45):
−(2β2+γIσ2)=−
( κ
1−2κγIσ
2
 +γIσ2
)
=− 1−κ
1−2κγIσ
2
 > 0.
This means that the investor’s maximization problem does not have a solution and the equi-
librium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 8. Claim 1: investors prefer to trade on the platform as σ2
δ
→ 0.
Equation (3.29) implies that each investor’s ex-ante proﬁts go to zero in the centralized market
if σδ → 0. Proposition 7 states that an equilibrium exists if κ < 12 . All that is left to show is
that expected proﬁts for each investor remain strictly positive as σ2
δ
→ 0. This can be seen
as follows. From the deﬁnition of the investors’ utility (3.2), the dealers expected quotes
conditional on a response on the platform (3.44) and the investors’ equilibrium strategy (3.30)
one obtains the following expression for the expected proﬁt πi of an investor trying to trade
on the platform:
πi = (1− (1−q)M )E
[
(α1θ+α2δi )
(
θ+δ−β1θ− (α1θ+α2δi )
(
γIσ
2
ε
2
+β2
))]
. (C.29)
As σ2
δ
→ 0, one obtains from (C.29) that
πi → (1− (1−q)M )α1σ2θ
[
(1−β1)−α1
(
γiσ
2
ε
2
+β2
)]
= (1− (1−q)M )α1σ2θ
[
(1−β1)−α1 1
2α2
]
= (1− (1−q)M )α1σ2θ
[
(1−β1)− 1−β1
2
]
> 0,
where the second line follows from the expressions for β1 and α2 in (C.24) and (C.27). The
third line follows from the expressions for α1,α2 in (3.47) and (3.48). The inequality follows
from α1 > 0 and (C.26), which implies β1 < 1, since b < 0 and a < 1 by the proof of Proposition
7. This proves the ﬁrst claim.
Claim 2: investors prefer to trade in the centralized market as σ2
δ
→∞.
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Computing the expectation in (C.29) gives
πi = (1−(1−q)M )
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩α1σ
2
θ
[
(1−β1)−α1
(
γiσ
2
ε
2
+β2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+α2σ2δ
[
1−α2
(
γiσ
2
ε
2
+β2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭ (C.30)
In the(C.30), A is not affected by σ2
δ
. Using the expressions for β1 and α2 in (C.24) and (C.27),
one gets
B = 1−2κ
1−κ
σ2
δ
2γIσ2ε
= 1−2κ
1−κ π
c
i , (C.31)
where πci is the expected proﬁt of the investor in the centralized market as deﬁned in (3.29). It
trivially follows that πci →∞ as σ2δ→∞. Therefore, it follows that
lim
σ2
δ
→∞
πi
πci
= lim
σ2
δ
→∞
(1− (1−q)M ) A+
1−2κ
1−κ π
c
i
πci
= (1− (1−q)M )1−2κ
1−κ < 1,
because of our assumption κ> 0. Therefore, investors will have a higher expected payoff in
the centralized market as σ2
δ
→∞.
Proof of Proposition 9. We will show that the term denoted by A in (C.30) goes to zero as
μ→∞. Then it follows from (C.31) and κ> 0 that πi <πci as μ→∞, with πi <πci deﬁned as in
(C.29) and (3.29).
In order to show A → 0 as mu →∞, it is sufﬁcient to show that α1 → 0 as mu →∞, since β2 is
by (C.27) unaffected by μ and β1 is by (C.26) between zero and one.
We show In order to show A → 0 as mu →∞ as follows. Deﬁne the function a(·) as in the proof
of Proposition 7. It has been shown in the proof of Proposition 7 that α1 > 0 for any μ> 0 must
hold in equilibrium. For any ﬁxed α1 > 0, one has a(α1) →∞ for μ→∞. The equilibrium
condition a(α1)= a < 1 can only hold if α1 → 0 for μ→∞ (since a(·) is monotone increasing
with limα1a(α1) ∈ (0,1)). This proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 10. Using (C.30), (C.31) and (3.29), one gets
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lim
q→1(πi −π
c
i )= limq→1 A,
where A is deﬁned as in (C.30). We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 8:
lim
q→1 A = limq→1α1σ
2
θ
[
(1−β1)−α1
(
γiσ
2
ε
2
+β2
)]
= lim
q→1α1σ
2
θ
[
(1−β1)−α1 1
2α2
]
= lim
q→1α1σ
2
θ
[
(1−β1)− 1−β1
2
]
> 0,
where the second line follows from the expressions for β1 and α2 in (C.24) and (C.27). The
third line follows from the expressions for α1,α2 in (3.47) and (3.48). The inequality follows
from α1 > 0 and (C.26), which implies β1 < 1 as q → 1, since b < 0 and a < 1 by the proof of
Proposition 7.
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